Interview with William Clark Jr.

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM CLARK, JR.

Interviewed by: Thomas Stern

Initial interview date: January 11, 1994

Q: Let me start with the usual question. tell us a little about your background and education and how you came to the foreign affairs community.

CLARK: I took a slightly convoluted route, which actually may have been quite similar to that of my Foreign Service colleagues. I was born in California; I grew up in Hayward, a town outside of San Francisco. While growing up, I met and made friends with a number of Nisei, who were taken to resettlement centers during World War II. After graduating from Hayward Union high school, I went to what was then known as San Jose State University. I might note that the high school no longer exists because unfortunately it had been located on the Hayward fault—an off-shoot of the San Andreas fault. Because of its shaky location, it was torn down as a potential unsafe building. On that empty lot, the city put a civic center, which pleased the real estate community if no one else.

In keeping with my father's wishes I enrolled in a pre-med course, which was entirely satisfactory. It became clear to me that I would probably not become a doctor, but what was not clear was were my future laid. Fortunately, at the time, there existed a program which allowed people to join the Navy for a year. I enlisted in that l in 1948 looking for a year's travel or diversion, in any case. After boot camp, the Navy sent me to electronics

school for the whole year. I was discharged at Treasure island a year after entering the service, not having been further away from home than twenty miles. I returned to San Jose State. This time, influenced to a degree by a mother who thought it might be nice to have a scientist for a son, I decided to become a chemistry major with a math minor.

Then came the Korean “police action”. I was recalled by the Navy as a technician and spent almost two years in Hawaii, working on communications gear as an electronic technician. This tour gave me the opportunity to review my academic career to date. I found that although I had started as a pre-med and then took chemistry and math, all my electives were in economics and political science. So, when I returned once again to San Jose State, I became a social science major, despite the family chorus of “What are going to do with it?”.

I finally graduated in 1955 with a BA in Social Sciences. I missed the Foreign Service entrance exam that year because after graduation, I went to Hartford, Conn. as a trainee for Travelers' Insurance Company. I was placed in the group insurance division as consultant, not a salesman. It was distinction without a difference. I was sent by the Company to Los Angeles where I finally caught up with the Foreign Service exam. I had known about the Foreign Service and its entrance exam for quite a while. While at University, I had gone to the Post Office to get the prerequisite employment forms. Unfortunately, that Post Office had never heard of the Foreign Service. By the time, it found out about it, it was too late for filing. So I looked for another opportunity after landing in Los Angeles. The Department actually sent a recruitment team to Los Angeles which found space not far from my office. I paid them a visit and told the head of the team that what I really wanted to do was to enter the Foreign Service Staff Corps and then later entered the Foreign Service Officer Corps through lateral entry. I added that I had a good job and that I wasn't interested, but I would take the exam if he would give me the necessary forms. He said that no one ever passed the test, but I persevered. So he gave me the application forms and I took the test with about 1,000 others, most of whom raised their hands when asked who had taken the test before. I passed the written, which had just

recently become a one-day test, mostly multiple choice, on the first attempt and then took the orals in Los Angeles, which I also managed to pass.

I had taken some psychologist courses while at the University, so that I recognized quickly the “good guy, bad guy” composition of the oral exam panel. So the orals went fairly well. I also had a security interview on Los Angeles in an office near mine, which was right on Pershing Square. The security man asked whether I liked boys or girls and I admitted that I preferred girls. Later in the interview, he asked the same question and got the same answer. When he asked the same question for the third time, I became a little testy. He said that he was under instructions to conduct the interview in that manner. Being from California, I said: “That must be because there are a lot in the State”. His immediate response was: “Yes, but we are trying to weed them out!”. He obviously had misunderstood my reference. I was referring to the State of California; he was referring to the Department of State.

After all the checks were completed, I was sworn into the Foreign Service in February, 1957. None of my friends, either from San Jose or from after graduation, took the exam. So I didn't know any of the applicants or any of my junior Foreign Service Officer colleagues.

We—I was already married to Judith—came to Washington and took a very nice apartment in Southwest, only to find that we were living a considerable distance away from our colleagues. I began taking the orientation course at FSI, which was then located where New State now is. My class consisted of a fairly diverse group of more than 30 people. It included four women, one black—Ron Palmer, who has been a friend ever since—who was one of the younger members of the class. The Department had at the time an age ceiling for entrance to the Foreign Service; I think it was thirty-two. The average age of the class was 27, which is roughly the average age of today's entering class. The white males were graduates of many different universities and colleges. It was at a time when the Department was expanding to some degree which explains the rather large size of the

class; the incoming classes then were certainly larger than today's. We had representation from the South, California—there were four or five of us from there. The Ivy League was represented, but it was not an overwhelming number.

The A-100 course was then six weeks long. But before going overseas, the student returned to take a consular course. So, if I remember correctly, the entering course was broken up in two sections. The first part was a general introduction to the Foreign Service and the Department of State. We had a few representatives of other agencies talk to us, but it was very few, as I recall it. I found it a very useful course, especially for someone like myself who knew absolutely nothing about Washington or the Foreign Service. I knew roughly what people did overseas, but certainly not in much detail. I had never known any American Foreign Service people, but my father was a member of the Canadian legion and through him I had met some British consuls. But I was totally unfamiliar with the State Department and the Foreign Service. The A-100 course was good one because it provided us with some familiarity with our future career. The course director was an old China hand and his boss was a hard charger. The course was well done. We went out to Front Royal for a week of “togetherness”. It may have been modeled after the British “weekend house party”. It gave each of us an opportunity to explore our own behavior and to do different things. My poker game improved during that week, although by this time, I knew that game pretty well.

I was assigned to the International Educational Exchange Service (IEES), headed by Manny Esposito. It was an office in the Bureau for Cultural Affairs. But since the office was located near K and 18th Street—far from the Department—, we really never had much contact with the rest of the Bureau. I was supposed to be the junior officer in the Liaison Office, which was IEES' “external affairs” office. I actually ended up in a GS-15 position which the Department had never been able to fill. I became a follow-up specialist, which required me to keep in contact with foreign people who had completed their Fulbright exchange program period in the United States. We would also keep in touch with Japanese people who had come to the US under the GARIOA program. We would

send them periodicals in their field of interest—i.e. policemen would get police journals. I tried to keep in touch with those we had brought to the U.S. The maintenance of personal contacts was done by people at our overseas posts. At the time, USIA had a newsletter called “Pacific Bridge” which we sent to the graduates of the exchange program. This follow-up program came into being because the Department had come to the realization that it was losing contact with those it had brought to the United States under an exchange program. So it mounted an effort to stay in touch, to see what the exchangees did after their return to their home countries, how they interacted in their own society after contact with American society; we were interested to see whether the exchange program was having any impact.

This follow-up program was relatively new. I had a woman for a boss—Virginia Geiger. We had a man who was a specialist for “English a second language”. There was a woman from USIA. It was supposed to be a four-officers office including one for a junior officer as a “gofer”. While I was there, only two of the senior positions were filled. So I never really did function as a “gofer”. I stayed in that office until I went overseas two years later.

I should mention that like many of my colleagues, I took early morning language class of FSI. I was studying German and I finally qualified in that language. In those days, the officer had to qualify in one foreign language or he/she would not have passed the probationary period.

As I said earlier, before new officers were sent overseas, they were required in those days to take another six weeks at FSI to become as familiar as possible with consular affairs. I attended that part of the course. I had, some months before departure, been told that I had been assigned to Sierra Leone. My first reaction was :”Where?”. My second reaction was to point out that the US government didn't have an establishment there. I was told that there would be a post in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. The U.S. government had decided to open a post in Freetown because all of Africa was moving in the direction of independence and it was assumed that Sierra Leone, sooner or later,

would join in with the group of independent nations. When my assignment was made and even when we arrived, Sierra Leone was still a British colony and therefore our post was a Consulate. Sierra Leone became independent just before I left in 1961. Though a Consulate, Freetown was an independent reporting post. Our despatches went directly to Washington. We did not report to London.

Actually, I had requested an assignment to Africa, but it was “North Africa” that interested me. The Department said that Sierra Leone was as close as it could get to North Africa. Of course, my first choice was a German-language speaking post on the grounds that I might as well use what I had worked so hard to learn. I wanted to improve my German language skill, which I have never been able to. Nor have I ever been assigned to a post where German was at all useful. My second choice was North Africa because I had become interested in the Middle East and the Arab world. My third choice was Portugal, which I always put on my wish list because I had become convinced that no one ever got assigned to Portugal. That turned out to be also true, at least for me. So I learned very early about the assignment process. Of the three choices I gave the Department, it picked Africa from the my request for “North Africa”. As I said, I never used my German or never got to Portugal.

My friendly personnel counselor was my idea of what a career officer should look like. He had a little gray brush moustache; he wore a three piece suit; he sat very upright behind his desk. After I heard of my assignment, he summoned me for a counseling session. He gave me a canned speech on how Personnel had been following my career with great interest. He said he knew that I had been studying German and that he was sure that I would be assigned to a German speaking post. I let the gentleman go through his prattle without interruption. Then I said: “That is very interesting, but I have been told that I have been assigned to Freetown, Sierra Leone. I understand that Sierra Leone is a British colony and I don't think that German is used there”. The counselor sat up ever more erect and said: “You mean you knew this all the time and you let me go through my

presentation?”. I admitted that was so. He then dismissed me curtly. It was the last time that I ever saw a career counselor!.

After having looked at a map of Africa and having located Freetown, I had to announce to my bride that the Department had made a decision about our immediate future. She took it like a good soldier. Then I met Herbert “Tom” Reiner, the senior officer who had been assigned to Freetown as well. It was at the beginning just a two-man post. I was enthusiastic about the assignment and looked forward to opening a new post. I also read Graham Greene's “The Heart of the Matter” which set my mind somewhat more at ease because it showed that one could survive despite the somewhat primitive conditions. There was a little more information, but Greene's book was the most extensive description I could find of Freetown.

Reiner had done the basic survey work. So he was somewhat familiar with Freetown. He had been the administrative officer at our Embassy in Monrovia. After making the survey, the Department decided to appoint him as Counsel. On our way to Sierra Leone, we stopped in Monrovia for two months, making preparations for opening of the new post. In Monrovia, I learned another valuable lesson. The hotel in which we were staying cost more than our per diem.

As could be expected, we didn't have an office in Sierra Leone, much less living quarters. Tom had recommended that we not move to Freetown until at least some office space had been rented. That was alright. I helped out a little with the consular work in Monrovia. I also had time to read parts of the Foreign Service Manual which had been sent to Monrovia, but had arrived in such condition that I had to re-assemble it all. Because I was to be assigned to a new post, not only did I receive the basic consular course at FSI, but I was also given a one day crash course on the duties and responsibilities of a Class-C cashier. Fortunately, once Freetown was opened, we were “fiscally serviced” by Monrovia. in those days, a post could survive with authorization to draw up to $ 2,000.

When we arrived in Freetown in 1959, we found three rooms in the second best hotel in town. The best hotel, The City Hotel, wasn't much, so you can imagine what The Riviera was like. The first floor was occupied by a Lebanese merchant. The second floor was a bar-restaurant and a couple of rooms. There were more rooms on the third floor. The hotel was used for a variety of purposes: eating and business—of all sorts. We leased part of the building, but had not refurbished it. Judith and I had one room, Tom had a second one and the room in between us became the office. We had some furniture and some was on its way still. Later, we moved the offices to a building right across from the Colonial Secretariat, which was very convenient.

What little supervision we received came from Washington. Our efficiency and reviewing reports were written by a Washington office in the Bureau of African Affairs. Occasionally, we would contact London for assistance, but that was very rare.

Our responsibility was primarily to initiate and maintain contact with the local leadership. We did some consular work, but not much. After Tom and I had been there for a few months, USIA opened an office. That placed an administrative work-load on us because we had to contract for and prepare for the opening of that office. Later on, we had to do the same thing when the assistance agency decided to open an office in Freetown. I don't remember us ever being asked about the assignment of USIA or assistance personnel, but I am sure that Tom would have supported such expansion. Tom had some minor difficulties with these new personnel; I also was concerned a little because I was the General Services officer and a lot of the work fell on me. The Consulate had a jeep and a Ford Fairlane. USIA sent a Plymouth for its representative. In those days, Plymouths had huge tailfins which made the car seem humongous particularly on Sierra Leone roads. When the assistance man came, he had a Chevy Impala, which was a bigger and better model than our other cars. This about the time when the Department was in one of its “budgetary reductions” phases. So it sent us a Nash as the official car, which was much smaller, of course, than the “official” cars of the other agencies.

As you can see, I did a lot of administrative work while in Freetown. Fortunately Tom Reiner was an old administrative hand and I learned a lot from him. When I first arrived, I was also the communicator and learned how to use a “one time” pad. In addition, I had the opportunity to do some contact work, primarily with the military, consisting of 1 2,500 men army. The men were commanded by British officers, seconded to Sierra Leone for that purpose. They were usually raised in rank a couple of notches for this duty. A number of the British officers in Freetown had been formerly part of the British Indian Army and had to be reassigned after Indian independence. They never stopped talking about “the good old days”.

I did some economic reporting, focusing on investment opportunities. A trade mission came out and I wrote their report. We kept looking for American business opportunities in this rather small corner of Africa. We found some, which looked big to us, but were probably small in the eyes of an American entrepreneur.

The post grew in the two years I was there, not only with other agencies, but with additional Foreign Service people. First came an economic officer, who was brand new to the Service and had been employed for this particular task after having worked for an oil company in India. We taught him about economic reporting. Then came a communications clerk, followed by an administrative officer. The addition of those two people essentially made us administratively independent from Monrovia. Then a junior officer was assigned to Freetown and a secretary. So when Sierra Leone became independent, there were seven Americans in the Consulate. The US presence was already multi-agency and the elevation of the Consulate to an Embassy went very smoothly. I had the pleasure of welcoming A. Carnahan who was our first Ambassador in Sierra Leone in mid-1961, just before I departed for my next assignment.

You have to remember that the late '50s and early '60s was the time of the African “boom” in the US government. People were volunteering to go to Africa to become acquainted with a rapidly emerging part of the world. We were right in establishing and later expanding

our presence in Sierra Leone. Africa did appear to be coming into its own and important to the United States. Even when Sierra Leone became independent, our presence was relatively modest and I think justified. It was a country which was close to Guinea and Sekou Toure, who had invited Chinese and Russians to his country as “advisors”. That gave Sierra Leone a security importance.

Furthermore, Liberia was on the south and that country became somewhat unstable after Taubman's death and the military coup. It was useful to the US to have representation in Sierra Leone, a stable, even if later a somewhat corrupt, democracy.

Sierra Leone was a nice, little country. The British had done a fair job during the colonial period. Freetown was a city of about 80,000 out of about 2 million in the country. The country was not rich, but certainly not poor by African standards. It is a lot poorer today than it was then. The farmers were mostly subsistence farmers. It had diamonds, bauxite, piassava—the big bristles in heavy-duty street sweepers.

At one point, Sierra Leone threatened to cut off all supplies of piassava which might have meant a lot of dirty streets in the U.S. They never carried out their threat.

The hotel were we stayed first was not much, as I noted earlier. But we contracted for housing soon after our arrival. The Consul got a decent house. We rented a house that had been built by a doctor. There were some Lebanese and local entrepreneurs who were building housing on speculation. While not the greatest, these houses were comfortable. Our house was a two bedroom with an inside garage. The bedroom was air-conditioned. That raised one small disagreement with the Consul. He didn't believe in screens. Of course, his house was fully air-conditioned so that the issue of screens didn't arise. For the rest of us, the bugs flew in and the bugs flew out. I thought we could do better and argued for the purchase of screens. Later, the US government built some housing on Hill Station which was the area occupied by the British. I argued against it, but after I left, we were

given some land by the government; so we built some apartments there. Eventually, we over-built and then had to rent some of the apartments.

We got our food from the local economy—for example, the Patterson-Bizet Department store-. The Swiss had a cold storage operation which sold fish and meats. We considered ourselves well taken care of because some of our colleagues, for example in Conakry, would drive to Freetown to purchase some of their food supplies. That drive was not easy—about 200 miles over some well worn roads. They would drive down to buy flour and potatoes. So living in Freetown, particularly when compared to other places, was comfortable.

We maintained contact with the British. It was a curious situation. I could invite to our house British people who had not met each other even though they lived in the same town. There were essentially three British groups: business, civil servants and military. The latter two mixed to some degree, but the business community did not mingle with the government people. We brought them together and we also mixed in Sierra Leoneans as well. So the American homes became a sort of meeting ground for the different groups in Sierra Leone. The bar at the hotel was also a meeting ground.

The British ran Sierra Leone with a very light hand. The West Coast was different from the East Coast. It did not have any good farming land, which kept large landowners away. So when the decision to make Sierra Leone independent, there wasn't any resistance from large land owners. Those Britishers who didn't want to stay just packed up and went home; they had no earthly goods that they couldn't take with them. That is a major reason why the transition to independence went so smoothly. In addition, as I said, the British gave the Sierra Leoneans considerable leeway in the management of their affairs which built a base of civil servants able to manage the country once it gained independence. Most of the British business community stayed; it continued to manage the diamond concessions which, although owned by Sierra leone, was run out by London's diamond industry, which itself was under the control of De Beers of South Africa.

The British permitted the development of local political parties. Sierra Leone was filled with people who had originally lost one tribal war or another. When I say “indigenous”, that means about 108 tribes, most of whom originally had come from some other part of Africa. The two largest tribes were the Timnie and the Mende. The traders were essentially Muslims who had migrated from Guinea, but had businesses all along the Western coast. The country was deficient in farming land, as I have mentioned; it was covered in part by rain forests—we had 200 inches of rain per annum. So the farmers had to move very couple of years to grow such crops as piassava because the land was leeched by the growth.

In addition there was a community of Creoles who were primarily returned slaves, either having fled the Americas or who had been on slave ships which the British Navy had intercepted and brought back to Africa by releasing them in Sierra Leone. There were some who had participated in the Cameroon rebellion in the Caribbean and been brought back and left in Sierra Leone. The word “Creole” was applied to a mixed population who spoke an English dialect of their own. That patois gave me fits; before leaving Washington, I was convinced that my English would suffice. Unfortunately, the dialect consisted of large words you wouldn't expect and small words you couldn't find. I could not understand it, even after hearing it for two years. The common greeting was “How the boddy?” and the answer was “Tanga the boddy fine”. It was fun to greet some Creoles that way in the morning, but I decided quickly not to become a teacher to some of my colleagues. Some of our employees did not speak English very well. The clerks spoke pretty good English. The drivers and maintenance did not. The Sierra Leoneans who spoke good English would not have worked for the wages we were paying.

The Creoles were based primarily in Freetown. The other people had a more country-wide base. They were split between conservatives and socialist. Sierra Leone had essentially a two party system, although other small parties did exist. Each party had its

own newspaper, most of which were small. The Daily Mail was the largest newspaper. All of this political activity created a solid base to build on after independence.

Sierra Leone had the first University on the West Coast of Africa, known then as Fourah University and now as the University of Sierra Leone. It became the basic training school for African civil servants for all British colonies on the coast. So a lot of Sierra Leoneans were working in Lagos, Ghana and other colonies. The Sierra Leoneans were in general a well educated group. A lot of the well do to professionals in Sierra Leone sent their kids to schools in the U.K. Many of those, upon returning to Sierra Leone, went to work as civil servants. Their social status was somewhat between British and indigenous people. They were paid better than people not trained in the U.K. and were granted “home leave” which meant that the British government paid their transportation to the U.K., although they were Sierra Leoneans. So in Freetown, there were three status levels.

We also had in Sierra Leone a heavy missionary presence. They came mostly from the US, Ireland and Germany. The Americans were Protestants; the Irish were, of course, Catholics. The American missionary movement had sort of divided Africa among its various sects. In Sierra Leone, one found some fundamentalist missionaries. If you stayed with them, you had to sign a statement first that you didn't have any tobacco or strong spirits—either with you or within you. So I always stayed with the Catholics.

Q: You have already mentioned that the transition to independence went smoothly. How else do you remember the emergence of independence?

CLARK: As I mentioned, the political system had been fairly well developed under the British colonial rule. Even before independence, Sierra Leone had an elected Parliament. The Creoles were never a real force; there weren't enough of them to have any power. They divided themselves between two parties. The conservative party was run by Doctor Sir Albert Margai—who had been knighted—, who was the first non-Creole Sierra Leonean trained in Western medicine. He had achieved that primarily with missionary support.

Margai's opposition was a quasi-socialist party headed by Siaka Stevens. He was a friend of Sekou Toure and saw himself as a revolutionary which was so fashionable at the time. That point of view earned him a jail sentence, meted out by Margai and friends, just before independence. He stayed in jail until after independence and until the Margai government had established itself. Siaka Stevens later become known as one of the more corrupt politicians in Sierra Leone. He took over the government and was its head for many years although his performance did not turn out very well.

The judiciary was already well established and independent before the British withdrawal. That was just another indicator of the pretty good job the British had done in Sierra Leone to prepare it for independence. The justice system was of course heavily influenced by the British tradition. Even in most sweltering summer heat, the judges and barristers would wear robes and wigs. Some of the judges had been brought to Sierra Leone by the British colonial service from other parts of the Empire. For example, in Sierra Leone, I met the first Tamil that I have ever encountered. He had lived in Ceylon, but saw no prospects for the Singhalese to ease their repressions of his people and therefore he joined the colonial service and ended up in Freetown as a judge.

When we first arrived in Freetown, the French and the Liberians were the only other governments that had representation there. But the US was unique in that it was the only country that had a career Vice-Consul—me— as part of its representation. The French had an older officer, Pierre Coffe, as a Vice Consul, but had never accredited him to Sierra Leone. He was one of only 12 Africans that had been recruited by the French Foreign Service. He was a native of the Ivory Coast and had been assigned to Freetown primarily to watch the Guineans and to monitor what their leader Toure might be planning. I got to know Pierre; he had a very nice French wife. One day he came to see me to tell me that he was about to leave the French and go to work for his native government's foreign service. He told me that he had been given the choice of two assignments: ambassador to Rome or ambassador to Monrovia. When I asked him which he would chose, he surprised

me and said that he would go to Monrovia. He said that he was new to the ambassadorial game and therefore would undoubtedly make some mistakes. He preferred to make them in Monrovia than in Rome. He spent seven years in Monrovia because Taubman, the President of Liberia, liked him so much he wouldn't let the Ivory Coast transfer him. After Taubman's assassination, Pierre was assigned to Tokyo as ambassador where our paths crossed again. There, he became the Dean of the Corps for years and years. It is a small world!

The transition to independence provided me some insights that I found useful later on. I was impressed by the manner in which the British handled the change over, which was done at midnight. We were all in the stadium; the British flag was flying. At midnight, the lights were turned off for a few seconds. When they came on again, the Sierra Leone flag was flying where the British one had been. No fanfare, no military honors, no departing troops. No trauma, no histrionics. Effectively understated!

I don't think that the British had made a conscious decision to nurture their colony until it was ready to fly on its own. Sierra Leone had always been relatively prosperous and lacked any major independence movements, unlike some of neighboring countries. It did have a university in Sierra Leone which was unique for that part of the world. So the civil service had a base for recruitment, although it was run by the British. Later, of course, it became primarily a Sierra Leonean staffed civil service, but it never had the independence fervor that infested the services of other African colonies and countries. The stability of Sierra Leone was also assisted by the diversity of the groups that lived there. There were many small tribes and groups which made it every difficult to coalesce enough people behind any one major drive. It would have been very difficult to pull off a rebellion, for example.

On the other hand, even if the British had not made a conscious decision to lead Sierra Leone to independence, they could read the hand writing on the wall from all that was happening around other parts of Africa. The British probably made a conscious decision

not to stop the movement to independence. We went through Conakry on the way to Freetown. It was just after the Guineans had voted “NO” to the De Gaulle's “French” options. They were the only ones of the former French colonies to have voted that way. The British undoubtedly learned from that. Also Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was pressing very hard independence and Sierra Leone just followed in his footsteps. The British let it happened; they did not try to stop the march towards independence. That made for a successful transition, unlike what happened in some of the neighbor in countries.

Independence came late in April 1961 and I left in June, just a few weeks later. Because of that, I was the only one in the Embassy who was not going to serve with the new Ambassador, A.S.J. Carnahan. I stayed at the Chancery while the rest of the staff went to the docks to meet the launch on which the Ambassador was arriving. That is the way people had to come into Freetown because the airport was twelve miles on the other side of the arbor. One would have had to drive 120 miles from the airport to get to Freetown if you went overland. So people took launches which ran back and forth across the harbor. Originally, when we opened the post, I was asked whether we wanted to have our own launch. I decided that I had enough problems and gently refused the offer. The Embassy later got one and I have heard a story about that, which I have never checked for accuracy. As I understand it, the administrative officer recruited two of the Embassy's maintenance men to become seamen. On the maiden voyage, which had the ambassador on board, one of the new seamen was stationed on the boat and one on the landing dock. At the appropriate moment, the one on the boat threw the line to the man on the dock as he had been taught. The dock man tied it securely to the pier as he had been instructed. Unfortunately, the man on the boat had not been told that had had to tie his end to the boat. Therefore, the launch ran right under the pier and the maiden voyage was a “smash” success.

In any case, in my days, the Embassy did not have its own launch. The staff went to meet the new ambassador at the dock. I stayed at the Chancery to answer phone calls. One came in from the US for Mr. Carnahan. It was to let him know that his brother had taken

seriously ill. So I met the Ambassador with that news and asked him to call home. I left the next morning and never saw the Ambassador except for that one meeting in the hallway to pass on the bad news.

Q: In June, 1961, you left Sierra Leone and were transferred to Japan. How did that come about?

CLARK: In those days, ever April 1—April Fool's Day—a Foreign Service employee was asked to submit a list of three assignment preferences. When it came time to think about another assignment, I sent in my request, listing a German speaking post as my first choice, Japan as my second and the old standby—Portugal—as my third. I told the Department that the Japan assignment was however dependent on getting some language training first. I thought that was rather daring for me not being known as one of the world's great language students.

Japan seemed potentially interesting for a number of reasons. As I mentioned before, I had been brought up in California and had had some Nisei friends. I had served with the Navy in Hawaii. So the Pacific was not an unknown to me. Japan was well on its way to recovery from World War II. It was going to host the Olympic games in 1964. So it was becoming well known around the world and I thought it would be an interesting place in which to serve. A few weeks after having submitted my wish list, I got a nice letter from the Department informing me that I had been selected for language training for six months after which I was to be assigned to Yokohama as a consular officer. I did not know anyone in the East Asia Bureau or in Japan nor did I have any academic background in the country or even the area. I had no help in getting this assignment; it came out of the clear blue sky.

So I went to Tokyo for six months of language training. At the time, the language school had a policy requiring all wives to take 100 hours of Japanese, but no more. Judith first took the 100 hours and then clamored to have the policy changed. It was and she then

took more than half as much language training as I did. The wives' training policy was dropped also because some of the wives weren't interested in taking even the 100 hours.

I had been assigned to language school only for six months as sort of a probationary assignment I had never been to Japan and neither I nor the Department had any way of judging how well we might navigate there. The plan was that if I and the Department were satisfied that Japan was the right place for me, I would have gone to Yokohama for a year or so and then returned to the language school to finish that course, That was fair enough.

One of my colleagues at the school was Gordon Beyer, who had been a Marine officer in Japan previously. He later became one of our ambassadors in Africa. But because he had had Japanese experience, his language assignment was for two years. As it happened, Beyer found Japan a different place for a young Foreign Service officer with two small children than it had been for a single Marine officer. He also was not very adapt at learning the language. So I found that I liked the language; he didn't. We both wrote letters to the Department; he asked that his training be shortened to six months and I asked that it be lengthened to two years. The Department honored our requests and Beyer went to Yokohama as a consular officer after six months at the language school.

The language school in Tokyo in 1961 had 22 students—all Americans. The policy to permit non-Americans to attend wasn't instituted until many years later. Since I was going to be in Japan for at least two years, the Department had authorized us to ship all our household effects. We had been told that it was most unlikely that, as a language student, the Embassy would find accommodations for us in its compound. Of course, it did and put us in Perry House, where the quarters were fully furnished. When I asked what to do with our household furniture—fortunately, we didn't have very much—, I was told that the Embassy had no storage space and that therefore finding a home for our goods was my responsibility. Somehow, we managed to jam it all in the small storage area that was assigned to each apartment in the Perry House. When the Department decided to extend my assignment as a language officer to two years, the Embassy sent me a note saying

that I was not entitled to be in government owned quarters and that I would have to find my own private accommodations. I am sure that the Embassy needed our apartment for one of its employees. So I was furious twice: first for having to live in government quarters when we first arrived in Tokyo and then subsequently for being booted out once we had settled in. We ended up renting a house behind Shibuya Station, which we could actually afford because the rent was low enough to be covered by our housing allowance. The house was a one Japanese-style bedroom and den, living room, Japanese-style dining room, kitchen and a maid's room. It had a small garden; it was rather nice. It had been built by a man who built another house right besides it and a third one behind that one for his son. He owned all the property between two streets, which today of course is worth a large fortune. I visited the area recently; our house had been torn down. It was a somewhat strange house. It had a western wing. The living room was 21x21 and had a fifteen foot ceiling. The den was 15x15, also with a fifteen foot ceiling. The maid's room was small. You walked from the western-style living room into the Japanese-style dining room which forced you to lower your head. The bedroom was Japanese, as I said. The kitchen was a traditional kitchen. The bath was Japanese-style—an ofuro. So the house was a real mixture of East and West. It was a very nice house and very convenient to public transportation.

I enjoyed the language school. When we arrived, it was school policy to give the students quarterly exams to monitor progress. If progress had been adequate, then you were given $100 to finance a week's field trip. In those days, you could exist in Japan for a week on $100, including travel expenses. It was a challenge to see how far one could go in Japan on $100. We found that little sum could get you quite far in the country. The school used to bring an outside observer to check the progress of each of the students. I had been at the school just two weeks when I had my first “inspection”. I had learned to say “Good morning” and that was about it. But Judith and I were adventuresome and said that we would like to spend a few days in a Japanese inn in Kyoto. That was interesting. We didn't

know whether breakfast or a bath was being announced or whether it was a fire drill, but we managed to survive; it was good fun.

The school was based on almost a “complete immersion” principle. That is we were supposed to speak only Japanese. But the school was located in Yoyogi Hachiman near the Meiji Shrine. It was next to a US military housing compound, called appropriately Meijimura—or Meiji Village. The compound had its officers' club, a PX, commissary, etc. We used those facilities for shopping so that the immersion was not total. There were never more than two people in one class. The instruction day was four to five hours followed by three hours of self-practice. The classes were drills, the old-fashioned way. We used tapes, lots of tapes although not to the degree they are used today. The school had a couple of reel tape recorders which one could listen to, but it was very primitive compared to today's language school facilities and equipment. Eventually we graduated to conversations. After a few months, the students began to work on writing the Japanese characters—Kanji. The reason the school waited to do that is because it found out that the students became so fascinated by the characters they would never get to speaking the language. It was hard to judge progress if the student only wrote characters.

Even though we lived in the Embassy compound, our social life did not revolve around that community. We of course knew some of the people at the Embassy, but our social life was centered on the school and with the other students. Most of the students were Foreign Service officers, but we had some USIA and CIA personnel there as well. There may have been a couple of military officers as well. The school tried to bring the students into Japanese life. It would program field trips which enabled us to meet Japanese groups. We participated in a mini-exchange program in which we would teach English to some Japanese in return for them teaching us their language. The school put some emphasis on teaching us to navigate in the Japanese community we were living in. It taught us how to introduce ourselves to the sake shop owner and how to make sure that the policeman in the police box knew who you were and where you lived. Japanese do not use street

names or house numbers. So it was very important that someone like the policeman knew where you lived because he could direct your guests to the right place.

Q: Had you stayed at the language school for only six months, how helpful would that have been?

CLARK: It would have been useful. If I had studied Japanese intensively for six months followed by a tour of eighteen months as a visa officer, I probably would have returned to the school to finish up the course. I liked Japan. I didn't want to become “Japanese” as some of the language students have become. They sometimes tend to become more “Japanese” than perhaps even the Japanese; they will view matters through Japanese eyes only. They come to believe that the Japanese can do no wrong. I never let that happen to me, but I have been fascinated by that syndrome. I was never very good at flowering arranging which may explain why I maintained some balance.

Language school brought our linguistic skill up an “average” conversation level; it was certainly not adequate for interpreting purposes. When I attended the school, we would be invited to the Residence for large functions, as I have mentioned. That was essentially because the Embassy did not have sufficient numbers of officers who could converse in Japanese. That was the only times we were involved in Embassy functions; by agreement, on the part of the Embassy and the School, we were not involved in the Embassy community. Our job was to learn Japanese, not to mingle with Americans.

By the end of the two years at the school, I could get by in Japanese, but I was not bilingual by any means. It was suggested that when I finished school, I'd be assigned to Sapporo as the Vice-Consul. Having just served in a two person post, that wasn't particularly appealing. I went to see Owen Zurhellen, then the special assistant to the DCM at the Embassy. He asked why I was reluctant to go to Sapporo. I told him that I had just served in a two person post. Furthermore, I was on a promotion list which would have made me a Consul and there wasn't enough to do in Sapporo for two Consuls. He smiled

and asked whether I'd be interested in Osaka. I told him that that sounded good. What I didn't know was that he was about to transfer to Osaka as the Consul General. So I ended up working for him. Zurhellen, by the way, was one of the best Japanese language officers that the Service had. He had studied during the war and then used it in his assignments.

Let me illustrate why I was not bilingual after two years of language school. When I first reported to duty in Osaka, Zurhellen told me that the Japanese Foreign Minister was coming to Kyoto for United Nations Day. He wanted me to go to hear the Foreign Minister and then to write a report on the speech. Fortunately, the authorities gave out copies of the text because the Foreign Minister was Mr. Shina, originally from the Island of Honshu. He spoke a dialect called Zuzuben which I didn't understand at all. I told Zurhellen that I might have wasted two years in language school. He said not to worry about it. A couple of nights later, we were invited by some local officials to a restaurant where we were served by some young ladies from local tea-houses. One of them sat next to me and I was looking forward to practicing my hard learned Japanese. She started speaking in an Osaka dialect which left me completely dumb-founded. I reported that episode to Zurhellen who again said not to worry about it. He invited me to a dinner at his house where he was going to entertain some senior Japanese businessmen. After dinner, one of the guest, the founding father of Matsushita (Panasonic), spoke to some of the guests who were sitting around. They were CEOs of their companies and were all graduates of Tokyo University. They were salaried. Matsushita owned his company although he had never gotten passed the fourth grade in his school in Osaka. Seeing his audience, he also began to speak in the local dialect. I asked him whether he was trying to do me in. After that episode, I decided I'd better learn some of the local dialect which I did. So the school could never have made its students bilingual because the dialects which you encounter in every part of Japan are so distinct that with rare exceptions, almost all Japanese can fall back into their local dialect leaving other Japanese from other districts almost completely in the dark. Most Japanese will claim that they can understand all dialects, but I think they have troubles with some, if not all of them. All Japanese could understand my standard Japanese, but

I could not understand all dialects. The one that really mystified most Japanese was the Okinawan dialect, which is now dying out. Okinawa is the only place in Japan where I needed an interpreter. He would interpret my Japanese into the local dialect and vice-versa. The Okinawan I was speaking with could not understand Japanese; I could not understand the Okinawan dialect. Because of TV and other interchanges, dialects are being used less and less today. The “official” Japanese language is basically the Tokyo dialect.

As I said, in 1963, we were assigned to Osaka. I was there as an economic officer, principally to follow the textile industry. I became an economic officer because that happened to be the vacancy then available. I think the “cone” concept was developed while I was in Osaka and because of my assignment, I became an “economic” officer in the Foreign Service system. My degree, eight years earlier, was in social sciences and that meant that I had split my courses between economics and political science. So I had some academic acquaintance with the “dismal science”. The Consulate General in 1963 was quite large—much larger than it is now. It two offices—one in Kobe and one in Osaka. It covered several prefectures in the southern part of Honshu and all of Shikoku. We also had establishments in Nagoya and Fukuoka. We must have had twenty Americans in the CG. There were also USIA offices in Kobe, Osaka and Kyoto as well as some CIA representation.

Osaka was the center of Japan's textile industry, primarily cotton. The Spinners' Association was headquartered in Osaka and so was the Cotton Traders Association. The latter represented the cotton buyers whose purchases were spun by the members of the Spinners' Association. I learned to become a diplomat. In the morning, I would go to the Spinners and urge them to reduce the amount of textiles they were exporting to the United States; in the afternoon, I would go to Traders and urge them to increase their purchases of cotton in the United States. Being able to do both with equal fervor made for a good diplomat.

Even in 1963, we had concern about trade with Japan, particularly in the textile areas. We still had a trade surplus in Japan, but in the cotton area, we had to push for greater sales because we were still growing more in the US then the world was using. It was just being warehoused and we were instructed to sell as much as we could possibly do. Before I was assigned to Osaka, the continuing large amounts of textile exports to the US finally required that a treaty be negotiated between the two countries. That first agreement was rather simple compared with the current multi-fiber agreement; it only covered cotton textiles, for example.

I monitored other goods as well. I used to go to Tokyo to talk to the baseball gloves manufacturers. I would ask them also to restrain their exports to the US. I made that pitch until Spaulding stopped manufacturing gloves in the US; then we didn't care about Japanese production and exports. We needed the Japanese to make the goods needed to play our national game! I also followed the steel industry. Sumitomo Metal Company had a continuous metal casting process which I believe they had bought from the Soviet Union. There were three different casting processes in the world at the time. It took me two months to convince the Japanese that I wasn't an engineer who would make detailed reports to their American competitors. Finally, the company agreed to give me a tour of the mill which I found very interesting. For several years thereafter, I used to ask American manufacturers why we didn't use a continuing casting process. They said they had other means which were easier to use. They may have been easier but they were not as efficient and cheap. It has now changed, but it took a long time for the American manufacturers to catch up. So I became interested in a number of commercial enterprises on which I used to report regularly.

By 1963, Japan had recovered to a considerable extent from the War. There were some areas which still bore the scars, like the area in front of the main railroad station in Osaka. In that area where some flimsy building all occupied by squatters. They were booksellers who wouldn't move and the government couldn't figure out how to get them out. If a fire

burned a building down, by the next day, it was put back up again. We did a survey of Osaka looking for space for an office building so that we could abandon our offices in Kobe. We found that the land then occupied by the squatters by the railroad station was more valuable than any footage in Manhattan. So even thirty years ago, land in Japan was extraordinarily expensive. However, in the early 80's, I did cut a ribbon opening our new building in Osaka.

There were other reminders of the war. Across the C.G. building in Kobe, lived some Korean refugees who had become squatters. Many of them had been brought to Japan during the war. But in general, the standard of living was on the rise. Covered arcades could be seen. Shopping was inexpensive for us because the exchange rate was 360:1. A bowl of noodles cost 80 yen. A lot of the infrastructure that we take for granted, like sewers, had not yet been constructed, particularly in the rural areas. But you could notice that Japan was about to enter a modern era. There were big buildings, but they were still flimsily constructed. The maintenance left something to be desired. However, we found living conditions quite adequate particularly when compared to what we were used to in Africa.

The Japanese did not show any resentment toward Americans. No one ever castigate us for the war. They were especially pleased if you tried to speak Japanese with them. As Mark Twain noted, it wasn't important if you spoke well; the important thing was that you spoke at all. So I used my Japanese all the time.

During the Osaka tour, we lived in a U.S. government-owned compound behind the Consulate General building in Kobe. We had a one-bedroom apartment. We all commuted to Osaka. The Consul General had a home between Osaka and Kobe, where we now have housing for our staff. We have closed the office in Kobe. Kobe and Osaka were essentially one city, but two very distinct communities. Kobe was where the foreigners lived. It was the port with the trading houses, the golf course, the country club. Osaka saw itself as Japan's real commercial center, although Tokyo was clearly becoming the

center even in the mid-60's. Osakans compared themselves to New Yorkers and Tokyo to Washington, but that was just not the case. Osaka is still an important commercial center, but certainly not the main one.

There were many representatives of other countries in Kobe-Osaka, mostly in Kobe.

My colleagues in the economic-commercial section followed other commodities and products. We fulfilled the requirements of the world trade directories. We all submitted special reports on the trade that we were following. We traveled around reporting on the firms we had visited. At that time, end-user checks were still required. That is, the U.S. government was interested in making sure that items sold under the foreign military sales program were being used for the purposes intended and had not been diverted to other programs or even worst, exports to third countries, especially communist ones. We would go to see what happened to surplus brass that we sold; the buyer of course often could not trace precisely what had happened to his procurement. As long as he didn't export, we didn't worry too much.

Kobe was a nice small city which had been damaged in the war as had most of Japan. Being a major port, Kobe was subject to bombing, although it had not been hit as heavily as Osaka. I have always assumed that Kobe was spared to some degree because it had a high concentration of foreigners living there, although I have no documentation to substantiate that thesis. It had not recovered as fully as some other cities had. It was falling behind in terms of importance and influence. Yet it was a more comfortable city to live in than Osaka. It was more international and had been so historically since it was a port for a lot of foreign vessels. An American ran a restaurant called The Texas on the main street of Kobe. It was a pre-war restaurant which had been operated by non Japanese for a long, long time. There were other foreigners living in Kobe who owned and operated businesses. They all gathered at The Texas at lunch time, rolling dice. I always wondered what they did in the afternoon—probably slept!

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There was a sizeable foreign representation in Kobe-Osaka, mostly in Kobe. Our Consulate General had been built in Kobe and was an award-winning structure. It was a two story building over-looking a fish-pond. It was a beautiful design, all glass—something you wouldn't dare design in today's security conscious atmosphere. It was also an easy building to work. That did create a small problem because the C.G. had a beautiful office with private bathroom overlooking the port. He didn't like to leave those surroundings for his office in Osaka. The consular operations were principally in Kobe as were the administrative ones. Two political officers and the six of us in the economic-commercial section were in Osaka.

The political reporting, which then consisted primarily of memoranda and despatches, went to Tokyo. The trade directory reports went directly to Washington as did most of the other commodity reports. Embassy officers would come to Kobe-Osaka from time to time to discuss our findings and views. The Economic Minister came. The Embassy people

traveled perhaps even more than they do today. The Reischauers came a couple of times; they liked to travel.

The social life was active. Our friends were either Japanese or Westerners who spoke Japanese. One of our friends was a young Episcopalian minister, Ed Browning. who together with his wife lived in Kobe to study the language. I later met them again in Okinawa where he was the Bishop. After reversion, he was sent to Europe as a roving Bishop and now he is the presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church.

I had an interesting tour in Kobe-Osaka. I learned a lot about the Foreign Service. My first boss, as I mentioned, was Owen Zurhellen. He used to scare people; he growled at them. I just growled back. In those days, we used non-professional couriers to carry the mail back and forth from Tokyo. Our CG would do it for three weeks out of a month and the CG in Nagoya would service all of us one week per month. One time, Zurhellen was having a fight with his administrative officer and I wasn't aware of it. I was meeting with him alone; a phone call came in and the Japanese operator put me on because she wasn't going to ask the C.G. to answer it. It was an employee of the Nagoya C.G. saying that he was at the station waiting for someone to pick up the pouch that he had brought with him from Tokyo. He wanted to know what he should do. I reported the conversation and asked Zurhellen what I should tell the courier. He looked up from his desk and said: “Bill, are you in administration? If not, tell the courier to come to the office”. The courier arrived and we waited for a half-hour. Finally, I went back to Zurhellen's office to tell him that the courier was cooling his heels waiting. I asked what I should do with him. Zurhellen said: “Didn't I ask you before whether you were in the administrative section?”. So I walked out. A few minutes later, Zurhellen came out of his office and took the Nagoya courier out for lunch. Later in the afternoon, I told Zurhellen that perhaps I had been out of line, but that I didn't want our office to look as stupid as it did in those circumstances. No one else would have talked to Zurhellen as I did, but because I did, we got along quite well.

The C.G. who followed Zurhellen was one of the more insecure people I have ever known. He was an old Japan hand, but had had some rough spots in his career that he attributed to the malice of others. He thought that all of his staff were hell-bent on acting like the Consul General. It was nonsense in any case, but especially for a post in Japan where everybody was always concerned with their position in society making sure that one never operated at a level higher than one's position. It turned out that I became the only officer on the staff that he would talk to. When I was assigned as Consul in Sapporo, this CG asked whether I would stay to manage the Kobe office. I told him I would think about it, although I was sure that I wanted to move to a post of my own. I think the CG wanted me stay because he had come to realize that I was not going to sabotage him. So the experiences in Kobe-Osaka were very useful because I learned a lot about people and management.

There was a definite effort on the part of the Japanese to do things that today would not be acceptable. For example, the Governor of Osaka had a mushroom-hunting party in the Fall; he hosted another event in the Summer. Everyone was being very hospitable. Today, that is just not done; it would be too expensive and questions would be raised why all these resources were being spent on the consular corps. During that period, Japan was seen as needing the help of the foreign community. Much of the Japanese public relations effort were concentrated on the question of how foreigners' attention could be focused on development of their locality, even though the plans were not necessarily adequately considered. But all the Japanese were thinking about this issue with each city or prefecture competing for attention. The Japanese would build the necessary infrastructure and then seek foreign investment for plants and other economic development projects. Not many Americans built in Japan, but that was not because the Japanese weren't trying very hard. The Consulate General, although not involved in encouraging investment, did survey its district and reported on what the Japanese were doing and what kinds of investments they were seeking. I am not sure that anyone ever read any of these reports, but we did write them.

Q;In this period—1961-68—were there any visible indicators which might have presaged the major industrial revolution which subsequently transformed Japan?

CLARK: Quite clearly. The first sign that caught attention were the developments that were taking place in preparation for the 1964 Olympics. While I was at language school for two years, the Japanese were building the ring roads around Tokyo. They also built a high speed highway between Tokyo and Osaka. They built a monorail to the airport. The Japanese were very proud of these infrastructures because it made them feel that they were entering the “modern” world. Of course, by this time, Sony was already the preeminent producer of transistor radios, but that was not a major achievement. I remember talking one evening to Akio Morita at the Ambassador's residence—language officers were brought to the residence for parties to serve as interpreters, to greet Japanese guests and introduce them to the Ambassador—a practice that has since ceased. Morita said that his company was developing a tape recorder for television; he thought that it would be an attractive product. I asked what the price might be. He said that he thought it would probably sell for $ 300, which in those days was a handsome amount. I expressed the view that I thought that at that price, the market might be limited; that episode clearly show why I stayed a bureaucrat and Morita became a famous industrialist. It was clear in the early 1960s that the Japanese were planning to become a major player in the world's economy.

That Morita story is an illustration also that Japan is a society which has an amazing amount of access. It was true in the early 1960s; it is still true today. Even as a young officer, I would talk to the Finance Minister at the residence. He was delighted to talk to someone who spoke Japanese; he did not mind talking to someone considerably his junior both in rank and age. Even then, I could always talk to senior political officials; that is still true today. Junior officers from the Embassy can still visit with Diet members; that would not be possible in Washington. The key was the ability to speak Japanese. We had far better access than, for example, young Japanese unless they were from the

member's district. Japanese are much more accommodating for face-to-face meetings than Americans. They make time for these discussions. It is just more important in their culture to have such sessions than it would be for us. This approach was perhaps more prevalent in the 1960s than today, but it is still practiced today. I had a lot of access even as a younger officer; some of those contacts I have maintained through the years. We have matured together.

As I said, the Olympics was the first major Japanese effort to modernize itself. The Japanese have an elaborate tax structure which permits them to collect revenues and redistribute them. It is called kofuze (the redistribution tax). It is based on that old philosophy which taxes those who are able to pay and allocated those resources to those who need them. That spread resources around the country. That gave the Japanese government an opportunity to target development. The Tokyo Olympics served as a rationale for upgrading traffic flow in the Tokyo area and to other cities, both roads and trains—the bullet train. The next great event was the 1970 International Exhibition in Osaka. That was used to build more transportation systems and other infrastructure projects. Then came the Winter Olympics in Sapporo, which people there said they would never host again. But it got them a new subway system and new roads and other facilities. This approach to development is one of the reasons for Japanese disappointment when Seoul was designated as the host for the 1988 Olympics; they had hoped that Nagoya would be chosen so that it could join the list of cities that had enjoyed infrastructure development. Japan used these major events as rationales for economic development. It happened when Okinawa was returned to Japan. They build an ocean exhibit and then roads and other transportation projects so that visitors could reach the site. Major events of the kind I have mentioned permits the government to spend resources disproportionally to certain areas, which would not have happened otherwise to the same degree. The event was the excuse for a major economic development effort. Without the event the government would be accused of favoritism.

There were other signs in the early 1960s of Japan's future as an economic giant. It was at about this time that Toyota exported its first car to the U.S. It was a car that worked relatively satisfactorily on Japanese roads of the day which didn't go very far nor could they accommodate much speed. When the same car traveled on US roads, it was different story: it blew up, as the Renaults did. There were enough Japanese that knew something about the rest of the world, but certainly not nearly as many as today. But as a society it reads voraciously. That doesn't mean that all had an accurate picture of the world, but they certainly tried their best. They were always interested in the US. I used to get many questions about the US. As many other Americans, I used to run into people who had studied the US in minute detail and who had some minute fact that they wished to check. It didn't occur to them that I might not know everything about the US! The Japanese were very interested in learning English. It has been true for a long time that wives of American officials could make a very reasonable income from teaching English; some could make more than their husbands if they were willing to work long hours. Some of that is still true today. In the 1960s and 1970s, school children would invariably approach us just to say “Hello”. Today, that doesn't happen anymore because everyone expects them to know that word of English and many more. They didn't go as far as some other Asians in touching a Westerner, particularly one with blond hair. But they would point to you and say “Gaijin da” (foreigner) partly because in the 1960s the school children didn't see that many foreigners—even in Tokyo. Today, that is not done very often. I remember one day when Judith and I went by boat to Shikoku. It was a hazy day and we sat on the top deck. She is red-haired and light skinned. By the time we got to Shikoku, she was glowing red. That attracted a crowd of kids who followed us around; she was the original red-haired barbarian. They were amazed!

Q: Let me now move on to Sapporo. You have mentioned that you had been offered a position in Kobe, which you turned down. How did the transfer to Sapporo come about?

CLARK: It followed the normal procedure. The Embassy people knew me; I was a language officer; I was the right grade to be the Consul—principal officer—in Sapporo. Sapporo had two American officers and an American secretary. So my move to Sapporo was not unusual. The only interesting aspect of it was that I had been offered the Vice-Consul job in Sapporo two years earlier, as I mentioned earlier.

Much of the job was “showing the flag”. We tried to focus on what was going as Hokkaido was trying to catch up with the rest of Japan, particularly on the economic front. We tried to find investment opportunities. We did a lot of work on establishing “sister cities” relationships between Sapporo and an American city. I had the usual workload of a principal officer in administering an American consulate. Even though we had a Vice-Consul, I had to do some consular work; we provided the full range of consular services. While I served in Sapporo, there was one American in jail, whom we visited periodically. I also spent a lot of time touring the consular district which covered the whole island of Hokkaido and the three northern prefectures of the main island of Honshu: Aomori, Akita and Oita.

As I said, we worked on commercial matters. That was not a subject that engaged many foreign service officers at the time. At the time I was designated as an economic officer. I liked economics. I did political reporting, although Hokkaido was not in the mainstream of Japanese politics. We provided interesting regional footnotes and sometimes we picked up an interesting tidbit, but our political reporting was only a small contribution to the very few who followed Japanese domestic politics in Tokyo. I doubt whether many of our insights ever reached Washington. As an indication of what was important, I should mention a couple of economic reports that I submitted directly to Washington. That did not sit well with some of the people in Tokyo. The Commercial Counselor in particular was upset because they had not been filed through him. The Political Counselor told me to file reports directly to Washington, with copies to him. I think that difference in approach was a sign of what was important to the Embassy and to Washington.

We were involved in mounting a commercial exhibit in Tokyo. The Embassy had tried to have it done, but had failed. The exhibit was intended to be displayed in second-rank department stores. I knew the man—Mr. Imai—who headed the merchants' association; he also directed the largest Hokkaido-owned department store. I went to talk to him to see what could be done. He said he thought he could make the appropriate arrangements and he did. So we actually worked out the Embassy's problem from Sapporo. I was thanked for my efforts by the Embassy official, but somewhat grudgingly.

I was in Sapporo when the city fathers decided to apply for being the Olympic hosts. One of the members of the Imperial household came to the site. Then the Japanese delegation went to Rome to plead its case. Upon their return, I was sent an invitation to a “welcome back” reception. There was an entrance fee for the reception—not very much, but unusual. I sent one of my staff over to buy the ticket and went. It was probably the first time that an American Consul had ever paid for anything in Sapporo. But it gave me a lot of good publicity. It showed people that the Americans were interested in what was going on. I had already volunteered in messages to Tokyo and the Department that Sapporo was worthy of American support. I became a Sapporo fan, as I became a Naha fan, a Tokyo fan, a Osaka fan—although always remaining an American fan. Of course, the Olympics were a super special event for them. The final site selection occurred only a few weeks before we left Sapporo. so that I didn't witnesses any of the preparations. I knew where the various Olympic sites would be. In fact, the 12 meter ski jump took place right next to the old Consulate building—which was a combination office-residence. If I had remained in that office, I could have just turned my chair and looked out at the jump competition. My successor certainly had a good view of that event.

Sapporo had suffered very little damage during the war. That was generally true also of Kobe. Hakodate was more damaged because it was a port. But in general the northern cities escaped major damage. We did have a major military presence in Sapporo after the war some of which was still there when I served there. We had an Army detachment

at Chitose, where the airport is. We had an Air Force detachment at Wakkanai which is at the north-west tip of the island. It used to be the departure point for the ferries to Sakhalin Island, when half of it belonged to Japan. We had a large airport base at Misawa in the Iwate Prefecture. I spent a lot of time with the military, particularly those stationed at Chitose which was only twenty-five miles away. I tried to involve them in some of my activities in Sapporo; they in turn involved me in base activities. We did get to Wakkanai; it was very isolated. That was interesting because there had lived a famous American who had been in Hokkaido soon after the Meiji restoration. His name was William S. Clark. He taught at the Agricultural School, which later became Hokkaido University, one of the Imperial Universities. He only stayed six months, but as when he left, his students —most of them sons of Samurai families—walked him to the port. The story goes that his last words to them was :"Boys, be ambitious". So there is now a statue to him of the campus. I don't believe that a solid Victorian gentleman as Clark was, would have said anything as crass as that, but that is the Japanese myth. He may have said :"Boys, be ambitious in Christ", but somewhere the last two words dropped out. He is still well known for his comment. As I said, William Clark's statue was on campus; my name was William Clark; the commander of our military base in Chitose was a Colonel William Clark; the commander of the Air Force base in Wakkanai was James Clark. We were never able convince the people of Hokkaido that all of this was a coincidence; they were convinced that all Americans named Clark were sent to their island. They were convinced that the American government intentionally sent Clarks to Hokkaido as a tribute to the first one. I have a picture somewhere of the four Clarks standing in front of the statue of the first one.

My days as Consul were very varied. I spent about one fourth of my time traveling around. I liked to drive around Hokkaido. At the time we still used a "one-time" pad—that is a device by which you manually encode and decode messages. It was great fun, although hard to imagine today, thirty years later. It was particularly aggravating when you had to decode a twenty page message, the essence of which could be read in the following day's newspaper. That work- load wasn't too great and the secretary and I used to take

turns. I did a lot of the administrative work—accounts, personnel, etc. I saw a lot of people who used to drop in to the Consulate. I did some visa work, although that was the main responsibility of the Vice-Consul. I wrote reports. We did a little of everything.

With rare exceptions—e.g. when talking to my American colleagues—, I spoke only Japanese for my two years in Sapporo. No one expected me to speak English; we conducted all of our business in Japanese. I could not have asked for a better opportunity to become immersed in the language. Hokkaido attracted people from all parts of Japan. So the islanders spoke Japanese very close to “Hyojungo”—that is the Japanese used by NHK broadcasting system—which is considered the “true” language. So the Japanese that I learned and used was as devoid of dialect as I could have hoped.

The social life was quite active. We had a Japan-America Society; I was a member of the Rotary Club, where I met a lot of people. I used to speak to Lions' Clubs, many of which were in remote towns throughout the island. A lot of the social life was work-related; it was another opportunity to meet people and to make a pitch for whatever US policy was on the top of the agenda at the moment. The Japanese in Hokkaido were perhaps even more friendly than those in Kobe. They had a long connection with the US, starting with the Meiji restoration. At that time, they asked a former US Secretary of Agriculture, Forrest Caplan, to bring a team to Hokkaido to assist in the planning for the economic development of the island. That team—sixty people—actually assisted in drawing up the city plan for Sapporo; it is based on the “grid” concept which was later also used for Nara and Shinten in China. It was in fact a very ancient concept, but the “wheel was reinvented” for Sapporo. The story goes that the team laid out a North-South “grid”, but then someone came along and pointed out that the “North” was the “magnetic North” and not the “true” North, making it three degrees off. The planner thanked the kibitzer profusely, revised the plan so that it is now six degrees off. I can't vouch for the accuracy of the story, but it is an enduring tale. The Caplan team laid out the railroad that goes to the port of Otaru. It conducted a geological surveys. So it was a very active mission; I think Caplan's diaries are still in the

Department of Agriculture. So our relationships with Hokkaido go back many, many years, although we didn't open a Consulate in Sapporo until after World War II.

Q: I would like to ask you about the local staffs both in Kobe and Sapporo. Were they competent?

CLARK: It was competent. By the time I arrived in Kobe-Osaka in 1963, most of the staff had probably been working for the US government for about fifteen years—that is, right after the war. So we had some first class personnel because working for the US Consulate was the best job in town. It paid well and seemed to have an assured future. Even after the local economy took off, these people stayed with us, although, for example, when Tupperware came to Kobe, they hired two of our best employees. One became general manager and the other the plant manager. Most of our employees were bilingual to a degree, although their reports required considerable editing. The Sapporo staff was much smaller. There we had an administrative assistant, two women in the Visa Section, two boiler men and a driver and two political assistants—one was very good, the other had been with the Consulate for a long time. The latter was essentially a Russian linguist who spent much of his time reading Russian newspapers. He was not terribly productive, but he was the senior local employee. He used to tell me that before the other fellow as hired that he used to perform those functions. One time, after we had sent the new employee to the US for training, we faced out annual Fourth of July party. I told the older man that this was his opportunity to show me what he used to do before the new man was hired—that is introduce the guests, etc. He promptly got drunk. We finally found some way to ease him out without appearing to be heartless employers. As in the Kobe case, we had no trouble employing local staff when the Consulate was opened; as the Japanese economy developed, it became increasing harder to attract the top talent. In Sapporo, we had no local staff working on economic-commercial matters; in Kobe, there must have been ten professionals working together with five American officers. Today, Kobe has one reporting officer—the Consul General.

Q: I would like to discuss Japanese political development, starting with your Kobe experiences and then your Sapporo tour. What are your recollections about those local political situations?

CLARK: I think we now understand that as, Tip O'Neill was so fond of saying, all politics are local. It was relatively easy to see in Japan who did things for a city or a prefecture. There were plaques on buildings which not only provided the name of the sponsor, but what his job was at the time. So everybody knew who was doing the city a favor and that did not go unnoticed. The government was and still is highly centralized, but governors and assemblies for example are elected by their prefectures. The mayors are elected by city residents as are city councils. So there is some local autonomy, but taxation is centrally controlled and mostly collected by the center and then distributed back to the localities.

The Japanese have a custom which requires that if you wanted people to turn out at the polls or at a demonstration or some public gatherings, they had to be paid “Kurumadai”, which covered their transportation and eating costs for the day. That was not viewed as a payment for services received; it was just a fair and just compensation for out-of-pocket expenses. That meant that people who wanted to be candidates were expected to have enough means to make such payments.

The local assemblies focused essentially on how they wanted their prefecture to develop. During the early 1960s, manufacturing in Japan was much more centralized than it is today. It existed primarily around Tokyo and Osaka. In other prefectures, funds were used to develop industrial estates—preparing the land, putting in infrastructure (roads, utilities, etc)—in an effort to attract manufacturing plants. That became an effective strategy. Eventually, plants were build away from Tokyo and Osaka, partially because the central government also accepted the concept of decentralization. But this Japan-wide development was largely the doing of the prefectural assemblies. Before the end of the year, one would invariably see a lot of infrastructure work because they needed

resources to buy the traditional year-end gifts. It always took a lot more time to fill in the holes after New Year's than it did to dig them before the end of the year. But people got paid mostly before the end of the year. The arguments in the assemblies were primarily which geographic areas would get that year's projects. This were small projects because the large ones, such as port improvements for example, had to be led and funded by the central government. The taxation system in Japan is known as “kufuzei” in which the central government basically taxes prefectures according to their abilities to pay and then distributes the funds according to needs. The poorer prefectures therefore get more tax money back than they paid in; all prefectures have their own taxing authority. For example, sales taxes go to the prefecture, but the percentage to be levied is decided by the central government. Some of the funds that were returned from Tokyo were designated for specific expenditures; some could be allocated by the prefectural government.

Sapporo was supported in part by the Hokkaido Development Agency, as a reflection, I think, of its lag in development behind the rest of the country. It got therefore special assistance and consideration. It was the poor part of Japan.

In Kobe-Osaka, we used to meet with the socialists and the communists, but they were not that anxious to interact with us. They kept pretty much to themselves. We were encouraged by our people in Tokyo to meet all sections of society, regardless of party. In Kobe, I relearned an important lesson. There was never a restriction in Japan in meeting opposition parties as I ran into later in Korea, for example. We were encouraged to meet a large variety of Japanese; our problem was much more with the lack of interest of certain Japanese groups to meet with Americans. Sapporo was somewhat different; I got to know people much more on a personal basis because it was a much smaller community. I got to know the spokesman for the Communist Party because he was a student of Abraham Lincoln. So we used to spend the middle part of our conversation talking about Lincoln; the first part of the talk was devoted to the petition or complaint that brought him to the office in the first place. We would discuss that, then we would talk about Lincoln. when he decided that he had spent enough time in my office, he would say something outrageous.

I would say that he couldn't make comments like that in my office and there upon he would get up to leave. It was a well choreographed discussion. I rather liked him and we along well. We were almost at a point on a couple of occasions in working out a couple of joint programs—debates—, but we could never quite put it together although we did get close. The tough crowd was the young socialists; they were militants. They would come to the office and march upstairs and then we would go through a routine that left them well frustrated. This was the period when Vietnam was a hot button in Japan; we would have demonstrations against our policies. Those demonstrated would usually march on the Governor's office; the route passed right in front of the Consulate. So, even if we were not the main target, we would get some side effects. The police came to me on a couple of occasions to request that our gates be closed. I told them that since it was during working hours, that such action would be inappropriate. I would only do so if they would declare that leaving the gates open would endanger the Consulate; they were never willing to go that far. So we left the gates open; sometimes I would even stand by the gate and watch the demonstrators go by. They would chant slogans, then stop and wave and then move on chanting their slogans again. In Kobe especially, the presence of the "Yakuza"—"Yamaguchigumi"—was noticeable. This one of the larger Japanese gangster gangs. That was not true in Sapporo; there you knew they ran some prostitution rings, but the gangs were not that visible.

When tension really began to build up in Osaka—that was in my second year at the post—, we had a number of demonstrations in the building, part of which we occupied. Our offices were on the ninth floor. The building had two elevators. It was a public building and that prevented the police from stopping people—according to their interpretation of the law. On the ninth floor, we had a small lobby where one existed from the elevators. Then there was a large desk for the receptionist which blocked the entrance to our offices. Demonstrators would take the elevators, get off and then block further ingress to our offices by just sitting down in the lobby. When I first arrived at the post, the Consul General had decreed that no Americans could be visible to the demonstrators; just members of

the Japanese staff. I suggested that we couldn't send the Japanese employees to face any risks that we were not willing to take ourselves. So I went to the lobby, which was very instructive. The demonstrators would chant that they wanted to see the Consul General. They overlooked me; that is not whom they wanted to see. So I sat on the desk and listened. At some point, they would start singing “The Internationale”. I found that if I could make eye contact with the demonstrators, they would stop singing. So that is what I tried to do and eventually, they stopped singing. They stood up for the singing; when they stopped, they would all sit down again. Finally, the police would come up and ask them to leave. When the police arrived, the demonstrators would all link arms. Then the lieutenant would point to one of the demonstrators and the police would cart him or her off. It was always rather jovial at the beginning of the demonstration. But after a half hour or so, the police would begin to become fed up and got a little rough. This process of carting off a demonstrator one at the time went well until the police got to the ring leaders. They would invariably stand up, tell the police not to touch them and then majestically stalk off to the elevator and leave. So it was only the followers who got beaten up. It was a process that was repeated over and over again.

These experiences led me to the conclusion that the socialist-communist support both in Kobe-Osaka and Sapporo was essentially formalistic; beyond the leaders, there was probably not much intellectual commitment. As I mentioned earlier, no one ever instructed me not to interact with socialists or communists. Soon after I arrived in Japan, Douglas MacArthur 2nd was replaced by Edwin Reischauer. The two had entirely different perspectives about Japan and its politics. John Emmerson, who was the DCM, was a target for Japanese conservatives because while he served in SCAP, he was responsible for insuring that political prisoners were released from jail. So he was at the jail's door when the communists and socialists were released and therefore was called the “Red Dean” by the conservatives. Emmerson was also a McCarthy target because he had been one of the “China hands”; he had transferred from there to be part of MacArthur's staff in Japan. Then he came back to Japan as DCM thirteen years later.

The debate in the Embassy in the early 1960s was more about when the Socialists might take power or more likely, when might they win enough seats—one-third—in the Diet so that they would be able to block legislation. The Embassy was concerned with socialist-communist influence in the labor movements. The largest supporter of the Socialist Party was Sohyo—the labor union that mainly represented government employees. But this did not prevent us from talking to the socialists. I have never been in the communist headquarters in Tokyo, but I have certainly visited all the others. The unions were not anti-American per se; they did object strongly to our Vietnam policy. Up to a point, they were anti-capitalist; that is as long as it didn't interfere with their own capitalist enterprise. Some communists were theologically committed to their cause, but I think most were like a young student I met who attended Otaru Commercial College in Sapporo. He was studying economics in a department that had a good reputation. The faculty was essentially Marxist. On one occasion, I pointed out to the student that he was going to college, learning Marxists economics and living in a society which was booming under a capitalist philosophy. I asked why he was studying Marxist economics. He told me that it was easier. Keynesian economics were very difficult. He was going to work for a private concern and make his fortune, but in the meantime, he would learn the “easier” economics.

The US military bases were not subjected to many demonstrations in the 1960s. Certainly the one in Wakkanai was protected because it was the mainstay of the community. The same was true for Misawa because it was also was a large employer. This was true even while we were being subjected to anti-Vietnam demonstrations; the military was left relatively unscathed. There were some efforts by the socialists and communists to generate anti-American feelings. I remember once being at an American Coast Guard station in Hokkaido; it had a big antenna and a Loren system which was used to assist to assist ships at sea to know their positions. It was a useful installation for ships of all nations. The communists started to voice complaint about the antenna tower on the grounds that its electronic emanation would sterilize all the women in the area and would

lift all the umbrellas within its reach and gobble them up. As far as I know, no umbrella ever got stuck in the tower.

Q: Let me ask you how the majority party, the Liberal Democratic Party, operated in the 1960s?

CLARK: Pretty much as it does today. The basic unit of the Party was a faction. Each faction centered on one man and because of that tended to have geographic allegiances. —, for example, was strong in Kansai and Kyushu. He used to collect on every lemon that was grown. The factions were built around strong men. At the time, the party machine was very predictable. I did not generally talk to the senior Party members; I talked mostly to the junior members. Most people knew who the next Prime Minister would be and who would succeed him. It was a ritual with strict rules and therefore completely predictable. That system broke down starting with Tanaka, which was in the late 1970s. The Sapporo-Hokkaido faction was not influential; it had adherents, but few financial resources. It was important that the island remain in the LDP fold. So the Party sent a heavy hitter to the island soon after the war, when the island had elected a socialist governor and assembly. So the LDP sent — who had been the Chief of Police in Tokyo when the Emperor surrendered. Before the war, when governors were appointed, he had been a governor. His family came from Hokkaido, so he was sent by the LDP to contest the next election. He ran and won the governorship, which he held for twelve years. He gave up a promising career in Tokyo where he would probably have become a Cabinet member, but became a major political force in Hokkaido.

Money in the 1960s was not as important as it became in later decades. Elections did not cost as much, so that the need was not fully there. We knew pretty well who was getting paid in Sapporo, but it was no a major concern. It didn't take a genius to figure how the money was collected—mostly from businesses—and to whom it was then paid. We are now talking about sixteen years after the war; families had not become rich. The Dodge plan had redistributed the wealth; it took the money class a few years to recover

and return to its pre-war prominence. So it was not the issue that it later became. In fact, money had always flowed in the Japanese political system, but in the 1960s, as I said, campaigns were not as costly, life styles were simpler and therefore politicians were did not spend as freely as they did later. Eventually, the political-financial system got out of hand, but that was much later. Like so many matters in Japan, a business and later a family, had a status to maintain; people felt intuitively what was “right” in terms of amounts of donations to political leaders. Businesses were not only donating to the LDP. I spoke to a lot of businessmen who told me that they supported the LDP, but that they also gave some donations to the Socialists, to “cover their bets”. As I said before, Hokkaido did not have many financial resources. Okinawa had not yet been returned to Japan; so that the islands at the northern and southern tip of the chain did not share the benefits that the larger islands enjoyed.

Sometime later on, the British made a big fuss over the tariff that was being applied to their scotch. Their whisky sold well, but they wanted to sell more by reducing the price. A bottle of Johnny Walker's Black cost about fifty dollars at the time. The British finally convinced the Japanese government to lower the tariff; the prices were reduced significantly. The sales plummeted. Johnny Walker's Black was a known item; everyone knew what it cost. Once the price was reduced, people thought that they were being given cheap merchandise.

Q: Let me ask you about your relationship with the Embassy. Who was your supervisor?

CLARK: It was the DCM, as I recall. The Embassy had a supervising Consul General, but his jurisdiction had been the subject of many vigorous debates. When I was in Sapporo, the DCM supervised the constituent posts. In fact, there was not much supervision at all. The Embassy requested very little of us; most of our work was self-generated. It was also true that we were probably not kept current by the Embassy. But you must remember that this was before modern communication facilities. So our expectations were not as high; we didn't expect to be “fully” informed. That is not true today, of course. Officers today feel

that unless they see all of the daily cable traffic, they are somehow deprived. We got the information that we needed. I got to Tokyo finally, after having been in Sapporo for a year, for a principal officers' meeting. The DCM said that he hadn't seen me for a year. I told him that we had no need for anything and the Embassy had not asked for anything; so that I had not seen any need to visit. He was surprised that I had not come to Tokyo before, but I was spending all of my travel allotment touring my district. I thought it was a very good situation; I was happy with the Embassy's lack of supervision.

Q: Let me ask you about Japanese attitudes in the 1960s. Did you get many comments about rearmament?

CLARK: Not really. I got more comments about the whether the Japanese should even have a Self-Defense Force. The Self-Defense officers used to go to work in Tokyo in civilian suits; their uniforms were kept in a locker at their offices. If they were seen in uniform, people would point to them and call them “tax worms”. People did not hold the Americans responsible for this Self-Defense force. Sometimes, there would be a discussion on why we had written in Article 9 of the Constitution—barring Japan from a military establishment that could be involved in off-shore actions—and then support the establishment of a Self-Defense Force. But there was not much of that even. The communists were of course adamantly opposed to any military. I used to tease them by asking to name one communist country that did not have an armed force. To them, that was a different issue and not related to Japanese affairs.

The American military presence was not much of an issue either. For example, there is a little town in the middle of Hokkaido, called Nayoro, which was the home base for a Self-Defense Force unit. In the mid-1960s, our Special Forces were stationed in Okinawa. An arrangement had been made between the military which permitted our Special Forces to come to Nayoro for joint winter exercises in the snow. The Mayor of Nayoro was a socialist. He came to my office and slammed a protest on my desk. I asked him what did he want me to do about it. He said that he didn't expect any action; he had delivered his

protest and returned to Nayoro, undoubtedly telling his supporters of his vigorous efforts. So the Socialists had a position, but their defense of it was hardly vigorous or credible. Of course, Hokkaido was in a somewhat different situation from the rest of Japan. It was the closest island to the USSR; some of its fishermen were picked up by the Soviets for fishing in the wrong area or to pass information. My driver had been a prisoner of war in the USSR for five years; he was not very happy with his former captors. There were people in Hokkaido who had been forcibly removed from the Kuriles by the Soviets. So many islanders were anxious and bitter about the Soviets; there was a different mood on Hokkaido then there was in the rest of Japan. It was certainly different from that which the Japanese in Kobe-Osaka exhibited.

There was one interesting development during the fifteen year span between my service in Sapporo and later in Tokyo. When I was in Hokkaido, it was the stronghold of the Japanese drive for the return of the northern islands from the USSR. Later, when I served in Tokyo, the center of that sentiment shifted to Honshu—the main island and south of Hokkaido. The attachment to the northern islands did not stem from family ties, as some does in the Koreas. All the Japanese had been evacuated from the northern islands. There were family graves there which was one reason for the drive. The other was that the islands had been traditionally part of Japan. Furthermore, those island provided good fishing grounds. I must say that, even while I was in Sapporo, I had the feeling that if the northern islands had been returned to the Japanese, very few, if any Japanese, would have returned there. These islands were not paradise. If they were to be returned today, they would be developed as fishing grounds, but there won't be many settlers. The issue is mostly one of national pride.

Q: In 1967, after your two years in Sapporo, you were assigned to Columbia University for graduate work. Was that at your request?

CLARK: I was selected for mid-career training. I asked to be detailed to Columbia. I had a choice between Columbia and Stanford. Having come from the West Coast, I

decided I'd like to see how the other half lived. I had thought I wanted to concentrate in economics. But the rules of the Department were at the time that since I did not have an undergraduate degree in economics, I certainly could not do graduate work. I suggested that I was really interested in the economics of Asia and that actually in University my major was social sciences, half of which was economics. I thought I could do graduate work in economics. The Department was adamant; I could, if I wished, attend the FSI's twenty-two week course in economics. That was too general for me; I wanted to concentrate on Asia. We finally compromised; I would be allowed to attend the School for International Affairs. The courses I took at school were essentially left up to me. So I took a number of Asian economic courses. The year turned out to be a very useful one. I met a number of excellent academics with whom I maintained contact thereafter. I participated in a three-college symposium sponsored by Columbia, Harvard and Yale. There I met Jim Nakamura, Hugh Patrick and Henry Rasoski—the academic experts on Asia. The year gave me an opportunity to some in-depth work on Asian economics. I analyzed the differences in acceptance of the West in China and Japan. One can draw some interesting conclusions by looking at land ownership and that the relevance of that factor to the willingness of the society to modernize. The Japanese had a ready-made bureaucratic class—the Samurai—that didn't own any land; that made the acceptance of western innovation easier to adopt. The Chinese Mandarins owned land; they might have taken a role in the government, but they would sooner or later return to their lands. That made change much harder. I also did some work on Chinese economics and on Japanese economics as well, particularly on development. I took a course on Korean history and development from Gary Laynard. I studied Japanese bureaucratic development from a professor who was an expert on Japanese and British politics, although he did, because he had done more work on the subject, spend most of his time on British politics. I wrote a good paper on the growth of the Japanese Foreign Ministry—one of the first analysis in English using original Japanese sources. So it was a profitable and fun year. I did not get a degree because I refused to take the required courses just as I had not gotten an undergraduate degree in Political Sciences because I refused to study “City

Management"—it did not seem germane to my future. So I ended up with a degree in Social Science. In any case, I don't believe that the Foreign Service should not send people to graduate school to get a degree; the main purpose of such an assignment should be an enhancement of knowledge which might be useful to the officer and the Foreign Service.

There were other Foreign Service officers at Columbia at the same time. One was Bill Cunningham who attended the second semester; the other was Dick Barkley, our current Ambassador to Turkey—he was focusing on European affairs.

Q: So after studying Asia for a year, you were assigned to the SEATO desk in the Department?

CLARK: Right! The assignment was a curious one, obviously. EA was watching out for its officers and it indicated some reservation about the assignment, as I did. But I was told that it was just a temporary one. Then, as now, INR had first crack at anyone who was slated for an out-of-area assignment. That was me, because EA/P did not have a position for me at the time. I was interested in an assignment in Europe, but INR would have had priority. So I was assigned to the SEATO desk, which was still part of EA. It was part of the EA Regional Affairs Office. At the time, we had a SEATO "vault", where all the "secret" SEATO documents were stored. That was a perversion of the classification process! The Regional Affairs Office in EA had always been, and still remains, a somewhat curious office. It was a creature of the assistant secretary, who used the staff as he pleased. At times, the office was used for speech writing. When I was in it, it was not used that way by William Bundy or Marshall Green. We handled odds and ends and did not get involved in bilateral issues. We did have a strong relationship with USIA.

SEATO began in the 1950s; it was originally known as the "Manila Pact" for the city where the treaty was signed. So when I took the desk, the organization was about 10 or 12 years old. If I tried real hard, the work-load may have kept busy for 20 minutes per day. It was

a very quiet assignment. But it gave me an opportunity to stay current on Asian affairs —the Vietnam war was raging. What other troops were there came largely from SEATO countries. The treaty relationship with Thailand sprang from the SEATO Treaty. So there were some issues, but it was hardly a full-time job. At the time, we used SEATO as a useful forum for discussion on military matters and also an avenue through which we could assure the South East Asian countries that we were interested in their security.

I sat in the same office with the US military officer who was on an exchange assignment from the Pentagon. Also there was Louise McNutt who had been in the Bureau for many years working on UN affairs. She kept her own files because she had absolutely no confidence in the central file system. That was useful for she could find almost everything she needed. We also had a regional affairs officer; he got me involved in a fledgling organization called ASEAN. Since I didn't stay in that assignment for less than a year, I didn't mind and I did learn something about Asia and its multi-lateral organizations. At the end of that year, I was detailed for three months to the UN Mission as the Asian advisor to the Delegation.

Every year, before SEATO Day, the Secretary of State recorded a SEATO message, which was sent to Bangkok, which, I think, was probably the only place that SEATO Day was celebrated. In 1969, I wrote the draft for a new Secretary of State, Bill Rogers. I cleared it with other parts of the Department. The day before it was to be read, EA had a staff meeting which gave me the opportunity to mention the message to the USIA representative who attended. This was shortly after Frank Shakespeare had become Director of the Agency. He was a great devotee of TV. Soon after the USIA man returned to his Agency, I got a call asking whether the Secretary could be televised giving this statement. Since this question had never arise before, I had to send a memorandum to the Secretariat, saying that we were planning to televise the Secretary. Since time was of essence, I walked the memorandum to the Secretariat. The next day, we started to set up camera's in the Secretary's conference room. Before we were ready the Secretary strolled in and asked whether he could get started. I told him that we were not quite ready, but

that we would be ready to televise him soon. He looked startled because he apparently was caught unaware. He went back to his office and read the riot act to his staff. He had not been briefed and was not ready. Finally he came out and did two takes; he reviewed them later and asked me which I preferred. I said I liked the second one; he said he preferred the first, but he said that we could which ever take we wanted. That was my first meeting with Rogers, but certainly not the last! Later, the Secretariat called the office of the assistant secretary to chastise me for “surprising the Secretary”. I told the front office that the Secretariat had had the memorandum for twenty-four hours and if the Secretary was surprised, it was not EA's fault. The Secretariat could always have told me that it would not be done! I was too junior at the time to realize that if you had a matter for the Secretary, you dealt with his special assistant and not the Secretariat bureaucracy. When I became more seasoned and knowledgeable about Washington, that slip would never have happened. The TV tape was then shown on Washington stations.

While on the SEATO desk, I did attend a SEATO meeting in 1969. It was Rogers' first solo visit overseas. At the beginning, he was just going to the SEATO meeting. Then someone decided that he should stop in Vietnam first and as long as he was stopping in Bangkok, he should also stop in Karachi on the way to a CENTO meeting in Ankara. Then he went to Europe. I stopped in Bangkok and returned to the US from there. When we landed in Saigon to let the Secretary and most of the party off the plane, I told the pilot that I too would like to deplane to watch the arrival ceremonies, which where always a show when a senior American official landed. The pilot said: “Fine, but if any shooting starts, I am leaving”. That led me to the conclusion that I could watch the ceremonies just as well through the window on the plane. As I said, I returned on my own from Bangkok. In those days, there were such things as “excess foreign currencies”—Pakistani rupees, Israeli shekels. So I had a choice of going through Karachi or Tel Aviv on the way back to the US. I went to Israel; it was my first visit to that country; it lasted for an hour while the plane refueled. All we had to do is be able to say that we had landed in the right place and that permitted us to use the “excess foreign currency”.

The SEATO meeting was an interesting experience. Being new to the desk officer job, I did a lot of preparation in Washington. I looked at the files reflecting previous meetings. I found that SEATO had always issued a communique, which had historically been drafted by the SEATO Secretariat. I decided I would take a crack at a first draft, which I did not send to Bangkok, but cleared it within the Department. I knew it would be debated once the meeting got started. I should mention that after each SEATO meeting, there was a special session for all countries that contributed troops to the Vietnam effort. Out of that meeting, there had also always been a communique. A draft had been prepared for that meeting and on our way to Bangkok, the Secretary was reviewing the comments that all of the contributing nations were making. It looked like an interminable process. There was not a single comment about a SEATO communique. Rogers was delighted and thanked me for doing a terrific job on that paper. We had not told him that we had not yet circulated it for comment. The Secretary got off in Saigon and I went on to Bangkok. There I asked the Embassy officer handling SEATO affairs—John Kelly, now our Ambassador in Finland—where the SEATO Secretariat's draft was. He said that there wasn't any. I knew that there had always been such a draft, so I suggested that we go over to the Secretariat to see what they were up to. General Vargas of the Philippines was the Director General of SEATO at the time. The Deputy Director was a USIA officer. We asked him where the SEATO draft was. He told us that it was on the third draft. So John and I, without even looking at it, went to all the other SEATO delegations, including the Thai, to give them a copy of our draft. We talked to some, like the Australians and New Zealanders and the British. When the delegations finally met, the Secretariat passed out its draft and asked that it be used as the working document. The British representative said that all the delegations had the American draft and preferred to work from that. The Secretariat representative pointed out that his staff was only available in the morning and therefore work had to be done during those hours. To which the American representative, George Aldrich, replied that the delegations would work also in the afternoons and that if they need the Secretariat, they would call. So we worked all day on my draft and finished by evening.

That worked very well. So Rogers, by sheer luck, was right in his comments because in the final analysis, it was our draft that was essentially passed without any major changes.

The American delegation was headed by the Secretary, of course. George Aldrich, the Department's Legal Advisor, was there. I was his deputy on the communique drafting committee. Bill Sullivan was there to handle Vietnam issues. Charlie Small was there. Admiral John McCain, CINCPAC Commander, was there. No senior member of the EA Bureau was there, which was an indication of the importance we attached to SEATO. Bill Rogers wanted conclude all discussions as quickly as possible. The Foreign Ministers who headed the other delegations loved to go through the communique word by word. Rogers thought that after the drafting committee had finished with it he could have the afternoon off, which he did. Rogers wanted to finish the communique; he pushed very hard for approval saying that he had full confidence in the drafting committee. The New Zealander offered an amendment to it in the final minutes of the meeting, at the behest of the Vietnamese. But he was not quite sure what he was amending; neither was anyone else quite sure. But Rogers said that we all agreed with the proposal and it was approved. It took us two hours afterwards to figure out what the New Zealander had proposed and where it would fit in the communique.

There were a couple of other interesting events during this meeting that come to my mind. One actually led to my next assignment. I mentioned that the CINCPAC Commander was attending the meeting. He had a Political Advisor, furnished by the Department of State, Bob Fearey. Bob had a reputation in the Foreign Service as being very difficult to work for. He was in Bangkok after having stopped in Saigon with the group. But some of McCain's staff went ahead to Bangkok. When it arrived, they noted that they didn't have the CINCPAC's briefing book. I told them that I had taken them to Honolulu and left them there. I suggested that they ask the Political Advisor; they said they would prefer not to do that. So I offered to provide them mine and my boss'—he was up in Chiang Mai. I changed the names on the covers and gave them to the CINCPAC staff. The next evening, I saw Bob Fearey and asked him whatever happened to the briefing books I had left with him in

Honolulu. He said he had them with him. I told him that one of them was McCain's. He said that he would give him the copy ASAP. That was essentially my introduction to Fearey who later chose me to be his assistant in the civil administration function in Okinawa, on the basis of our attendance at the SEATO meeting.

Leonard Unger was our Ambassador to Thailand. He had been there for several years and knew more about SEATO than any of the officers working on the subject. One day, I got an urgent call from the Embassy's deputy Political Counselor. He told me that the Ambassador wanted to change the briefing books. I said I would be glad to talk to him to see what he wanted done. The Embassy officer noted that it might be difficult to change the books since the Secretary already had his copy. I knew that the Secretary had not opened his book. I was in my little hotel room when Unger called. We negotiated the changes over the phone and I made them in the Secretary's book. Rogers never knew; as far as I know, he never looked at it at all. This SEATO meeting was typical of many such gathering. Speeches were drafted and cleared in a car coming and going to meetings or meals.

SEATO was never an important institution. The officers we used to assign to it were always frustrated. Whenever they were asked to research anything, they would go look for documents in the Secretariat and find that they were so far out of date to be useless. SEATO was kept alive because it provided a psychological support base in South East Asia at a time when we were involved in a war in that region—a war that was not a smash success either in Vietnam or at home. Admiral McCain paid some attention to it; he had a large staff devoted to liaison with the organization. It had some aspects of prestige for him. I remember that he wanted to come to the SEATO meeting in 1969 on the Secretary's plane. Dick Pedersen, who was the Counselor of the Department and in charge of the Secretary's travels, and I were working together on the seating on the airplane. He was not very much in favor of making room for CINCPAC on the plane. So I finally told the military aide that we would save one seat for McCain. That raised eyebrows because the CINC never travels alone; he always had an aide with him. I said that I was sorry but that

we had room for only one person. The aide went to McCain who said that he would take it. He traveled from Honolulu without an aide! The plane was configured to have a table in front. At that table, sat Pedersen and his wife and McCain and Bill Sullivan. When Mc Cain joined the group, he asked Mrs. Pedersen if she minded if he smoked. She said “no”. So McCain proceeded to pull out a big cigar and lit it. He saw precious little of the Secretary during the trip, as far as I could tell. I remember at one time, he was trying to find something in the briefing book. He said to Sullivan: “God-damn it. I can't find anything in my god-damn briefing book without my god-damned aide!”. During that whole trip, it is highly unlikely that the Secretary and McCain had much of a chance to discuss anything at any great length. In Saigon, he had to go see the troops, in Bangkok he had his own Committee to attend while the Secretary attended the Foreign Ministers' Committee.

Q: You said that you spent about a year on the SEATO desk, part of which were devoted to assisting the US Delegation to the UN. How did that come about?

CLARK: When the UN General Assembly meets in the Fall of each year, each geographic bureau sends a representative to New York to be an advisor to the US Delegation and to see it on meetings that the Secretary might have with his counterpart from countries in their region. The UN person in EA was in the same office with me, but I was the underemployed staff member. So early in 1969, I was asked whether I would go to New York for the General assembly meeting. That sounded like great fun and I readily agreed, even though it meant postponing my arrival in Okinawa—my next assignment for a couple of months. I wanted to see how the UN worked without being assigned there for a long time.

I spent my three months in New York, working on EA issues as they arose during the Assembly meeting. I also met with representatives of other EA countries to discuss the issues of the moment. That was in part to enable the US delegation to have someone that could go to each East Asia country delegation to garner support if needed for US position. We were supposed to know what the sentiments of each delegation were, whether they

would be amenable to changing positions, what might be done if policy changes were to effected. You become the “whip” for a geographic region.

I sat in on all the meetings the Secretary had with East Asia Foreign Ministers. That does not happen today because the regional assistant secretaries or their deputies do that. Rogers did not like to have many people in those meetings; so there may have been two or at a maximum three Americans attending these one-on-one sessions. I don't believe that the assistant secretary was there. So it was usually the Secretary, a member of the US Delegation at the UN, myself and the Country Director—sometimes. In those days, the US contingent was very much smaller than today. Over time, the Fall meetings grew into a major exercise with ever increasing representation from Washington.

I learned that countries tended to send some good people as members of their UN Delegations and as part of their Permanent Representative offices. We had very little to do with the UN Secretariat; it was essentially a paper-pushing and locating operation. I met Tommy Koh of Singapore—the UN was his first Ambassadorial posting. I remember talking him into voting in support of us on some issue. After I fist had made my pitch, he said that he thought he would abstain. I told him that we would be grateful if he could vote with us and asked him whether it would not be possible for him to check with his home base for some new instructions. He said he had already been instructed. I asked him what the instruction were. He said: “I am instructed that whatever I am not instructed on, I am to abstain”.

The year 1969 was the last year we were able to successfully defend the Republic of China against that “menace from the Mainland”; that is, we were able to have the China seat remain in Taiwan's hands for another year.

In general, I concluded that the UN was a useful instrument of international diplomacy. Of course, it was a lot more talk than action, but there was enough done to suggest that it was a useful forum. We worked very hard to prevent further erosion of our Vietnam

policy. The Soviets kept threatening to table a resolution of disapproval, but in the final analysis, never did. We also worked hard on the China Sea issue and the Korean issue —that dreaded North Korean resolution to end the UN Command and withdrawal of all foreign forces from the peninsula. Of course, all members of the US Delegation got involved in Middle East issues. My colleagues were an interesting group. I had my onward assignment; the ARA representative was on his way out; AF sent Dean Brown, who was an Ambassador. So each bureau was represented by very different levels of officers, as had been historically true.

Q: How did your assignment to Okinawa come about?

CLARK: As I said, I was in the regional Office of the Bureau for Far Eastern Affairs. I was a Japanese language officer. The Country Director for Japan at the time was Richard Sneider, later Ambassador to Korea. One day, he asked me to come to his office. All who now him have recognized what a great manipulator of policies and people he really was. He said that he wanted me to go to Okinawa to head up a liaison office—the political advisor's office for the Civil Administration. He said that he had send my name to Bob Fearey, who had agreed on my assignment. Sneider said that Fearey knew me “well and favorable”. I mentioned him in connection with the SEATO meeting that was held in 1969. He had moved from POLAD in Honolulu to Civil Administrator in Okinawa. I told Sneider that that assignment seemed alright. Once the word had gotten around, I received unsolicited advice from a number of people who thought I was making a mistake, primarily for going to work for Fearey. In fact, Bob and I became great friends and he is one of my son's godfathers. But he had a reputation of being very tough on people, particularly those who had not established the right relationships right away.

I knew something about the Okinawa problems from my tours in Japan. I also knew that, for the record, an assignment to Okinawa would show as “detail to the US Army”. That was not the most propitious entry a Foreign Service officer could have on his record; I had no illusions that the Okinawa assignment would be “career-enhancing”. But the opportunity

to participate in a process which would return occupied territory to its former country seemed to me to be too important to miss. The decision to revert the island back to Japan had already been reached in the previous year; it was progressing towards an unset date, but I was confident that it would happen during my tour in Okinawa. I was looking forward to assisting the reversion and preventing any obstacles from being erected. What I didn't know was that Sneider was going to go to Tokyo, first as the officer in charge of the reversion process and later as the DCM. Sneider knew that when he asked me to go to Okinawa, but I didn't.

The whole administration of Okinawa was under the US Army. We did have a consulate there which was sub-office of the consular section in the Embassy in Tokyo. That was the ingenious solution to the question of how the US Government could have a Consulate in territory which it already administered. The head of Okinawa consular section was very unhappy with that solution because he was not treated as a Principal Officer which impacted on his eligibility for a number of allowances like Official Residence expenses. All of the Americans in the Consular Section remained part of the State Department establishment; they were not seconded to the US Army. That office was there primarily to service the American military who needed documentation if they were to leave Okinawa for visits to other places. The US military was not entirely happy with the State Department presence for quite a while, but it finally adjusted to it.

I, on the other hand, was detailed to the US Army as were all of the Foreign Service officer who worked for the Civil Administration. I replaced John Manjo who had been the first Foreign Service Officer to head the liaison office. Before that, that position had been filled by a US Army civilian. The office liaisoned with lots of units, but principally it was there to maintain contact with the government of the Ryukyu Islands, which was run by Okinawans. That was the organization that really governed the Islands.

The US presence in Okinawa was headed by a High Commissioner. He was also the commander of the 8th Army—a lieutenant general. He was assisted by the 8th Army

Chief of Staff, a CINCPAC Chief of Staff because the General also was part of the CINCPAC staff, and a civilian Chief of Staff. Below that level, there was a large Civil Administration staff, which had legal, economic and administrative sections as well as the Liaison Office. The Civil Administrator was a civilian; his deputy was a Colonel. Over time, the Department assigned Foreign Service Officers to the Civil administrator. When it became clear that the Islands would be reverted to Japan, the Army became less and less interested in the function and the State Department increased its representation because, wisely, it thought it was important to have officers in Okinawa who knew the language and the culture as we approached the actual reversion date. So my deputy was a Foreign Service Officer; there were two other FSOs in the Liaison Office as well as four military officers, three secretaries, two Japanese-Americans for translation purposes and two Okinawans.

Our major political objective was to keep stability on the Islands until Japan could take control. We were concerned with anti-base agitations which was on-going; much of it was generated, strangely enough, by the base workers' union. We used to have demonstrators demanding the abolition of the bases and the same time they insisted on no more reductions in staffing. Logic was not of great importance! So we had to wrestle with some unrest. The US had used Okinawa for a storage area for poison gas—mustard and CSH nerve gas. The demonstrations forced us to remove that material from the Islands. That was very touchy issue.

Then we had to worry about the future of the facilities we had on Okinawa. Over the years, the US had maintained that many of these facilities were being built for the benefit of the islanders, but which, as part of the final settlement, were in fact sold to Japan for $360 million, which in the late 1960s was a fairly sizeable amount. Ten percent of that went, at the demand of Senator Javits, to a Japan-US Friendship Commission—an educational program which is devoted to funding research and studies. It is still alive even though it had been expected to go out of business years ago.

We had to deal with the disposition of the Senkaku Islands which are located between Okinawa and Taiwan. They are on the Chinese Continental Shelf. Nevertheless, Japan claimed them—the only territory claimed by Japan which is on the other side of the Japanese chain. These islands had been part of the Japanese Empire, but had been administered from Taiwan. When we occupied Okinawa, we administered the islands from there. The US government, in one of its usual firm, unswerving positions, said that it was turning the administration of the islands over to Japan, but would not take a position on which country they belonged to. The Taiwanese stimulated some demonstrations against this solution on the Senkakus which we had to deal with.

One other issue that we worked on diligently was the question of which facilities might be retained on the Islands and which would have to be relocated. In fact, this was not a major problem. Unlike the our bases in Japan, the bases in Okinawa were leased from the Okinawans. That made for a large “landlord community”. As we approached reversion, the Japanese government picked up the leases and became the tenants. The lease terms were quite generous; in most cases, the leases were more profitable for the Okinawan owners than alternative uses. That factor dampened down the enthusiasm for closing the bases.

The reversion negotiations were a three way discussion: the Japanese government, the Okinawans and us. There wasn't much interest in the issues in other countries. It some way, the most difficult part of the process was to get the various US bureaucracies to agree and to speak with one voice. Let me take you back into history briefly. The first US administrator of the Islands was the US Navy. Then the responsibility was shifted to the US Army. The High Commissioner, as I mentioned, was a US General—the last one being Jim Lambert. We were all fortunate that he was in charge during the end game; in fact, he extended his tour in Okinawa for another year to finish the job. He had been an engineer and thought that seeing reversion to fruition would be a high note of his career. Issues referred to the Pentagon were handled by a special group in the Office of International

Security Affairs which was responsible for Okinawa and Panama issues. This group had been in being for many years; it had a relatively narrow view of Okinawa. It resisted change. The Army finally reluctantly agreed to support reversion, in part pushed by Lambert who was committed to the process and who was instrumental in making progress. The Army, until 1968, viewed Okinawa as a vital defense territory for the defense of our Far East position. The Navy was much more relaxed. They had a much smaller operation on the Islands. The Air Force had a large installation as did the Marines, but the Army was in charge and therefore viewed itself the greater “defender of the faith”. The Air Force and the Marines knew that their facilities would remain even after reversion; so they stayed out of involvement in the politics of reversion. Three years before reversion, the Okinawan government changed from a conservative one to a reform in an election. The new Chief Executive was less favorably disposed to us than his predecessors, but he was absolutely committed to getting us out of the civil administration of the Islands. That helped in getting good cooperation out of him. We were able to do some things with that Executive that we might not have been able to do with a conservative. For example, he was very helpful in the removal of chemical weapons, which was quite an operation.

I think in general we had done a pretty good job in getting the Okinawans prepared to administer their own territory. We certainly did a far better job there than we did in Micronesia. The Okinawans, at reversion time, were in pretty good economic shape by South East Asian standards. They were not at the level of their countrymen in Japan, but then they had not been there even before the war. It became the poorest prefecture in Japan as it had been before the war. Our investment was relatively modest to that made by Japan after reversion. We had done a fair amount, but our investment was essentially in the development of the bases, which did become the mainstay of the economy. The Islands were essentially an agricultural area; employment provided by the bases was a major economic boost. Of course, a whole base support industry developed—bars, restaurants, etc. We had a good many Americans stationed on Okinawa who spent some of their income on the local economy. So our presence certainly was important to the

economy, but still not sufficient to bring it up to Japanese standards. We did relatively little on infrastructure investment. We were building a rather large dam to help improve a fair water system. The roads were acceptable and we were building some at the time of reversion. There was a working telephone system. So the economy was finally moving in the right direction; the Japanese accelerated the process.

I arrived in Okinawa after the initial negotiations had been completed. The amounts of compensations had been settled. But there here were still some ambiguities that had to be worked out. One was that, in the reversion agreement, we had promised the Okinawans a complete after system. That seemed to have been forgotten in days after. When we finally got around to looking at it, we found that the main pumping station was in the middle of Kadena Air Base. The Air Force was reluctant to turn the base over to the Okinawans, but eventually it gave in and we did return the base to Okinawa. That was just one example of a lot of loose ends that had to be tied down before the final ceremony. These fine points were not left intentionally vague; the initial agreement was relatively detailed and voluminous, but still too broad to nail down every last aspect. We spent a lot of time with Japanese on how the various projects—the dam, the roads, etc.—that we had started would be completed. In retrospect, that was primarily an exercise in negotiations because once the Japanese took control of the Islands, they proceeded as they wished. We undertook those negotiations because we had an engineering division in the Civil Administration which was dedicated to doing a good job and it wanted to be sure that the Japanese would not let all their good work go down the drain. Actually, we just should have told the Japanese what we were working on, given them the plans and then let them do what they pleased.

The initial negotiations were between the Japanese and the US Government. Subsequently, as the details had to be worked out, the Ryukyu Islands administration was brought in making the those discussions tri-partite. The US was represented by a Foreign Service officer assigned especially to Okinawa for these last negotiations; he had a small staff working with him. The Japanese had an Ambassador assigned to Okinawa; he was

the head of their delegation. The Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands was the chief Okinawan representative and he also has a small staff devoted entirely to the negotiations. At the end of the day, it was primarily a hand-holding operation which was useful in that regard. The Americans doing the negotiations never really appreciated how useful their role really had been. They thought they should be far more operational, but that is not what that staff was intended to be. They were there to act as an information transmission belt and to make sure that all none of the Okinawans were surprised by any developments. This process permitted the local inhabitants to have considerable input before they were officially at the negotiating table.

From the time the US Government had agreed to deal with reversion, the State Department began to infiltrate the US military establishment on the Islands. We, who worked in a US Army organization, got along quite well with the US military. By the time I arrived, the Civil Administrator and his staff had the confidence of the High Commissioner and the US military-civilian interface went quite well. We, of course, had differences of opinions with the US military on substantive issues, but we were fully accepted by them as part of their operations. The Consular office, which as I mentioned was a sub-office of the Embassy in Tokyo, had a more difficult time. The head of the office was never quite pleased with his status because, as I also mentioned earlier, he never had all the perks that went with being a Principal Officer. Until just shortly before reversion actually took place, the US military was very suspicious of the independent State Department personnel on the Islands. They used to monitor the consular operation closely, even though that function was in Okinawa essentially for the benefit of the military. Of course, as time went on, that consular operation was most helpful to the Okinawans who wanted to travel to US or its territories. At one point, Dick Flint, who was the head of that consular office, used to go to Tokyo once each quarter to report what was going on in Okinawa because all of his communications went through military channels, which he felt restricted his reporting. He did write letters and traveled to Tokyo, but I think he felt that he was being censored. The

consular section actually worked on one of the military bases; that meant that Okinawans who had consular business to transact had to go through a military check-point.

My assignment to Okinawa was rather serendipitous in the first place having accidentally met Bob Fearey while I was working on SEATO Affairs in Washington. I arrived in Okinawa right after the completion of a major conference on the reversion process. Representatives of State and DOD from Washington attended as well as representatives of the High Commissioner. I was told that it had been a very good conference, except for one occasion when a State Department officer—trying to be amusing, I think—commented that General Lambert was using “back channel” communications to Washington. The General didn't appreciate the gratuitous remark and tore the State Department officer into shreds. In fact, Lambert did not use “back channels” and tried his best to be very cooperative with all elements of the US government. The conference finally got over that inauspicious beginning and was successful. My job, right from the beginning, was to liaison with the government of the Ryukyu Islands. At an earlier period, the Civil Administrator and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands had been in the same building. But then a new headquarters was built which separated us from the local government—three miles away which most often took thirty minutes to navigate. So the Liaison Office was not spending as much time as it should have with the Okinawans. It was my job to see the Chief Executive, although his official counterparts were really the High Commissioner and the Civil Administrator.My main task was the liaison one. I was also responsible for a public affairs function, which included the management of a small fund to build small village places and other facilities of that kind and were intended primarily to engender good will. We spent some time on “putting out fires”. If problems arose, we would try to find solutions. We intervened to a considerable extent in local politics. The last time we tried it—election of Chief Administrator— it was an abject failure. We did support the LDP candidate for Chief Administrator. He was followed by a conservative who in turn was succeeded by a socialist, Mr. Yara, who also became the first governor after reversion. About the time I got to Okinawa, the LDP opened an office in Okinawa, headed by a Mr.

Nishimi. He later became the Governor of the Islands. Before I arrived, I believe that we provided financial support to LDP candidates; by the time I arrived, the election had taken place and no further US government financial support was disbursed. There was an election of Mayor of Naha. But the reform Mayor was so solidly entrenched that his election was assured. But we had a policy before reversion had been agreed on to support candidates that backed the status quo.

One of the things that I found interesting was the chemical weapons removal because it gave me considerable insight into the workings of several organization. One of those was the US military. The existence of weapons had been published in the Wall Street Journal about six months before my arrival in Okinawa. The military was rehabilitating some of the mustard gas canisters which were deteriorating. A small leak had developed on one of the canisters; no harm had one to anyone, but the story became known to the Wall Street Journal. That began the drive to remove them form Okinawa. The preparation for evacuation was very elaborate. at the last minute, Washington decided that a test run would be necessary—six months in advance of the total evacuation. Some of us argued against this decision on the grounds that a test run would only exacerbate the local concerns; if we were to get the gas out of Okinawa, we should do it as rapidly as possible. But we didn't prevail. We briefed all of the islanders. We had a Colonel who went all over Okinawa briefing all the local inhabitants, explaining the procedures and what the convoy would look like—a police car in front, then an MP car, then a contamination truck, an ambulance, then the five gas carrying trucks and then the same configuration in back —the ambulance, contamination truck, etc. When the demonstration process began, I was on the press bus watching the convoy leave the base. This convoy had only four trucks in it, raising the question of what happened to the other truck. Later, the Colonel explained that his briefings were based on a “normal” convoy; there wasn't enough mustard gas to require five trucks. A story of unintended consequences. The convoy had a long way to go to Tengan Pier, where the gas would be loaded onto to ships—it was too heavy to fly out. The Okinawans objected to that route. So in the six months between the demonstration

and the real thing, we had to build a special road that went straight to the pier, mostly across military occupied territory. The Okinawans had a point; the transport of gas is a dangerous process; their population would have been at greater risk over the original route. But had we not had the practice run, but actually evacuated the gas right away, we would have been successful too. The gas was transported to Johnson Island where, as far as I know, it still rests. We built a disposal facility there, which hopefully has been used.

During the actual evacuation of the gas, Okinawa was going through a severe drought. So we tried to help out by bringing some “cloud seeders” to Okinawa. We tried to make it rain when the convoys were not moving. Trying to make it rain, but not at specific times, was a complicated task in itself. It didn't work very well. There was rain, for which the “cloud seeders” took credit. Unfortunately, most of time, the rain fell in the seas away from the Islands.

I mentioned that Dick Sneider had gone to Tokyo as Minister for Okinawa Reversion. Dave Osborn was the DCM. When Dave left, the two jobs were combined and Dick became the DCM. By the time I arrived, the direct communications problem had been solved and we had no difficulties. As I mentioned before, earlier in the history of the Okinawa occupation, the US military always wanted to put its spin on the analysis of local events. By the time I arrived that was no longer true and we sent our messages without censorship. The Embassy received copies of almost all the messages we sent, which were sent to the Pentagon with the Department receiving copies. We traveled back and forth often; that was true for Embassy personnel as well as Japanese Foreign Office officials. So we had a close working relationships with Tokyo. Washington was still concerned about reversion. The military of course was interested in maintaining as much of their base structure as possible. The Vietnam war was still on, which made Okinawa a very important logistic base for that effort. Trucks and tanks were repaired on the island, by the hundreds. Reversion was also important as an aspect of US-Japan relations, so that the State Department was interested in what was happening on the Islands. But by the time I

arrived, the decision to return and the broad outlines of an agreement had been reached. Our job in 1970 and for the following two years was just to get it done and leaving.

As I mentioned, we did have a mounting number of demonstrations as we got closer to reversion. They culminated one evening in a march on our headquarters in late 1971 or early 1972. I was in a helicopter at the time overseeing the demonstration and radioing back what was happening. That was the last march. It was a union-sponsored march, but it had been infiltrated by some radical students. They managed to pull one policeman from his group; they knocked him down and threw Molotov cocktails on him, killing him. That ended demonstrations for good; the Okinawans had had enough. The students came from the local University. Some of the demonstrated came from Japan. There was a well known incident involving our Marines who had been in Vietnam. The Marine commander, Lew Wilson, later Commandant of the Corps and a Congressional Medal of Honor holder, had decided that despite all their Vietnam experience, his troops still needed more experience, particularly in building “fire bases”. He decided that he would hold some maneuvers in the northern training area. The Marines built a gun emplacement and put a 105 into it. In the meantime, local criticism, which spread throughout the world, grew because the Marines were invading the territory of the red throated woodpecker. People were concerned that the gun fire would scare the animals and that might prevent their reproduction. Some Japanese demonstrators showed up and Wilson figured he could handle them by himself. He didn't ask for any assistance from any one who knew something about Japanese or demonstrations. He sent one of his Okinawan employees to monitor the demonstrators. They got half way up the hill where the gun stood. One of them climbed a tree and nailed the Japanese flag on it and refused to come down. I talked to the Civil Administrator about the situation and urged him to call Wilson to cancel the exercise. The Civil Administrator did that and I monitored the conversation on an other phone nearby. Wilson got on and the Civil Administrator said: “Lou, I have Bill Clark on the extension. He would like to talk to you!”. So I gave Wilson my arguments; they didn't get very far. The Marines' political advisor told Wilson that the kid on the tree was obviously a leftist and that his fellow

demonstrators would congregate around the tree. Of course, anyone who knew anything about Japan would have known that the leftists hated the flag and would never have used it, much less rallied around it. The Marines took a chain saw and threatened to cut the tree down unless the kid climbed down. He of course wouldn't; so the tree was cut down, kid and flag and all. The kid broke a couple of ribs and was treated in the US military hospital. All this happened while I was in a meeting with General Wilson, three other generals and some of the Okinawans who were protesting the proposed exercise. Wilson got a note during the meeting. He passed the note to other generals and me with many inappropriate expletives. Finally, CINCPAC called from Hawaii and told Wilson to knock off the exercise. Despite this rough beginning, Wilson and I got along very well. As it turned out, the kid was a conservative and the son of a Japanese policeman. He didn't object to our forces being in Okinawa or in japan; he just didn't want the red throated woodpecker disturbed. That is just an illustrations of some of the problems we encountered with the military. It was also an example of a Japanese who wanted the US military to stay in Okinawa but he was definitely in the minority.

The reversion decision had been big news in Japan. The details and some of the troublesome implementations were not headline material. Sato, who served seven years as Prime Minister, was the big Japanese “mover” on reversion. He had said that his principal goal was to end the war in the Far East by the Okinawa reversion. He stayed as Prime Minister until it was completed. He is one of the few politicians who supported a positive policy that he was able to see to fruition.

In closing this chapter of my career, I should describe the actual reversion ceremony which took place on May 15, 1972. It was done on that day because the Japanese fiscal year ended on March 31. The Japanese wanted reversion take place on April 1. Our fiscal year, in those days, ended on June 30 and therefore we were holding out for July 1. The obvious compromise: May 15, which made everybody unhappy. I remember one staff meeting when the generals got into a debate over the need to put up another flag post on all of the bases after reversion in order to fly both the American and the Japanese flags.

The debate was about the modalities of pulling down our flag and then putting it up with the Japanese one. I suggested that the ceremony take place at midnight, after sun down when our flag is lowered in any case. And so it was done. We pulled down our flag at sunset and raised both the next day.

Q: In 1972, you were transferred to the Embassy in Tokyo as a member of the Economic Section. What were your responsibilities?

CLARK: I was the officer in charge of US-Japanese trade problems. It was a new title for the position. I was assigned to the Economic Section even though according to the Department's personnel guidelines, I was a political officer. At this time, there was some concern in the Department that the commercial officers were seen as “second class” citizens. They were never involved in policy matters, but were kept busy writing reports. Nevertheless, I was interested in the job, I wanted to be assigned to it and Dick Sneider helped me get it. I had several years before been designated as an economic officer because I was in an economic job when “cones” came into fashion. Then, in going to Sapporo, I became a political officer, but as you can see, these designations didn't have much meaning to me—or the Department either. In any case, one of the first things we did was to integrate the commercial and economic sections—they had been in separate buildings—, thereby giving officers doing commercial work also an opportunity to develop some policies in their areas of specialization. The commercial section had been headed by a Commercial Counselor who reported to the Economic Minister; that arrangement only created friction in the economic complex and did contribute to meaningful policy making. We integrated the two sections; 18 months later it was torn asunder again when the US Commercial Service was established, which was later transferred to the Department of Commerce approximately four years later.

As became my practice in subsequent assignments, I also tried to bring the political and economic sections together. Since I was technically a “political officer” and since I was the first Japanese language officer ever assigned to the economic section—

which is an indicator of the Department's attitude in those days toward economic and commercial matters—I began to go to the Political Section's staff meetings. From time to time, I even managed to get a Political Officer to come to the Economic Section's staff meetings, but not too often. During my 1972-74 tour, the Economic Section began to look at which Japanese politicians might have an interest in economic issues. It was a marginal beginning, which has greatly improved over time. In 1972, the perception was that political and economic work were two distinct and unrelated fields of activity, which did not need to be integrated. There were some suspicions as well in the Embassy, some of which still linger. For example, the head of our translation unit had before joining the Embassy worked for the Ministry of Trade and Industry. He worked closely with the Political Section and was therefore well attuned to its needs and desires. But I could never entice him to come to the Economic Section staff meetings and therefore we were never served as well by that translation unit. So even those Japanese employees viewed themselves as part of the Political Section and were not necessarily responsive to our needs. The Economic Section was the one that really needed the translation service because I was the only officer who spoke Japanese. It could have used material available from open Japanese sources.

The Ambassador, when I reported to the Embassy was Bob Ingersoll, one of the world's real “nice guys”. He had replaced Armin Meyer, who was a Middle East expert. The DCM was Dick Sneider. The Economic Minister was Les Edmonds, who was one of the more thoughtful people I have worked with. Mike Callengar was the Economic Counselor and I was a First Secretary. Even today, we still have both an Economic Minister and an Economic Counselor. That is an indication of how serious trade issues were even back in 1972.

The day after I arrived, I went to Hakone—to the Fuji-one of the nicest old hotels there—for the first ever trade talks between Bill Eberly, the US Special Trade Representative and his Japanese counterpart, the Vice Minister for Trade of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Tsuzumi. We spent three days there talking about trade. It was a time when the Japanese

trade surplus with the US was $3.8 billion. That was the same amount as our world-wide trade deficit. It was something we “would not put up with”! The balance of trade shifted in 1970. The main Japanese exports at the time were textiles and electronics (transistor radios, etc). Our position was that the Japanese market was closed to US goods and that it needed to be opened up. What those talks resulted in was some forward buying of aircraft and wheat which brought trade into better balance. These talks were, as far as I know, the first full trade talks between the two countries. We didn't emphasize then the nature of the Japanese market as much as we were urging the Japanese to buy American goods, like cotton and wheat. It was Les Edmonds' idea for the two delegations to negotiate a side letter that would have allowed American retailers to open up stores in Japan to sell US goods as well as other foreign goods to fill out the line. No one ever took advantage of that agreement. The American merchandisers thought that land was too expensive, that Japanese were not super-market oriented and that there was a law which discouraged large stores. We could have taken care of the last problem if an American retailers was interested in overcoming the first two. Sears, JC Penney and others took a look and rejected the opportunity. If they just would have bought the land then, they could have made immense profits years later without ever building on it. It is true that land was expensive throughout Japan. When I was in Osaka in 1963, I did the first land survey at the behest of the Consul General, Owen Zurhellen. We were looking for a building site in Osaka; we had one in Kobe, but wanted to build in Osaka. The front of the main railroad station in Osaka was occupied by a lot of squatters who had occupied the land after some two story bookshops burned down. After the fire, the squatters hurried to occupy the land, thereby making it their own. That land in 1963 was worth more than any space in Manhattan of comparable size. Land prices were always high in Japan, but they also grew tremendously over the decades and of course became astronomical in dollar terms because of the dollar decline.

The important point that I wanted to make is that, had the Americans retailers been able to see over the cost consideration barrier, they could have opened chain sores in Japan.

Starting in 1962, the Japanese themselves started enlarging their department stores, getting away from the standard “mom and pop” store. A large part of the LDP came from small shop owners; that trend was not acceptable to them and they revolted. That resulted in the “large store” law which required that any investor who wished to build a large store had to obtain the agreement of all the small store owners in the neighborhood. That was daunting for Japanese firms; the Americans figured that it would be an impossible barrier for them. But since we had reached agreement with the Japanese government that large American stores were acceptable, I think we could have worked out the modalities with the Japanese government. My assumption has never been tested, so that I can't be sure of the results had an American retailer decided to try to enter the Japanese market. It is true that American retailers faced the issues of costs, the “large store” law and the cultural Japanese aversion to large stores, but I hoped that a retailer or two would really test the market. In fact, during the time we are discussing, the Japanese had some large department stores, but not the large discount stores that were becoming popular in the US. That came later in Japan.

Eberly and his staff put a lot of emphasis on Japanese purchase of US aircraft. That was the year when Lockheed and Boeing were competing for Japanese orders. This was a very important question which eventually resulted in the resignation of Tanaka as Prime Minister because of alleged bribery. There was considerable discussion in Japan on whether our governments had agreed on one American supplier; I have never researched the issue, but I suspect that the rumor was probably true. At the time, there was no Japanese competitor; the aircraft field remained open to foreign competition for roughly another fifteen years.

Our trade discussions with the Japanese during this period was mostly about commodities. No pressure had yet been brought to bear by the American auto industry to open the market to their products. That market at the time was still insufficiently developed to attract American interest. The Japanese were beginning their penetration of the American market, but it was not yet a significant factor. During my time as the officer-in-charge of

US-Japanese trade matters, we had some discussions about “closed markets”, but that usually referred to specific sectors.

The Department's interest in our commercial work varied from individual to individual. There was very little interest in commercial issues in EA, unless a commercial issue appeared likely to become a political dispute. But the Bureau of Economic Affairs, particularly in the commodity sections, were interested in our work. But those officers were also not as integrated into the policy development process as they should have been. Congressional interest had not yet developed to any great extent.

The Ambassador showed more interest in my work than the DCM. He had come from the business sector and was interested in trade. Dick Sneider was interested as well, but to a degree. He was occupied with the management of the Embassy and had other tasks to work on. Les Edmonds was responsible for the economic work of the Embassy. In any case, although trade imbalance was an issue in 1972, I don't think we ever foresaw the present situation. We viewed as a cyclical matter which would rise during some years and decline in others. But then we didn't foresee the huge trade that now prevails between the two countries. In 1972, we were trying hard to raise agricultural trade to $3 billion. We reached that in 1974, shortly before I left. That we believed was a major achievement. Today, of course, that looks like peanuts, if you pardon the expression!

I did work very hard on trying to help the Brown Shoe Co. to penetrate the Japanese market. The Japanese had a “cultural” reason for trying to block that. In their view, shoe manufacturing was done by the “untouchables”, who had been brought to Japan for specifically that purpose. Imports might create unemployment for those people and then what would they do?. That argument had some validity. In fact, a young lady whose family might own a shoe store would have had difficulty in finding a suitable husband. She would be suspect of having some “untouchable” blood in her veins. In reality, I conducted a survey and found that only 10% of the shoes made in Japan were made by “untouchables”. But that didn't have any effect on the Japanese. They imposed quotas on

leather and hide imports. So we decided that if we couldn't get shoes through, we would try for the higher quality end of the leather and hide lines. Even that was very difficult. The “cultural” rationale for blocking shoe imports was pure bunk. The argument could be made that, based on Buddhist philosophy, shoes should be brought in from foreign lands because then Japanese could not be charged with killing of animals and using their hides. The main reason for import restrictions was that the Japanese government sold quotas for imports of leather and hides. It was a lucrative income for the government and for the traders which they were most reluctant to give up. One Director General in the Foreign Ministry told me that importers were not beyond calling on him at his office and dropping a short sword on his desk. He was worried for safety. So the few importers that controlled the trade were not anxious to give up their monopoly and would have gone to great length, I think, to enforce their privileged status.

Rice was never in question; there was an absolute prohibition against imports. But rice has had a curious history. When I first came to Japan and still in the mid-1960s, Japan was buying rice from us. It was not self-sufficient and was happy to buy the rice. I remember being in one of the better sake breweries in Osaka; I asked the owner whether his customers knew that he was using American rice. He said that they didn't and hoped they would not find out. The sake tasted the same regardless of the origins of the rice. In fact, the brewery was known for making sake from special rice grown in one particular region of Japan with special water. The rice came from us and the water probably out of the tap. So when the Japanese were not self-sufficient, they did not have any problems with import of foreign rice. In fact, the reason the Japanese have such great problems with rice imports now stems from their imports of twenty years ago. Then the Japanese government bought domestic rice at an inflated cost, but by mixing it with cheap imported rice, it could sell it to its people at a reasonable price. That ploy worked until the early 1970's when Japan became self-sufficient in rice. The government was then stuck with paying inflated prices to the farmers, but had to sell it to its consumers at a much lower level. That created a

major budgetary drain which was not foreseen and Japan slipped into this difficult situation gradually without attracting much notice until it was too late.

A lot of food came through purchases of a food agency which had a monopoly on the imports of such commodities as wheat. There were quotas on citrus—grapefruit, oranges, lemons. We finally got the lemon quota lifted after years of battles. The Japanese kept arguing that the imports of lemons might diminish their sales of Mekong oranges. There was no correlation between the two citrus fruits at least in our eyes. Now that oranges can be imported, Mekong sellers are still doing quite well. One could make the argument that the Japanese were using us for their own purposes because Mekong oranges were being overproduced by about 20%. The Japanese finally gave us a higher quota on oranges and then told the Mekong farmers that they had to cut down twenty percent of the trees because the “Americans had forced us to import more of their oranges.” There was no causal connection, but it the government's ploy was used to its advantage both with its farmers and us. Our import quota was raised, but at the same time, the Japanese made us the scapegoats.

In 1972-73, some one in the Department of Agriculture, decided that the United States was running out of soybeans. One day, we received instructions to inform the Japanese that until further notice we were cutting off all exports of soybeans. We raised the question with Washington whether that ban included soybeans for tofu—bean curd—which was a staple of the Japanese diet. These were special soybeans for which the Japanese had issued contracts. The answer was that the export prohibition covered all soybeans. So I went to the appropriate Japanese Ministry and delivered the message. The next day, the press published the story; the price of tofu immediately doubled. Agriculture in Washington continued to study the problem and then soon found that in fact we did not have a soybean shortage. Our embargo in the final analysis did not reduce any Japanese soybean imports, but the price of tofu remained twice what it had been before we made our pronouncement.

Every housewife in Japan hated us, for a while, since they saw the rise in the tofu price as an American-driven plot. It was not one of our finest hours!

Q: Did the Embassy have an Agricultural Attach# at that time?

CLARK: Indeed it did. It was a rather sizeable office which was part of the Embassy's economic cluster, reporting to Les Edmonds. The Attach# was primarily assigned to push American agricultural products. That is true even today. The Embassy in Tokyo has always had a relatively large Agricultural Section. Japan has always been both actually and potentially a large market for Americans products.

Our access to Japanese manufacturers at that time was pretty good. My Embassy job did not require me to do some of the things I had done in Osaka. For example, I did not make “end-user” checks; that is, investigating what foreign buyers were doing with military hardware they had bought from the military. I did have contacts with Japanese businessmen, partially because I was the only Japanese speaking officer in the Economic Section. But plant visits remained pretty much the responsibility of the constituent posts, although I did some just because I liked to do it. Even then, we were interested in finding areas in the prefectures that might lend themselves to American investment. Not much investment ever developed, but we did gather some interesting insights into Japanese development. There were some American investments, like Texas Instruments. It had a long fight to establish an operation in Japan with 100% American ownership to make semi-conductors. That was when we still had a monopoly on that market. The Japanese finally agreed and Texas Instruments built a plant in Kyushu. Now, that operation is well integrated into the Japanese market. IBM had already established a presence in Japan with 100% ownership. That was an interesting situation. Even in the early 1970s, although the operation was entirely owned by IBM (incorporated in Japan), its actual operations was run by a completely Japanese work-force, up to and including the president of IBM-Japan. The production of the IBM facilities was counted by the Japanese as foreign manufactured, until the 1980s; that bolstered their argument that they needed to subsidize

their own computer development because “foreign” firms had such a large share of the market. So the Japanese, when analyzing the foreign penetration of their markets, included all IBM production, even though taking place in their country, as being “foreign”.

The American business community in Tokyo in the early 1970s was fairly good size. It was not as large as it was as its height and it is now smaller, but even then there must have been about 1000 American business men in Tokyo. There was an American Chamber of Commerce, with whom we worked well. This was the period during which the Japanese opened their market to foreign banks; that created mini explosion of American banks opening offices in Japan. Most of them started on the wrong foot; they insisted on having an office on a street corner for “walk-in” traffic, although that was not a good business opportunity. They paid awesome amounts for rental of real estate which was not very useful in the final analysis. The American banks had not done their home work; they knew little about the Japanese market. Banks in Japan were not allowed to advertise for “walk in” business; furthermore, the ordinary Japanese was very reluctant to deposit his yen in an American bank. They used Japanese banks or postal savings accounts which were exempt from tax declarations.

The Ambassador would meet with the Chamber's executive board monthly. At each of these session, one embassy officer would brief the group on matters that he or she were working on. In exchange, the Chamber would brief us on what they were working on. That relationship has grown even closer as years passed. The Chamber had complaints, of course, but in those days, the business community appealed to the Embassy only as a last resort. That meant that the problems were usually quite large before they were brought to our attention. Even when they had a problem, most of the Chamber's members did not wish to be identified as the source of the complaint. They would ask us to help in the resolution of an issue, but didn't want to be publicly connected with the process. They were concerned about potential Japanese retribution.

I might add a couple of additional matters of interest. Because of an earlier assignment, I retained my interest in textiles. There was an official in USTR who dealt in textiles. His name was Tony Jurick; he had been involved in much of the Okinawa negotiations. He was sort of prot#g# of Strom Thurmond's. When I got to Tokyo, I noticed that Jurick was coming for a visit. I asked who had been assigned as escort officer. I was told that no one could handle Jurick; he just ran around Tokyo on his own. So I volunteered to shepherd him; I followed him around and learned a lot. This happened in a period when the Japanese were just about ready to support us in global textile negotiations. They were becoming increasingly concerned about imports and less about exports. Tony had a meeting with his counterpart in MITI, but never at MITI. They met in hotel rooms. I watched them hammer out the negotiations. After a week, they finally reached agreement. Then Tony wanted to know where the formal meeting would be held which would ratify what the two of them had already agreed upon. The Japanese official said that it couldn't be in Tokyo because there would be too much pressure; he said it couldn't be in Washington because then he would be accused of having sold out to the Americans. He therefore suggested Hawaii. Tony had problems with that suggestion, but he finally gave in. Then came the question of how long this ratifying meeting would take. The Japanese official said “Five days”. Tony thought that this was excessive and suggested three. He thought that that was all that would be necessary. The Japanese said it had to be no less than five because for the first two days, he would balk at any American suggestion and fight for the Japanese position. At the end of two days, he would have to fly back to Tokyo; he would then return and sign an agreement, the terms of which had already been decided on during Tony's stay in Tokyo. And that is exactly how the drama unfolded. The American and Japanese delegations met in Hawaii, fought for the first two days, broke so that the Japanese could return to Tokyo and assembled again to finish the deal. That was an illustration of how American-Japanese deals are put together which we have seemed to have forgotten. Now we negotiate in the press, thereby preventing the Japanese officials to go through their elaborate Kabuki dance in order to show his constituency that he had been fighting very strongly for them. I found Jurick's modus operandi very instructive

and effective. I also learned that the Japanese official had considerable limitations on his freedom of action, which today's press seems to ignore or minimize. He had to manipulate his own constituency, just as Tony had to manipulate the American textile industry. I am now talking about the early USTR days when it was a rather meek organization. The staff was still small. They essentially coordinated and directed the rest of the bureaucracy to contribute to the government's trade policies. USTR were the lead negotiators, but they were not an entity unto themselves as they later have been accused of being. If there were any difficulties then they usually stemmed from the lack of economic expertise in State Department. Commerce had more people than they knew what to do with. That meant that State was always outmanned on trade issues, but the government worked well in those days on trade issues.

All of the Japanese bureaucracy is beholden to its clients; that is probably true in most countries, but it is certainly so in Japan. There is a close relationship between a Japanese official and his constituency. Then and still today, bureaucrats retire at age 55 or 60. If they are very successful, and need to have a second career, there is the Amakudari—the descent from heaven— which brings the official into one of the organizations that he represented during his government career—after a two year “cooling off” period during which the bureaucrat is given a job in a think tank or some other “purifying” activity. I have a good friend who used to be the Japanese Ambassador in London. He then became a consultant to Mitsubishi. I asked him what his duties there were. He said he had given that matter considerable thought at the beginning. He finally had reached a conclusion. He said he would remember a photograph of the chairman of a large Japanese corporation. There would be a lot of people in the background. In the background, somewhat indistinct, would be a Chinese vase, which you can not see clearly, but you know that because it is in the chairman's office, it must be valuable. He viewed himself as a Chinese vase—a sort of decoration.

In those days, the Ministers themselves became involved in negotiations after the deal had been struck, if at all. On textiles, Ministers tried their best not to get involved so that their

political future would not be endangered. One of the famous episodes in the US-Japan textile story took place in Hawaii when Nixon met Tanaka. Nixon insisted that he needed a concession; Tanaka, after a lot of arm twisting, gave him the Japanese political equivalent of the “check is in the mail”—Zensho shimas, which literally means “I will make my best effort”. Japanese experts understand that the term means “No way” or “I will give it a good shot, but I know that I will fail”. Nixon took the literal translation and played it up as having achieved more than would have been expected. Neither Japanese or Americans liked to get involved in textile negotiations.

Agriculture was a little easier. There was no flat barrier in Japan against import of such commodities as wheat. The negotiations on those commodities was on how much would be imported. Beef and oranges were a different matter; there the argument was on whether any imports would be allowed. Those discussions took place until fairly recently. The present Foreign Minister, Hata, was a Minister of Agriculture at a later period and then was very helpful to us on oranges. He did get involved in the early 1980s when I was the DCM. I went to see him to talk about oranges just after we had gotten a small break on beef imports. At that time, he told me that he had done all he could for US agriculture for the time being. He needed some pause in the pressure. I think that if US can find an influential Minister who has the confidence of his constituency, then a deal can be struck. Hata was the right minister and he was able to influence his constituency. That doesn't always happen. Because the Japanese tend to rotate their Ministers every two years, there will be sometimes a Minister who will not be able to take any helpful steps. Then you have to go to the politicians who do have influence in the particular commodity area in which you are interested. This close relationship between the government and the politicians supports the thesis that in a country like Japan it is essential that the Embassy's political and economic sections have to work very closely together.

Q: In 1974, you were assigned to Washington as head of the Special Trade Activities Division in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Was this a new position?

CLARK: No, it had been there for sometime. Mike Glitman was the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for trade matters. Carl Schmidt was the Office Director. There were three Divisions: Special Trade Activities, GCP (relations with developing countries) and Developed Country Trade. Tom Enders was the Assistant Secretary. He was very interested in commodities, such as oil. That meant that as long as we didn't cause any problems, we had plenty of leeway to do our jobs. It was an interesting time to be in that Bureau. Joe Greenwald replaced Tom in early 1976. Joe's first promise was that he would not stay in his office as late as Tom had done—he ended up staying later. Secondly, Joe was very interested in trade, so that much of what I had been doing on my own, I had then to clear with Joe.

Working in a functional bureau was not dissimilar to working in a regional one. Fortunately, I liked all the people I worked with. Having worked only briefly in a regional bureau, I was not wedded to the primacy of regional bureaus. Furthermore, special trade activities had responsibility for monitoring anti-dumping and countervailing duties. So we focused on specific problems which did not get us into great disputes with the regional bureaus. We also were the support staff for negotiations in the OECD and in other organizations on government procurement, anti dumping regulations, etc. It seemed to me at the time that I was more focused on specific issues than I was when I was in EA's Regional Affairs Office. There, as I said, I was responsible for SEATO affairs which was certainly a vague charter. In EB, I worked with ITC; we wrote reports for them on countervailing duties. I learned in detail about certain matters. For example, I learned more about mushrooms than I ever wanted to know. I was not popular in Kennett Square, PA—the mushroom capital of the US—when I wouldn't take up their claims.

Some of my duties brought me into contact with USTR. I found that staff to be a good one to be working with. It is there that I first Clayton Yeutter, who was the deputy trade representative. Alan Wolfe, now a key player in the semi-conductor's industry, was the counsel in USTR. We worked together on Japanese trade issues—e.g. specialty steel. I

also worked with the Commerce Department. It is interesting to note that before the Trade Act of 1975 which went into effect the following year, the government sent out teams of officials to listen to complaints from American businesses and citizens. The team was composed of a representative from Commerce, one from USTR and one from State. I was State's man for the group that went to Atlanta and New Orleans. That was an interesting trip. It was wild at times. In New Orleans, some man in a tight suit and cowboy boots came to us and told us that he had started with nothing, but now owned considerable property and leased a lot; he was a soybean farmer. He politely, but firmly suggested that the US government stay out of the soybean business because people were paying attention to what was coming out of the “little spouts” and not the “big ones”. No one asked him to explain that comment, but he stayed on after our hearings and I asked him privately to what he was referring. He told me that people would pay top price for good beans and a low price for beans with trash in them; so he had to put a lot trash in with is beans; that is what he meant by the “little spouts”.

We had considerable interaction with Congress which was very interested in dumping. Steel was a big issue and particularly specialty steels—e.g. tool steel, stainless steel. Japan was one of the alleged dumpers; Korea had not yet come unto our screen, but they were about to enter that market with the construction of their factory in Chonwan. Japan, Sweden and the EC were our main focus with the Austrians also partially accused. The only restraints that we imposed during my two year tour was on specialty steels; that was the only commodity that we had to determined to have been “dumped”. There was an effort to have us issue restrictions on mushrooms, as I mentioned; had the issue been limited to tinned mushrooms, we may have taken some adverse action on imports, but the growers wanted a ruling on the whole industry. The fresh mushroom market was doing a booming business at the time and therefore it was hard to prove that domestic growers were being injured. There was an effort to put limits or penalties on shoes which did occur later. But at the time we reviewed it, the major imports came from Spain and Italy, but were focusing our investigations on Korea and Brazil because we didn't really want to look at

our European allies. We might have been a little more evenhanded in our investigating process. In the case of shoes, any restraints that we might have invoked would have hit the low end of the market to which American manufacturers were no longer contributing.

The process of determining dumping and imposing countervailing duties was complicated even in the mid 1970s. Everybody was involved. Voluminous reports had to be written on what needed to be done. The ITC process was fairly rigorous. I had a civil servant working for me, Bill Durol, who was a superb reporting officer. He is the one who drafted our submissions to the ITC on the countervailing duty cases. When I got to my job, it struck me that these reports seemed overly lengthy. So I went to talk to the ITC to see whether we couldn't reduce the verbiage. I struck terror in their hearts because they used Durol as their information source. They used his reports for their own determinations; so he in fact did all the ground work for the ITC and they begged me not to change what they considered to be a very useful process.

Commerce generally favored a more restrictive import regime. It was normally a proponent of the industry's point of view. Treasury was also involved through its international division. On the shoe case, for example, just before the issue was to be forwarded to the President for decision, a Treasury staffer checked with some American shoe manufacturers to see whether any of them were suffering under the practices then in existence. Not a single manufacturer complaint; all said that their business was good. That bit of information was included in the memorandum to President Ford, who, after reviewing the file, decided that he would not impose any new duties. ITC played the role of honest broker in an admirable fashion; I think it did a very good job. It think that both State and Treasury had a balanced position, although I am sure that we were perceived by many as being “free traders”. USTR would, if facts warranted, usually admit that some subsidies might have been provided, but would find that in most cases they were minimal and therefore not worthy of major US reaction. That happened in several cases.

Even in the mid-1970s, trade was a major issue both in the administration and the Congress. In State, the burden for formulating a position and defending it in intra-agency fora fell to the Assistant Secretary. I don't remember the Secretary or the Under Secretary becoming involved. The regional bureaus were quite cooperative; we worked very collaboratively with them. The job in EB gave me an opportunity to become acquainted with many of the officials involved in trade issues, both in Washington and overseas. As I said, we were responsible for monitoring government procurement; that gave me several opportunities to attend OECD meetings, which was the main forum for discussing this issue. In fact there was a quarterly meeting on government procurement. The issue was finally taken up in a GATT round of negotiations. Our main objective was to open government procurement. When I went to EB, this issue had already been under discussion for a decade in the OECD in Paris. Quarterly meetings had been held for years, each of which lasted for one week. My first attendance convinced me that this was a worthwhile meeting to attend regularly, as long as it was held in Paris. I also left convinced that the OECD members would never reach a conclusion; all of the delegates had become good friends and were very happy to spend a week in Paris together every three months.

I found that in this period, the US government and the international atmosphere was more collegial than it seems to me to be today. It was the same people on each capital working on countervailing duties, dumping and associated trade issues. I think today, for example, there is a greater USTR-State adversarial relationship than was true in the 1970s. USTR was a much smaller organization which coordinated US policy and actions. It relied on the Cabinet departments to do the heavy lifting. This is not to say that we all saw the world through the same prism, but the arguments were mainly between the Cabinet departments and not between USTR and a Cabinet department. I found my tour useful because it enabled me to return to a functional bureau which was not often done for a Japanese language officer.

Q: Then, in 1976, you were assigned to the National War College? How did assignment develop?

CLARK: It was a normal assignment. One day, probably early in 1976, I got a call from a friend in Personnel. It was during Carol Laise's first year as Director General of the Foreign Service. The Department had just been blasted by a Commission on “Education in Government”, which had reviewed the selection process for advanced training and then had followed the career of those that had been trained. By 1976, the Foreign Service still considered training as an assignment that delayed one's promotional opportunities. Therefore, most officers said that they were “far too busy” to undertake training; training was one of those assignments that an officer could refuse without penalty. The Commission found that many officers were assigned to training for the lack of any other assignment; it pointed out that if that practice were to continue, funding for training would have to eliminated or at least reduced sharply. So Laise immediately issued a directive saying that an officer assigned for senior training, he or she will do so unless it could be demonstrated that that officer was the only person in the world who could undertake his or her current tasks.

As I mentioned, one day I received a call from Personnel. I was told that my name had been put on the list of potential candidates for the War College. I was asked whether I wanted to stay on the list. I said that I would. I had not asked for senior training, but I thought that it would be interesting at that stage of my career. The War College was in Washington, so that I wouldn't be too far removed from those who controlled my future. Most importantly, the War College provided a global perspective; I had been focused on Japan—ten years—and trade issues. I thought it was time to broaden my horizons. I was also impressed by how the graduates of the War College kept in touch with each other and how far these graduates had advanced—when I was a junior officer, most of the services were sending only their best to the War College where they were given first class treatment—own plane, private meetings with chiefs of state, etc.

When it became known that I was going to the War College—because of the reputation that such an assignment still carried—USTR asked me whether I wouldn't prefer to go to Geneva in one of their jobs. The job was so low ranking that normally they would never have asked me, but thinking that I would do anything to avoid the War College, they made their pitch. They may have been surprised and maybe even shocked when I told them that I wanted to go to the War College. In fact, my advanced training assignment turned out to be very useful and I never regretted my decision. I could have sought another senior training, like the Sloan School, for example, but I was glad that I chose the War College.

At the War College, I had a chance to look at Europe and some other places. It got me out of my Far East mold. I had had a close acquaintance with the military from my two years in Okinawa, so that the prospect of being in a military establishment did not daunt me. My year at the War College reinforced my appreciation for the military; I found some bright officers at the War College. One of my classmates ended up as the head of DIA; one of them, Joe Hoar, is the head of CINCCOM; two became Commandants of the War College. Tom Niles was one of my State colleagues; he later became ambassador to a couple of countries. The class was better than the staff and in many cases better than the speakers. If any speaker tried to cover a current or very recent event, there inevitably was someone in the class who had participated and might therefore know as much if not more that the lecturer. I found that first hand knowledge to be a major advantage to my education; I could obtain insights from a participant. By 1976, the class' travel had been reduced to one week of domestic travel and two weeks of foreign. I spent my one week in the US in Boston in the company of four colleagues—all from Boston and Irish. Because of them, I learned a lot more about Boston than anyone could have expected.

When the question of foreign travel arose, I was asked whether I wanted to go with the Far East group. I said that I didn't want to go to Japan. there were three different trips to Europe, which all started in Brussels, but which covered much of what had already been discussed in class. We decided that we had heard enough of the Fulda Gap. Seven of

us, including Joe Hoar, got together; they asked me to write a scenario for a different trip. I developed a trip that would cover two countries with differing political systems which existed between the two European power blocks. So we spent a week in Finland and a week in Yugoslavia. It was a great trip. It was so novel that the Director of European Affairs decided to join us. War Colleges had been in these countries previously, but no trip had ever focused on the two together. I believe that my class was the first to go to Moscow. We were treated very well in both countries. We saw the Ministers of Defense and several sub-cabinet officials. In Helsinki, we started with a briefing at the Embassy. In Yugoslavia, we toured first and then went to Belgrade. The DCM and the Political Counselor came to the airport as we arrived in Belgrade for a flight to Split; so our briefing was in the airport lounge.

I thought the year at the War College was very useful, as I said. It gave me time to reflect; it gave me time to read and to probe some issues in some depth. I wrote a couple of papers; I was encouraged to have them published, but I had decided sometime previously that I would not publish any of my writings while employed by the Department. I did not want to subject my findings and views to the censorship of people who probably knew little about the subject I was covering. I didn't submit the speeches that I gave as Ambassador for clearance either; I sent them in after the fact.

Q: In 1977, you were assigned as Political Counselor in the Embassy, Seoul, South Korea. Had Seoul been one of your assignment preferences?

CLARK: This assignment came after one of the more interesting clashes that I had ever had with the Office of Personnel. The ego of the people sent to the National War College tended to expand all out of proportion with their realistic prospects. That of course did not apply to me! As it happened the Inspection Corps team had made a proposal that the Political and Economic Counselors positions in our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, should be combined. That position would become the No. 3 in the mission. That kind of assignment appealed to me because I had experience in both fields and thought that

a combined job would be very interesting. So I applied for the position—many of my colleagues were wishing to be considered for DCM positions or higher. I became the Bureau candidate for the KL job. There was another candidate who was a good personal friend; he was supported by EB. The assignment panel met for six—six—sessions before there was a resolution. I was called one Friday and informed that the panel had finally agreed to assign me to KL. My son was also very pleased because he had visions of swinging through the jungle, as most young men would do. The following Monday, I received another call from Personnel reporting that it had just found a telegram from our Ambassador in Malaysia who had decided that because of the physical structure of the Chancery it was impractical to combine the Political and Economic Sections. But, the person in Personnel, quickly added, I could still be assigned to KL as Economic Counselor. I was not thrilled, even though it was the No. 3 position in the Embassy. I didn't cherish the thought of becoming a tin, rubber and palm oil expert. I told them I would consider it. That evening, at home, I got a call from Dick Sneider. There were two Dick Sneiders in my life: one was a Japanese language officer and the other was by then our Ambassador to Korea. I assumed it was the first, who had retired in Washington, and was very surprised to hear the voice of the second. That Dick Sneider said that he was looking for Political Counselor. As could be expected, if you knew Sneider, he said that he had made all the arrangements and had already gotten everybody's blessings for the assignment. It was of course an invitation that you declined at your own peril. Nevertheless, I said I would think about it, although it was clear to me immediately that I would accept. When I went to the Department the next day, I found that Sneider had indeed cleared the assignment with all who counted; so then I talked to Bill Gleysteen, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and told him that I would go to Seoul. So I got to Seoul through a somewhat circuitous route. The EB candidate did not end up in KL either. I should note that of the thirteen officers in my War College class, three of us had onward assignments by graduation; I actually had had two.

I had followed Korean affairs to some extent while working on Japanese issues. Through my work with the American military in Sapporo, I had some familiarity with our military activities in Korea. But I had never been there. Furthermore, I had worked with Dick closely during the Okinawa reversion process. I was a little surprised by the briefings I received before my departure. The Korea Country Director was a Russian and Korean language officer. Even though I was going to Seoul as Political Counselor, he never found time to meet with me, except for five minutes one time, before he had to run off to something else. That seemed to be a little curious. That Country Director was shortly thereafter replaced by Bob Rich. I did spend time with other officers on the desk. At the War College, we would occasionally an afternoon off which I would spend in the Department reading up on Korean issues. So by the time we left for Seoul, I was probably as well prepared as I have even been for any assignment up to that point. I viewed the assignment as Political Counselor to be a major step forward in my career.

By mid-1977, we had an interesting policy towards Korea. I had been at the War College during the 1976 Presidential election and the subsequent transition period. One of the issues I reviewed closely was the President's decision to withdraw American troops from Korea. I discussed this matter with a number of people in Washington and found that the decision was not universally supported. But that was the US government position when I arrived in Seoul. It seemed firm and indeed one American general had already been brought home from Korea for voicing public disagreement with the Presidential decision on at least two occasions. On the economic front, Korea was expanding rapidly. That was not true for political development. President Park Chung Hee, after a good start, was distancing himself increasingly from his people and becoming more imperial in his approach to governing. That did not sit well with the Carter administration. It was looking at Korea as a police state, under the dictatorship of Park. Before I left, I heard many comments about human rights and its importance in US foreign policy. I did not talk to Pat Derian, but I did talk to some of her staff members. They were particularly offended by the Park regime.

My preparations had been thorough enough that I was not initially greatly surprised by anything I found in Seoul. We knew what the chancery and our living accommodations would look like. I was struck to some extent to the differences between Japanese and Korean societies. Koreans are much more direct and franker right from the beginning. I was surprised that Korea was not nearly as an oppressive police state as one would be led to believe from the media.

Q: Tell us please how you spent an average day as Political Counselor?

CLARK: Our house, which was in a compound, was relatively close to the Chancery. That made for a nice walk in the morning. I rarely drove. We would report for work between 7:30 and 8 am. I had about eleven officers and three secretaries working in my section, which made it a rather large unit. Of course, it included a variety of “political” officers. I would start the day by reading the English language press; I could read the Korean headlines, but not much more. We also had the daily Korean press translations provided to us by USIA. Usually there was staff meeting around 8:30. They tended to be brief and very focused; Sneider particularly was action orientated and was anxious to have useful work done. Depending on the day, normally I would see visitors thereafter; two or three times each week I was out the UN/US military command talking either to military officers. There were several components in our military establishment: the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the 8th Army, the Commander in Chief—United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the Armistice Commission, under a Navy Admiral (Bill Penley was the second one I worked with). So I spent considerable time with the US military talking about the DMZ, the tunnels, warning time, the Korean political situation, etc. The US military had in its employment some very knowledgeable civilians who had lived in Korean for many years (Houseman and Bradford, who is still there). They knew a lot about Korea and were specialists in the machinations within the Korean military.

There were almost daily visits with Korean politicians either in their offices or in mine. Then I spent a lot of time supervising the staff and reviewing their reports—I ended up

editing many of their products. When I arrived, I found a curious situation. My deputy was the politico-military officer in charge of relations with the US military. The officer who was responsible for liaison with the Foreign Office had great contacts, but couldn't write very well. The politico-military officer also had good contacts with the Foreign Ministry, wrote well, but did not have good rapport with the military. So shortly after my arrival, I had the two officers swap their assignments, much to the relief of both, I think. That change worked well. So some of my time was spent on management and administrative matters.

Jack Vessey was the CINCUNC when I arrived. The relationships between Vessey and Sneider were very good—much better than the Sneider/Stilwell relationships that had existed during my predecessor's time. Dick and Jack had a common interest in golf and other sports; both were strong men, but understood the overriding need to work together. I enjoyed working with that kind of relationship. The diplomatic/military relationship in Korea was close during my tour, but it depended very much on the personalities of the two principals. As I said earlier, I understand that this close relationship had not always existed.

Q: The Carter administration was known for its emphasis on human rights in the conduct of its foreign relations. It was not happy with the Park Chung Hee regime. What did it expect the Embassy to do about it?

CLARK: It expected the Embassy to take an active role on behalf of the Korean dissentients. We were expected to keep in touch with them. The American dissidents were primarily the missionaries and they were easy to contact. This task had some curious aspects to it. The Political Section had had a labor officer who used to convene the missionaries periodically. When he was replaced as part of a normal rotation, the missionaries decided that the new labor officer was probably working for another organization; in light of that assumption, they thought that they couldn't work with him, which annoyed me no end because a) there was absolutely no basis for their fears and b) he was a very good officer. I shared my views with the missionaries, but I did agree that

I would attend a monthly breakfast so that they could know that we, the Embassy, were listening closely to their views. I would met with them in any case because they had been quite critical of the Ambassador, for reasons that I found less than admirable—they felt that he had not understood their “Christian Mission.” (Sneider was Jewish).

We ere on occasions quite forceful in our pursuit of the human rights issue. If we heard that Kim Dae Jung was suffering in jail, we would try to help him. If he was cold, we would send a heater to the cell. Fortunately, the Director of North American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry was a very good officer—Park Sun Yun, who later had a very successful career in the Korean foreign service. We worked closely with him on the human rights issue and held several very frank discussion with him on that issue. On occasions, we were told that the Korean government would not follow our advice or request. We were not inhibited from seeing opposition leaders or from commenting on the situation in Korea. Interestingly enough, the US Ambassador and the Political Counselor could make comments, but I remember a Canadian Ambassador who, while making his farewell call on President Park, decided to give his views on human rights in Korea. Park told him that he had to take criticism from the Americans, but he did not welcome it from Canadians and curtly terminated his conversation with the Canadian Ambassador.

We had good relations with the Foreign Ministry and other Ministries. When the Park Tongsun matter arose, we entered into negotiations to get him back to the US. This would normally have been an Ambassadorial responsibility, but because we were not anxious to give our discussions any visibility, I ended up negotiating with Park Sun Yun. Tongsun Park was a Korean citizen who had lived in the US and had been accused of dispensing cash favors to American Congressmen in the infamous “white envelopes”. He came from a wealthy Korean family which was, among other things, involved in importing of American rice into Korea. Allegedly, Park was paid a commission for these transactions which he was supposed to use for lobbying efforts. He was rather flamboyant; the Koreans, for a while, were quite pleased with the results of Park's efforts, until it blew up. I remember one time, at a part, a Korean telling a Taiwanese that he didn't know how to “influence”

Americans. The Taiwanese smiled enigmatically and I am sure that a couple of years later was laughing uproariously. This issue also brought us into contact with the Ministry of Justice. we didn't have an extradition treaty with Korea, so we used a “good offices” arrangements in lieu. The Tongsun Park case was interesting because there was a very vocal group in Washington that raised the specter of Park corrupting the whole US government and most of academia and the business community—all with a fund of $ 790,000. That would have been a real bargain if he could have achieved their dire predictions! But the Park affair did cause considerable stir in the US. We were anxious to have Park return to appear before a Congressional Committee. We could only achieve that with the concurrence of the Korean government and Park himself, of course. Park had to worry about his family; his mother lived on a farm, but his brother was a prominent Korean businessman, who for sometime had a close relationship to the American Embassy. It was that brother (who later ended up tragically) that negotiated with the Ambassador from a familial point of view. The negotiations really revolved around what Tongsun would be willing to do. To put pressure on him, Treasury decided to investigate his tax returns and put a lien on his two houses. Finally, we agreed to give Park immunity from prosecution for his dealings with Congress, but we could not stop the Treasury investigation. I think in the final analysis, Park lost his houses either through sale or by confiscation. Park did return to the US, after a Justice Department team, headed by Ben Civiletti—then the Deputy Attorney General—, had come to Seoul to interview Park. It was a limited interview, conducted under Korean rules, with no Americans present. One day, while looking out of a window of the Chancery at the Ministry of Justice, I noticed a caravan of black cars leaving. I reported that to the Ambassador; we assumed that it was the Justice team heading for the airport. For the first and only time, Sneider offered the use of his Cadillac and told me to tail it out to the airport to find out what was going on. It turned out that Civiletti hadn't gotten what he wanted and was leaving in high dudgeon. Despite this fiasco, we did get Park back to the US for his Congressional testimony.

I thought the US government, on the whole, handled the Park affair reasonably well. Congress was making more of it than was warranted, although I would not deny that Tongsun probably violated US law. I suspect that his reports to Seoul were probably inflated making it look like that he was more influential than he really was. After several days of his testimony, there were only two Congressmen who were convicted and they confessed. There were no trials stemming from the Park case, which leads to believe that both Seoul and Congress thought there was more to the story than finally came out. There was too much to do about some violations.

Q: Wed had a number of interests in Korea, in addition to human rights. What were they and what were you able to do about them?

CLARK: We had regional security interests. That meant that we had to try to improve understanding between the Japanese and Korean military—not an easy task, as you can well imagine. After working hard on this issue, I was told by a Japanese friend that they were doing most of what we wanted done, but were not about to tell us formally because they didn't trust us to keep the information confidential. In other words, cooperation between the two military could occur as long as it did not become public. If it became public, the two parties were afraid that we would take credit for it and then it couldn't continue. That was one surprising development that I hadn't expected.

Then we had disagreements with the Koreans on economic policy. It is true that during my tour banking regulations were eased. Curiously enough, as Political Counselor, I spent some time trying to sell American nuclear power plants; the French were exerting considerable pressure for the sale of their plants and the Swiss were competing as well. I became good friends with the Westinghouse representative in Seoul.

The strategic issues always got first priority. Our military position in Korea effected all of our relations with that country. The Carter “withdrawal” decision was very unpopular with the government although Park Chung Hee said that if we wanted to withdraw, he

would not stand in our way. the most vocal opponents to withdrawal were the dissidents who felt that such action would inevitably result in stronger repressive measures since we would lose whatever leverage we might have had on the Korean government. The presence of US troop provided some protection to the dissidents and limited the human rights violations. So our military presence in Korea had to be the top priority on our list of concerns since that was the cornerstone of all of our policies.

Q: I would like now to ask you about the North-South Korea relations during the 1977-80 period. How would you characterize it?

CLARK: It was basically one conducted over the airwaves. There had been a few minor face-to-face exchanges; there had been a couple of meetings just prior to my arrival in Seoul. A Seoul representative had gone to Pyongyang and some North Koreans had come to Seoul. By the time I arrived, those contacts had ceased. During my tour, there were no official exchanges; in fact, there weren't even any unofficial exchanges despite a couple of kidnapings. Later, in 1980, there were some activists—students—who wanted to march to the DMZ to show their solidarity with their Northern “brothers”.

I sued to watch the intelligence warnings and indicators to see whether we could glean any signs of the North's intentions. The military estimate consistently was that, with luck, we would have seventy-two hours notice of an invasion. I must admit that I was never really very comfortable with that prognostication. I didn't think that the North would or could undertake such a major military action, at least on a rapid time table. The indicators assumed that all of the North's hardware that was observable—tanks, personnel carriers, guns, etc—were in peak condition just waiting for an assault. I had doubts about that; it did not seem to me to be reasonable to assume that the North was always ready. As history now seems to confirm, we made the same mistake about the Soviet equipment—it looked good from the air, but there were no engines or wheels for the equipment on the ground.

The I Corps, led by General Cushman, which was placed close to the front lines, was a devotee of war games. He used them periodically for training purposes. I remember the first one I participated in because I noted that the ROK officers who had been assigned to play the role of the North's military, seemed quite uncomfortable with their assignment. By the time I participated in one of his last games, the ROK officers were wearing North Korean uniforms and were participating as the “enemy” as enthusiastically as their comrades who were playing on our side. It was an interesting evolution. Of course, the South always won—by definition. The games were designed to show the ROK commanders, in a gentle way, that they were interacting poorly with each other. That could not be openly said because it would have been greatly resented, particularly if the message were delivered by an American. But Cushman managed to get the same thought across through the war game technique. But because the outcome was always predetermined—i.e. a South victory—the games had a limited utility.

We were also concerned about the possibility of ROK aggressive actions. In talking to some of the ROK generals, you sometimes got the feeling that they were itching to move north, confident of a total victory. This was not a majority view and for some of them I am sure it was more a matter of bravado than an actual desire. I don't think anyone seriously considered an attack on the North because it was not an option that had a certainty of military victory. I always viewed our position in Korea as a Janus operation—two faced viewing both sides to assure that neither the North or the South moved against the other. Our role in restraining the South was never articulated in any policy statements, but it was certainly a factor in the back of my mind and an Embassy concern.

We had contacts with the ROK military, which depended in large measure on them contacting us. We were always concerned that we did not know what the officer corps —major, colonels and generals—were thinking. Many were not stationed in Seoul and in any case discussions with the Embassy were discouraged. That prohibition was also extended to the UN Command, although of course they had to have daily contacts to meet

their work requirements. We spent a lot of time worrying about increasing our knowledge of the ROK military and the internal dynamics of that group. But for the three years I was there, there was essentially no improvement in our intelligence collection capability on this subject. We knew that the ROK military used an “old boy” network for promotions and assignments. One of the colonels, while I was there, was caught selling promotions which not only ended his career, but that of his commanding general. So we knew that there may have been an element of corruption in the promotion system, but we didn't really know how wide spread it really was and what effect it may have had on the morale of the ROK army.

I might at this time talk a little about the Carter's administration's troop withdrawal policy. Vessey—I am pretty sure after conversations with Ambassador Sneider—launched a study of the troop withdrawal issue which concluded convincingly that the policy did not make much sense. This reaction to a Presidential commitment was done very skillfully. We all participated in one aspect of the study or another. It took about a year to complete it. Finally, during Carter's visit to Seoul in 1979, the policy was reversed and the President told Park Chung Hee that the US troops would remain in Korea.

President Carter arrived in Seoul, prepared to dislike the Korean “police” state or the tin-horn dictator that headed it. Fortunately for the Koreans, Carter arrived in Korea after a visit to Japan, where, because of Japanese concern for security, he was surrounded by Japanese troops and police during his whole stay. Japan really looked like a military dictatorship. Carter arrived at Seoul's international airport late in an afternoon and immediately boarded a helicopter that took him to Camp Red Cloud, an American base near the DMZ. There he had dinner with the GIs and spent the night in the camp. The next morning he jogged with some of the soldiers and officers—I always admired the commander of the Second Division who jogged on a different track and didn't join the President on his morning outing. Then Carter came to Seoul again for the official arrival ceremonies. The weather was closing in, so the US military sent Carter and his entourage on a helicopter, but the baggage came overland. One of the President's aides was furious at this turn of events; he called the CINC to demand that a helicopter be sent to Camp Red

Cloud to fly the baggage down to Seoul. Then the White House called the CINC to tell him the same thing. The officer who answered the phone—the CINC not being available—told the White House that if he was ordered to do that, he would of course comply, but if any US soldiers were killed just to transport the luggage, that that would become publicly quickly. About fifteen minutes later, the White House called and told the officer to ship the luggage by road. It was an interesting experience in staff excess.

When Carter arrived in Yoido—an island in the middle of the Han River—he landed in a large plaza near the Parliament. He was greeted by about a million Koreans—ordinary citizens. The police presence was almost undetectable. American flags were flying, people were cheering and smiling, obviously glad to see the American President. After the arrival ceremony, Carter and family got into a motorcade and drove to downtown Seoul along streets jammed with eager watchers—probably as many as another million. They were also waving American flags. Carter stopped the cavalcade, somewhat to Park Chung Hee's chagrin, got out of his limousine and shook hands with the crowd. That was not Park's modus operandi, but Carter loved it and was greatly impressed with the reception and his ability to meet some of the common folk—as contrasted to his “captivity” in Japan. Then Carter and Park met; during that meeting, Carter was supposed to inform the Koreans that he was changing his policy on troop withdrawal. Before Carter's arrival, all of us in the Embassy had warned our Korean contacts that the President would change his policy, but that Park would be well advised just to greet Carter and not initiate the conversation on troop withdrawal. Unfortunately, Park Chung Hee could not resist the opportunity to give Carter a lengthy lecture on the folly of troop withdrawal. That caused Carter to change his script; he did not at that first meeting tell Park that his policy was going to change. In fact, he was so upset by Park's lecture that as he left the Blue House—the Presidential Palace— he said to the Secretary of State and Ambassador Gleysteen that he would not change his troop withdrawal policy. I was at the Embassy monitoring the motorcade. So we knew when they left the Blue House and we knew the American party was headed for the Ambassador's Residence. We had to get in touch

with the Ambassador and tried to do so. We were told that we would have to wait until the Ambassador got inside the Residence. Time passed and the Ambassador did not call us. More time passed and still no call. Forty-five minutes later we were informed that Carter, Vance and Gleysteen were still in the limousine, now parked in front of the Residence. The three of them and Brzezinski were talking about the troop withdrawal issue. Finally Vance convinced Carter to wait for a few hours before making any final decision. Vance and Gleysteen worked all afternoon to set matters right again and at breakfast the following morning, Carter told Park that the US was not going to withdraw any troops.

It was during this visit that we made an effort to get in touch with North Korea. Bob Oakley, then at the NSC, and I worked on that. Carter decided to offer three party conference—the two Koreas and the US. We didn't have a representative in Pyongyang, so we had to find an intermediary who had diplomatic relations with both the US and North Korea. That turned out to be Indonesia. We ran into a slight hitch. Our Ambassador, Ed Masters, was in Bali preparing for the arrival of Cy Vance. Ed Mulcahy, the DCM, was on a plane going from Jakarta to Bali to help, leaving the Embassy pretty well denuded in its leadership. That episode, by the way, led to a new policy which prevented the Ambassador and the DCM being away from post at the same time. We finally had to go through the Station Chief to get a message to Suharto with a request that he forward Carter's proposal to the North via the Indonesian Ambassador in Pyongyang. It was a very messy procedure not helped by the ineptness of the Indonesian Ambassador. In any case, the North Korean very bluntly and curtly said they had no interest. However, as often will happen, eight years later, the North resuscitated the idea and proposed that the three way talks start. Then we said that they had missed the boat; at that tie, we were no longer interested.

The President came with a mind set to dislike a “police” state. He was surprised by encounters with the Koreans. I think he came to like them. Every politician responds positively to a crowd that cheers him; Carter found many such crowds. He met with some leading dissidents, about twelve of them—Cardinal Kim and others. The group was not made up entirely by dissidents because it included Billy Kim who was a protestant minister

and very close to the commander of the Capital Security Command, which was the main control group for Seoul. Kim had been invited because he was a personal friend of President Carter; they had met somewhere during one of Kim's trips to the US. He became known as the “Billy Graham of Korea”. I think Carter made a poor choice by asking Kim to start the discussion. Cardinal Kim had to leave before the end of the meeting; so the session was interrupted for a few minutes while the whole group assembled in the Ambassador's Residence's garden for a group picture. I think all of the participants thought that they would get a signed copy of that photograph, but I certainly never saw it and I don't think anyone else did either. That also disappointed the participants.

The human rights certainly was on Carter's agenda. He discussed it with Park Chung Hee. He wanted the meeting with the dissidents to be highly visible and widely known. The American administration showed great concern for political rights. But, as we always seem to do, we neglected entirely the progress that was being made on economic development which is also a human right. The Samuel movement, which tried to improve the rural standard of living, was in full swing by the end of the 1970s. Roads were being build to improve access of farm goods to city markets; new housing was being constructed at a very rapid pace. All these efforts brought the rural communities to closer involvement in the life of South Korea and not only in political terms because even today elections for local government officials are not an absolute standard. But the villages participated in the country's economic development because government officials would make periodic trips to the countryside to see what the inhabitants wanted. If a bridge or a school was requested, the government would provide the cement with the villagers contributing their sweat and labor. It was a good program from that point of view. Some denigrated as merely another attempt to subjugate the rural population, but in fact it markedly improved the standard of living of the rural communities and fostered the spirit of self-help. Years later, when I accompanied George Shultz on his final trip through Eat Asia, we went to a golf course near Osan. He observed the countryside scenery and asked how far from Seoul we were. It was about twenty-five miles. He then noted that this was the

most prosperous countryside he had seen throughout Asia. He also commented that there wasn't anything comparable twenty-five miles from Moscow. That really caught my attention because what Shultz was saying was that the Koreans had done a better job of rural development than one of the two super-powers. My principal point is that our policy in the late 1970s ignored the economic progress that Korea was making and particularly in what had been a very impoverished rural community. But to recognize that progress would have diminished those aspect of human rights—the political—that we were emphasizing such as the right to freedom of speech.

Q: Tell us a little about the Embassy in 1977 and how it may have changed when there was a change in ambassadors in 1978.

CLARK: It was a very friendly place to work. It had a lot of collegiality. I had a food working relationship with other Embassy staffers; the various sections worked well together. I didn't have any fights with the Economic Counselor; the Commercial staff was relatively small. It was a very effective team. At the time and I suspect historically, there was a lot of pressure to obtain visas to the United States. There were a number of operators who for a fee would promise to obtain the visas for the paying customers. But the Political and the Consular Sections were well clued in and helped each other out to try to prevent as much fraud as possible. So there was good collaboration among all of the Embassy's sections. This good working relationship extended to other US government agencies, such as the USIA, which although not located in the Chancery was only couple of blocks away, in the old Chancery.

We did have some problems. One was the government owned housing at South Post. Most of our staff literally lived on a military compound. That almost by necessity made that staff part of a large American community, using the military base as its source of food supplies and entertainment. That might have been acceptable for a number of Embassy staffers, but it did create a barrier for the political and economic officers who might have mingled more with the Korean society had they lived in Seoul proper.

I had an interesting relationship with the CIA station since about 27 of its staff allegedly worked for me. Most of them were technicians, with whom I had very little contact. I would occasionally meet someone who said he had just met one of my “staff”, whose name, much less face, I really didn't know. I probably met each one when he or she first arrived; then I would never see them again. We had some first class Station Chiefs and had a very good working relationship.

The officer who probably had the toughest assignment in the Embassy was the Military Attach#. He was expected to perform as a normal attach#, but in light of the overwhelming American military presence in Korea, he was usually over-looked. I suspect that he must have been greatly frustrated. I think he was used primarily for decorative purposes and as a tour agent for those who wanted to visit bases and the DMZ.

I was always struck by the ambivalence we showed about the DMZ, as, for example, epitomized by the North Korean tunnels. The DMZ was a dangerous area. We were always on alert, looking intently for any movements on the other side of the border. Yet we would take bus loads of Congressmen or other VIPs into the Zone. We would take then down into the tunnels that the North Korean had dug under the DMZ and which we had discovered. That was a technical violation of the truce agreement, since only peace-keepers were supposed to be in the Zone. I always made it a practice to get out of the bus at the demarcation line and letting the visitors go on. So I never saw the tunnels, but worst was that on a couple of occasions in the winter, I almost froze. So the irony was that on one hand we maintained that it was a very dangerous area and on the other we used it as a tourist attraction. That was also true of Panmunjom where the two sides actually met from time to time in barracks that straddled the border.. The North Koreans made it interesting by photographing all visitors and watching all movements on the South Korean side with their binoculars and telescopes. A few yards behind their end of the barracks, the North had built an office building which was one room wide; that was always interesting to look at.

I was always intrigued by the continuing concern for a renewal of hostilities. In some ways, we viewed the next outbreak as a repetition of the previous one. For example, we maintained a “stand by” Chancery in Pusan as if we would be forced to fight around Pusan again. If we had really been concerned about another war, it would have made more sense to have the UN Command in Tokyo or in Pusan, but psychologically, it had to remain in Seoul; we could not overtly admit that Seoul might not be defensible. That factor tended to warp the “war games” we played and our battle plans because the defense of Seoul had to be among the highest priority. It was true of course that one-fourth of the Korean population lived in Seoul and surroundings and that its protection had to be taken into account. But this notion of “Seoul first” came under real scrutiny later on when the Korean military decided to build its headquarters south of Seoul after it felt that the South's confidence level was high enough to permit such a sharp break with the past. But the American military hung on to its Seoul property and fought moving every step of the way. If one really believed that war was imminent or that it was a real possibility, you wouldn't want a headquarters only twenty-five miles from the battle front. But Seoul had its conveniences which over-rode any concern for a North Korean invasion. So we always were faced with a dilemma: preaching the danger of an unpredictable North Korea, but not taking any action which would visibly support that concern. Although I never shared this concern for the immediacy of a war, I understood the role of the military which was to be always ready as if a crisis was looming the next day.

On the other hand, this alleged concern about North Korean aggressive intentions gave the US military policy makers in Seoul an opportunity to develop strategies and tactics that may not have been entirely in accordance with Washington views or which Washington may not have known about. In fact, sometimes even the Embassy was not aware or fully aware of what the US military was doing, although this was a rare circumstance. But I should emphasize that while I was in Seoul—which was not necessarily true for the periods before and after my tour—I had the feeling that the Embassy, under Bill Gleysteen and the UN Command, under both Generals Vessey and Wickham, worked very closely

together. Neither was trying to out do the other and trying to obtain Washington support for their own points of views if they differed from each other. We had some differences, but were always able to resolve them in Seoul without reference to higher authorities. It is furthermore true, I believe, that this specter of a North Korean invasion gave the US team in Seoul an excuse to rebut or delay the implementation of Washington decisions, such as Carter's troop withdrawal policy. That is not say that the Vessey study on the effects and modalities of troop withdrawal was “cooked”; I believe it was an honest appraisal. It should be noted that on the issue of troop withdrawal, there was absolutely no support through Asia for such action. In fact, since Carter's pronouncement in 1977 to today, we have not made any major cuts in our troop strength on the peninsula. At the time I was in Seoul, I think there were 42,000 American soldiers in Korea; today there are 36,000. So our military presence has been a constant. Furthermore, the possibility of a North Korean invasion forced us to overlook certain South Korean domestic policies and activities which we would have found egregious in other countries. We viewed some of these policies as necessary to maintain discipline in the face of an a potential aggressor. The Koreans used that rationale on several occasions. We heard it during the Park Chung Hee era, but not as often as it came up later. It was true that during Park's era, he used the invasion threat to take some actions which seemed entirely unnecessary such as building a wall along the border and counter-dams to force water back into North Korea if it were to blow up a dam which it was constructing—many South Koreans viewed that dam as a means to flood the South whenever it might have been militarily or politically strategic. These were patent efforts by the South Korean government to play on the fears of its population, even though the projects made very little sense economically or militarily. They were more a symbol of population control.

Q: What was the Korean attitude towards the United States?

CLARK: The military, after Carter announced his withdrawal policy, was concerned about US resolve as were the dissidents. The latter wanted the American troops to stay in Korea while, at the same time, being more vigorous in urging greater human rights for Koreans.

The relations with the government were pretty good as were the Embassy's relationships with the dissident community. However, both parties wanted more from us: one, greater show of our determination to defend South Korea and the other, more vigorous pursuit of human rights.

There was a group of Koreans, particularly younger ones, that worked very assiduously to be close to the American Embassy. Many of them joined the government later; most were American educated. When I left, I received a plaque from the NSPA (used to be known as the KCIA) much to my chagrin. That gift was inspired by some of the younger Koreans I mentioned. Most of them were very good people. Some of that younger generation—e.g. Foreign Minister Han Sung Jue, the current Korean Ambassador in Washington—were all part of the group. Most were academics, particularly political scientists. Many stayed out of government until President Roh Tae Woo was replaced in 1992. Now many are part of the regime. I think they represented a group that was essentially pro-Korean, but at ease with Americans. They had their own agenda which did not always parallel ours. They criticized us at times, as well as their own government. This group was not monolithic; there were shades of political differences. Some would adamantly not work for the Presidents Park, Chun or Rho. Some were already in the National Assembly in the late 1970s, such as Park Chung Soo and his wife—both Ph.D.s from the US. This group of younger Koreans were generally bright people, who tried to build bridges between the Korean military and the business community. They were very active and interested in change, but in a different direction than the dissidents.

I would have preferred greater contact between Koreans and the Embassy. But that is a desire of every Embassy; it always wants more. We would have liked to know more what was on the mind of the military, particularly the younger officers. We always wanted to know more about what was going on. There is never enough information, partially because an Embassy can not always be sure what it is it wants. But in terms of other embassies I have worked in, our Embassy is Seoul had very broad contacts. As I said, we had good contacts with the dissidents, even those that didn't like us very much. We had breakfasts

with the missionaries; we saw the Reverend Moon or at least his wife who would tell us all we needed to know about the Reverend's fate and that of his like-minded Koreans. I met one day with a dissident who wanted to show me that he had been detained for three days. The police didn't want him to turn any further to the left, so they beat only the left side of his body. I met with all of the opposition leaders. We had contacts with the labor unions, some of which were tame and some very radical. I met the mother of a textile worker who had incinerated himself to death. I think our contacts were sufficiently broad to enable us to develop a balanced policy. Had our contacts been only with the young Koreans or only the dissidents, then we might have had a skewed policy.

I think over a period of time, we did have an influence over the Korean government's human rights policy. Before Park's assassination, in fact, the government was becoming more repressive, primarily because of the growing insecurity of the regime. There were some riots in Pusan in 1978. The Korean government sent first some troops and then the Marines to quell the uproar. So in 1979, there was considerable incipient unrest which drove the regime to more restrictive policies trying to keep the lid on. Of course, the greater the repressive pressure, the greater the counter-action. Students took advantage of this situations and marched in protest. Then came Park's assassination, which scared the Koreans and moved them increasingly to the conservative side. That brought Chun Doo Wha to power.

Q: Let me now turn to October, 1980 and the events that took place that month and the months thereafter. President Park was assassinated on October 26, 1979 by Kim Jae Hah, the head of the KCIA. Do you remember where you were that day?

CLARK: It was evening and I was at home. I got a call from an Embassy officer requesting that I come immediately. He would not tell me what it was about. So I rushed to the Chancery where I was told that, on relatively good authority, we had heard that Park had been assassinated. This happened sometime before midnight. The CINC immediately set up a command post at the UN Command. I sent some of my officers to join the American

military staff already on duty. As you can imagine, there was considerable confusion on whether the deed had been in fact consummated and whether Park was actually dead. The DCM, John Manjo, was out of town in Pusan at an annual cemetery memorial ceremony. Tony Geber was the acting DCM. As it turned out, the assassin was one of our better contacts, but that didn't become apparent until early in the morning. At around 2 a.m., I looked out of the window of my office. I noticed a military convoy riding down the main street in front of the Embassy. It stopped at our guard post. One of the men in the lead truck of the convoy got out and began to converse with our guards. He then left and the convoy moved on. It was obviously a convoy of troops from out of town because we were informed by our guards that the leader had stopped to ask for directions to the Blue House—the Presidential Mansion. As we found out what had happened, we began to alert some of the key Americans in the country. I called Manjo about 5:30 a.m. only to find out that he had already been advised. The Korean government did not announce the assassination until about 7 or 7:30 a.m., but in Pusan, everyone could receive the news from Japanese TV stations. They released the news at about 5 a.m.

I believe that our Station Chief was the first to hear of the assassination. He had been alerted by one of his staff who had heard it from one of his sources. Actually, it was somewhat ironic that it was the KCIA chief who was the perpetrator. He was a somewhat unique chief because he had talked a lot about democracy. He carried many messages from us to the President on human rights. His credentials were so impressive that there was considerable discussion about him becoming President. As far as we could tell, the plot, if it was such, did not seem very planned. He had to leave the dinner to borrow the gun he used to shoot Park. Then he had to leave again to get some more bullets when he shot all that he had. It was not a well planned coup attempt.

In the Embassy, the Ambassador's office served as the crisis center. Phones began to ring. Fortunately, I had called home and had told my wife, Judith, what had happened so that she was able to field a lot of the questions she was getting during calls from the US and Europe. She was able to tell people that the city seemed calm and that there was no

shooting. Then the press inquiries started. The October 1979 crisis was different from any that I experienced in other countries. The large presence of the American military made the Embassy's role far different than that I experienced in Cairo. As I said, it was not an operation such as I set up years later in Cairo; this was run out of the Ambassador's office.

The first question to which we sought an answer was: “Who is now in charge?”. That was crucial to the next decision on what US attitude might be. The following morning, the Ambassador and I went to call on the Acting President—the man who had been the Prime Minister. At the meeting was also the PM's chief of staff—a very accomplished diplomat who had many assignments. We told the Acting President that the US would support the new regime; he did that, I think, in light of some telephone conversations he had had with Washington. We were essentially trying to establish a point of contact with the new regime. We also hoped to foster and support an evolution towards democracy which, as time passed, we knew did not happen with the Park assassination. The Acting President was a weak man who really didn't want the job. The military encompassed a group of younger officers who thought that the time had come to “retire” a lot of senior officers who they thought had passed their prime. That eventually did take place.

We had an open line to Washington so that it could be apprized of developments in real time. There was not yet a system of special crises management task forces in the Department; those came along later. We didn't get much guidance from the Department. It was primarily concerned about the “what and why has it happened?” questions and what our expectations for the near term future were. We were not really in a good position to answer these very sound questions immediately. There was some concern about North Korea being tempted to take advantage of the uncertainties in the South. As soon as the assassination became public, the Command went on full alert (DEFCON 1). It was a dicey situation since the Korean military had weakened its front line posture to some extent by bringing troops into Seoul. That risky maneuver was even more noticeable later when the military coup took place. In any case, there was considerable confusion in Seoul giving even greater rise to anxieties of North's intentions. One senior Korean officer Johnny

Sohn)—a veteran of the Pusan defense, who was later assigned to Washington as the KCIA station chief—came to my office in fatigues asking where he should go. I told him to return to his office and await developments. He thought that we would know what was going on, as did many other Koreans who called us. This period of chaos lasted about twenty-four hours. Then the full story began to appear and the assassin became known, as where the names of people who were involved in the events of the previous days. There was considerable speculation about the Defense Minister, who was at the time of the deed, in a house near the assassination place waiting for Kim Jae Kyu. He was not involved, but his proximity raised many questions. There were a lot of plot theories; I mean a lot! The assassination was tailor made for Koreans most of whom always see plots of one kind or another. I don't believe that anyone really understood events for a long time. In fact, I don't know that even today, any of us understand why Kim did what he did. People found the simple, but true, explanation hard to accept. It was a single gunman; there was no wide spread plot. The Koreans found it as hard to accept that simple explanation as some Americans find the generally accepted version of the Kennedy assassination. The Koreans found it hard to accept that someone would assassinate a President without a plan to take over the government subsequently. Kim did in fact come close to taking over, at least for a brief moment and perhaps he did really have a coup in mind. But since he was hung for his deed without ever giving a full public explanation, we will never know what went through his mind.

The assassination took place in late October, 1979. That spurred the younger military officers to position themselves for a power take over. One was the Commander of the Capital Security Command—General Chun Doo Wha. He began to travel around Seoul in an armored personnel carrier. Then there was Chung Yung Ho, who was in charge of the Special Forces. Included also was Rho Tae Woo. There were two other officers who eventually became the core of the coup. These generals marshaled the support of the younger Korean military officers and men. They all a command or other. The generals were all from Taegu, which was Park Chun Hee's stronghold. They all had attended the

same high school, all had entered the military at about the same time, all had served in Vietnam and all had been young staff officers in Park's entourage. They knew their way around the Blue House and the government. Once Park was assassinated, they looked at the military and their position in it. They saw a lot of generals, more senior and much older than they. They compared the ages of their senior commanders to the generals in the American army and found that the Koreans were, on the whole, much older. These younger officers found that an unacceptable situation. Between the end of October and December 12, the Korean military consolidated some of its forces, presumably further decreasing the advancement opportunities of the younger generals.

In that Fall, we had too little information about the Korean military, as was true for other times as well. We knew some of the unfolding drama and perhaps subconsciously hoped that it was not true. We gave the civilian government strong support, even for a time refusing to met with Chun Doo Wha. We publicly stated our preference for civilian rule; we gave maximum publicity to Ambassadorial calls on President Choi Kyu Hah. We asked the President if we could be of assistance. We distanced ourselves from the Korean military, particularly the younger and restless military elements. The Defense Minister at the time was a perfect example of the kind of senior leader that the young officers held in contempt. He had been a full general for twelve years including Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs before becoming Defense Minister. He had hung to power for a long, long time. That was the kind of officer that the younger generals wanted retired. The Deputy Commander of the Combined Forces Command, General Lew—later Korean Ambassador in Washington—was also viewed as one of the antiquated military leaders. These senior officers were very vocal in support of the civilian government on December 11; by December 13, they changed their tune. In any case, the younger generals were able to build up their command in and around Seoul.

The coup was well planned. I was at a dinner on the night of December 12. I left the part rather late, but certainly did no see any changes on the way home. The plotters, as I said, weakened the Korean military units along the DMZ and strengthened their forces

around Seoul. They were concerned that the forces south of the Han River would remain loyal to the civilian government and oppose their entry into Seoul. So the coup leaders loaded some of their troops on busses and drove them to the center of the various bridges that cross the Han. They parked them sideways, effectively blocking the bridges. Korean drivers, as all of us who have experienced them know, seeing traffic backing up, decided they would try to get around the busses. Within a half an hour, traffic across the bridges was at a complete standstill; nothing could have passed over the Han that night. The coup troops told people to go home; that they were just not going to get through that night. People just got out of their cars and walked home, thereby permanently blocking traffic across the river.

Unfortunately, because we did not want to believe what was going on, were not always on top of a very fast moving events. Ambassador Gleysteen might disagree with that assessment, but I had a sense that we didn't really believe that a coup would take place. We certainly did not want a military dictatorship and did everything we could think to let the Koreans know out views. We did not know what would happen the night of December 12. When the coup occurred, I went to my office. It was very quiet in Seoul during that night. As a matter of fact, the whole period leading up to December 12 was very curious. In the period right after the assassination, there tended to be a certain amount of nervousness among Korean. The military tended to use armored personnel carriers more. The 8th Army golf course was still in use. Many Korean generals had courtesy privileges at the club. One day, probably in November, Chun Doo Wan visited one day, escorted by a large force of bodyguards. The American manager of the golf club told Chun to leave because he was not going to have his course trampled on by all of the followers. That did not make Chun very happy.

The Ambassador, as I said, tried to have as little contact with Chun as possible. We did have channels to him, but we were certainly not going to be seen with him nor were we willing to meet with him, unless absolutely necessary. We did not know for sure what Chun's position among the plotters was; as I said, there were five generals that were

suspect—know as the Taegu “Seven Stars”. The Presidential candidate could have been any of the five; we really didn't know who was the leader. But in Seoul, Chun was the key military figure because he was in charge of the Capital Command forces. After the initial period of upheaval, the situation appeared to be calming, even though Choi was becoming increasingly un-comfortable with his role. We wanted him to take stronger positions about the desirability of a civilian government than he took. Because we did not know all of the machinations that must have been going on, we couldn't fully understand Choi's reluctance. We knew much of the backstage maneuvering, but probably did not know the full extent. We did believe that stronger statements about maintaining a democratic regime were in order; we certainly would have been even more vigorous in our public statement of support if the civilian government had been more forthcoming.

My impression was that the CINC and the US Army components felt somewhat constrained by the prohibition against talking to some of the Korean generals who were clearly in control of the military. The US general policy was not to be seen as courting these younger generals. Of course, since some of them were in command of important segments of the Korean army, some discussions were mandatory. But all contacts were to be strictly for professional reasons and US policy was to be expressed by the civilian component of the US representation in Seoul. General Wickham, the CINC, performed superbly both as a soldier and a US representative.

I would describe the period before December 12 as one of uncertainty, but outwardly calm. On December 12, the younger Korean made their move. They decided that the Defense Minister had been a collaborator in Park's assassination; therefore they marched on the Ministry and occupied it. As I suggested earlier, the coup leaders were concerned by the Korean forces south of the Han River; they were not under their control and might have moved into Seoul to prevent the take-over. I already mentioned how they blocked the bridges. The December 12 coup surprised us; I had no intelligence that suggested a coup on that date and as far as I know, neither did anyone else.

On that date, I was at a meeting somewhere and drove back to the house. I was unaware of what was happening at the Defense Ministry nor did I know about the blocked bridges because I had no reason on that day to be in the vicinity of the river. I went to the Embassy, where we heard that there had been a firefight in the vicinity of Yongsan, the US military base in Seoul. Ambassador Gleysteen went to the UN bunker so that he could better monitor the unfolding drama. One of the major concerns was of course the safety of the American troops and their possible involvement in the coup. So the Ambassador and the CINC were together, along with some of their staffs, including me. Manjo, who had the flu at the time, was left at the Chancery to run that end of the Embassy operation. He did a fine job under very trying circumstances. A crisis team was established in the Embassy on that day. Lines were opened to Washington and communications channels were made available exclusively for messages on the crisis. The Embassy went into an around-the-clock operation. The crisis team slept in the office more or less. We used a network of “wardens” to alert Americans, both private and official, of what was going on and to suggest caution if they had to leave their houses. This network had been established many years earlier just for such a crisis. Then began the laborious task of trying to find out what was going on. According to hearsay, General Lew came to the bunker vowing that the coup would not be successful. In the following days, he had converted to the support of the coup and was made Korean Ambassador to Washington.

Since a firefight had broken out, one decision that had to be made concerned what to do with the three International Schools. The firefight which took place about 3 a.m. could be seen from the Yongsan base which was almost right next door to the Ministry of Defense. The decision was made to recommend strongly to the principals of the schools that they not open the next day. I called them and explained the situation; they all agreed to keep the schools closed. That was announced on AFKN (the American military radio network in Korea) early in the morning of December 13. The Korean government later told us that they had resented this action because it felt that the situation was under control and the children would not have run any risks. I told the Korean official that I would prefer

to apologize to him than to some American parent whose child might have been injured or worst. I found it interesting that the Korean government was bent on maintaining that nothing unusual was happening; in fact, the situation was abnormal and a coup was in process.

In the early morning hours of December 13, another troop convoy entered Seoul. It also stopped at the gates of the Embassy; this time the convoy commander asked for directions to the Hankuk Ilbo (one of Korea's leading newspapers). Our guard gave directions. I went out to the guard. I asked what the convoy commander wanted. He looked at me blankly and said: “Who?”. I said: “The convoy commander!” Then the guard told me. Everyone seemed bent on considering all that was going on as completely “normal”. Later that early morning, tanks had drawn up at the end of Seoul's main street where the Embassy was located. Their guns were aimed at the avenue. I believe that was true in other parts of Seoul; the coup plotters had buttoned down the city. Some of the Korean forces that occupied Seoul were actually under the UN Command; that upset General Wickham greatly and he made his displeasure well known to both the Defense Ministry and the coup leaders. They had been assigned to occupation duty without his approval or indeed without any discussion with him. He was furious not only because such a move had broken a firm understanding of the CINC's peacetime command role, but also because the diminution of Korean forces in the front lines could have had devastating consequences for the defense of Korea had the North wished to engage in hostilities at that moment. As far as Wickham was concerned, the coup leaders had broken the military chain of command and their responsibilities to the CINC. We still were not certain who the coup leader was; we knew who the four major players were, but were entirely certain of who the leader was. We thought that Chun was the leader, but the situation was so fluid that we couldn't be sure. We knew who the leaders were because we knew what troops were occupying Seoul.

I think it was probably on the fourteen that we found out that Chun was in charge. Our intelligence was still rather sketchy even by December 14. I don't think that even today

anyone knows how many were killed in the occupation of the Defense Ministry. The official word was that no one had dies during that firefight; I have great skepticism about that report. There was a lot of shooing that morning not to have some casualties.

We tried to keep Washington advised; we told the Department all we knew even though our information was incomplete. It was interesting to compare the reaction frothe US at the time of Park's assassination and the coup. On the first occasion, we had lots of calls asking whether everybody was alright even though only one person had been killed. On the occasion of the occupation of the defense Ministry, when a major fire exchange took place, there was only mild interest from the US; we didn't get many calls from the States. It was curious. I think that was a reflection of the differences that people put on varying events. When Park was assassinated, there was considerable concern about the future of South Korea. The events of December 12 were perceived as intra-Korean military rivalry which would not result in chaos in Korea. I found those perceptions as curious. Washington, at Gleysteen's recommendation, finally issued a strong statement about US policy towards military dictatorship. We held that position for several weeks; we did not believe that out stance would change the situation in Seoul, but we believed that it was important for the US government on be on record so that there be no doubt about where we would stand in the future.

The streets of Seoul were quite calm during those few days. We moved to and from our residences without interference. No one was ever hassled.

At some stage, the Korean coup leaders decided that Chun would become President. That was no surprise to us because over the days following December 12, it was clear that he was becoming the main figure. We continued to hope that he would remain in the background, “advising” the civilian government, while allowing at least the semblance of a democratic government. Even after the occupation of the Ministry of Defense, there were a lot of people, both Korean and American, who hoped that democracy might be realized. The Koreans were quite open about their wish; newspapers became a little more

outspoken; the students were slowly, but surely, make their preferences known. The majority of the Korean people, I should hasten to add, appeared to have some concern with this outbreak of democracy. They all remembered the over-throw of Syngman Rhee in 1960. He was followed briefly by an elected President, PoSun Yun, who was deposed in 1961 by Park Chung Hee. Furthermore, the North was a much greater threat in 1979 then it had been in 1960; that was always a concern for the South. The students did demonstrate and when chased by the police would find refuge in the Yongdun Cathedral for sanctuary. It was always interesting that that sanctuary was always respected. After a while, people became tired of the continuing student demonstrations which would spill over into one of the major shopping areas of Seoul. The shopping area would be filled with tear or pepper gas, making very uncomfortable for both shoppers and shop owners. That began to have an effect on the Korean psyche. By this time, the troop had been withdrawn and it was the police which was responsible for maintaining law and order. The police were drawn from the same pool of young people as the troops; they were in fact drafted. Included among them were undoubtedly university students and I always found it interesting that students therefore in fact fought on both the anti-government and the pro-government sides. There were probably some who had thrown stones at the police on one day, with kerchiefs across their faces, were soon after finding themselves on the receiving end of the stones and shooting tear gas back at their former comrades. They did their best whichever side they happened to represent on a given day. That was an interesting twist.

These student demonstrations were occurring in the middle of an electoral campaign, with Chun being one of the candidates. That was the Spring of 1980. The phenomenon of the three Kims really came to the fore. They had been around for many, many years, but now, with a “free” election looming, they really blossomed. The three were Kim Dae Jung, a long time opponent of the Park regime, Kim Young Sam, a tepid opposition figure and now President of Korea, and Kim Jong Pil, a sometime ally of Park's. They were known as the “three curses of Korea. None of them would withdraw from the campaign, therefore splitting Chun's opposition three ways. We had contacts with all of the Kims trying to

understand why they continued on their political paths which would surely guarantee Chun's election. Kim Jong Pil, after a while, did not pursue his campaign very vigorously. Kim Young Sam agreed that the students should not be encouraged to continue their demonstrations; that was not Kim Dae Jung's tactics; he did speak on campuses. Those campus speeches finally became the alleged reason for Kim Dae Jung's arrest.

Even by the Spring of 1980, I did not feel that we had sufficient intelligence about what was going on behind the scenes. We knew very little about the students and their leaders; we had some contact with the students, but not enough. These contacts were conducted mainly by one of my staff—John La Mazza— and some people in the UN Command. We made major efforts to increase our contacts with the students, but found it very, very hard to make a breakthrough. Some wanted to talk to us; others were adamantly opposed because we were perceived as opponents of democracy and proponents of fascist dictatorships. We were not targets of any students demonstrations; they focused on the government, whose Prime Minister had offices only a half a block away from the Chancery. So we saw a lot of demonstrations, but we were essentially observers and not targets. During one period, there were three days of demonstrations. On the first day, the students got down the main avenue almost reaching the Embassy. The police fired its gas, which of course drifted into our offices. In 1980, the Embassy was still surrounded by a low fence. Students vaulted that fence and entered the Embassy compound; we escorted them out the back gate away from the confrontations which were taking place on the main street. So in fact, they were not attacking the Embassy, but merely trying to get away from the tear and pepper gas that the police was firing. On the second and third days, the main avenue was blocked off a couple of blocks away from the Embassy. A few got through, but it was a mere trickle and of no consequence. So none of the Americans ever really felt that they were the targets of the students demonstrations. We stayed on the roof of the Chancery watching the proceedings, but never felt threatened. We never had any problem going back and forth from our residences.

We had a little better feel for the military, but not enough—we knew the senior generals, but were woefully deficient on our knowledge of the thinking of the colonels and majors.

Q: This leads us to the Kwangju incident. Where there any indications that there might be a major disturbance outside of Seoul?

CLARK: We certainly were aware of unrest outside of Seoul. I had been in Kwangju about ten days before the uprising. At that time, there was a great hope in the city and surrounding countryside that Kim Dae Jung would be elected as President. He came from the Cholla Do province and was viewed as potentially the first important spokesman in Seoul for that area which had been neglected for hundreds of years, according to its residents. I remember talking to a priest in Kwangju, who was also the editor of the city's leading newspaper. I suggested that Kim Dae Jung's election would bring Cholla Do in better balance with the rest of the country. He looked at me as if I had come from another Planet. “We don't want balance”, he said, “We want Cholla Do to be the preferred area!” He was totally serious and I must say I was a little surprised by that attitude—Cholla was going to be the first province of the country and was going to get compensated for all the years of neglect. So if I had to bet where serious trouble might erupt, I would have picked Pusan, a large port city in the South. Trouble had erupted there before. Wherever it was going to break out, we were anticipating some disturbances somewhere.

So the Kwangju incident did not come as a complete surprise. It is still a matter of debate whether that incident would have happened if the government had not tried to close the down with its Special Force troops. These young soldiers were in a constant state of anxiety, always ready for trouble—real or perceived. They were sent into the city in such a manner that if any uprising was being considered by the population, their occupation would certainly trigger it. In fact, the population rose up, drove the troops out of town and then all hell broke loose. Kwangju was under the control of the city commune for at least a week. We had a USIS library in Kwangju, whose director was in the city for the first two days, until he was ordered to leave by the Ambassador. He reported to us from his house

which was away from the center. We received a lot of information from the missionaries, of which there were quite a few in Kwangju. They mostly communicated with their brethren in Seoul who then relayed the information to us. I am not sure that we therefore didn't have a somewhat skewed and perhaps even overstated view of the situation, but that is all we had.

The Embassy then returned pretty much to its crisis modus operandi. We deliberated on what position the US should take. To his eternal credit, Bill Gleysteen put pressure on the Korean military to insure that the actions were held at a minimum. I am sure that the Special Forces would have been inclined to “pacify the village”—using an old Vietnam term. After all, that is where their officers received a considerable part of their training, as well as the generals in charge of the government. The Ambassador, almost single-handedly, managed to extend the dialogue with the Koreans thereby preventing what undoubtedly would have been a blood bath. He talked directly to Chun Doo Wha. Wickham did the same thing. He has been criticized in Korea because some people thought that troops theoretically under the UN Command were being used in Kwangju. In fact, unlike the December 1979 period, that was not the case. No Korean troops under the command of the UNCINC were used in Kwangju. The Special Forces were never under Wickham's command nor the 20th. division—there is some question still whether the 20th Division was really used or whether these were really Special Forces troops in 20th Division uniforms.

We kept Washington informed as best we could. We passed all the information that we had, which by no means gave us a complete picture. After the first couple of days, both American and Korean correspondents went to Kwangju to report. We did not send any of our employees because a) there wasn't really much that we could do; b) we did not have any agreement among ourselves and Washington on whether we should mediate. There were some Koreans in Kwangju who wanted the US Ambassador to serve as mediator, but since this was essentially an internal matter, it was not a situation which lent itself to that kind of activity. We were of course tempted to come to the assistance of

the Kwangjuians to try to bring the situation to a peaceful conclusion, but I think if we had tried to intervene in any way, the situation would have deteriorated much more rapidly with far greater casualties than actually occurred. The idea of a mediation by the American Ambassador was kept alive by the people in Kwangju and others and, as a matter of fact, arose again later as theKwangju events were reviewed by various interested parties. Gleysteen agonized for a long time about the idea, but finally came to the conclusion that it just wasn't possible under the circumstances. I certainly agree with that conclusion; I believe that any American interference might have made matters worse. It certainly would have been an unprecedented move by an American ambassador and probably illegal in terms of international law.

Our interests in the Kwangju affair were first of all, the evolution of a democracy in Korea. That had been one of our goals even going back to the Syngman Rhee days. The “Seoul Spring”—when it appeared that democracy might actually flourish in Korea—and the all the work we had done to try to insure a fair election came crashing down with Kwangju. The second interest was the defense of Korea, which we thought might be compromised by internal uprisings and repressions. Thirdly, we were concerned about the safety of the Americans living in Kwangju. Fourthly, we were anxious to minimize any loss of life in Kwangju. To reach the last two objectives, we asked the American in Kwangju to leave; some left in convoys and some flew out. We broadcast alerts to people over the AFKN network and tried to call people. I called John Underwood, who was living in Kwangju. He said that I could not instruct him to leave; I told him that my job was to advise him very strongly to depart. It was then up to him to decide whether he would take my advice. In fact, he didn't and stayed, fortunately unscathed. His report was probably the best that was ever written on the Kwangju incident. He even gave us some information during the tense period, whenever we could get through on the phone which was not that frequently.

Initially, we only got bits and pieces of disconnected information. Then a German TV team got into the city and Henry Scott Stokes began to report. That provided a clearer picture, although we still had gaps. It was not the kind of situation which lends itself to a complete

picture. For example, we had no source in City Hall where the commune had made its headquarters. The Korean desk in Washington was anxious to be fully informed; it was very helpful to us in getting approval of the many recommendations that we sent in. Bob Rich, the then desk officer, did a good job.

The crisis in Kwangju lasted for about a week. Then early one morning the 20th Division moved into the city and occupied the city without much resistance, except for the City Hall, which was shelled giving rise to a debate on whether that action was really necessary. Eight or nine years, we wrote a report on the Kwangju incident. That report was sparked by the continuing debate that had taken place in Korea about the US role; in fact, the US role had become a football in Korean politics, with a succession of factions using their versions for ostensibly the support of their cause . In any case, Gleysteen always wanted to have the record made clear; he had made many public comments on events, but was anxious to have history be recorded accurately. In 1986 or 87, some Korean students had invaded the USIS building in Seoul and had refused to evacuate. Harry Dunlop, then our Political Counselor, spent a lot of time with the students trying to explain to them what the US role had been. Harry thought that he had been quite effective, although the police finally had to attack the building in order to dislodge the students. So Harry was also anxious to have a report written. The problem, in my mind, was always that the release of a written report, unrelated to any official Korean request, would raise more difficulties than warranted, especially since it was bound to be quite negative about a government with which we were allied. I felt that we had to have a reason for issuing such a report; it would have been a serious mistake if we had just issued it on a whim.

Harry Dunlop wrote an explanation of Kwangju which he submitted to Washington. The Embassy wanted to release it to support what Harry had told the students. The Department rejected that suggestion—I should note that I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary in EA in charge of Korean affairs. What I wanted was a report written by people who had actually participated in the events of 1980. I asked the Historian's Office to take a crack at a first draft. We preferred the Historian's Office to INR because that was

the most neutral office in the Department on matters such as this. The events were sufficiently removed so that much of the material had already been placed in archives and historians are more comfortable with that kind of research than the officers in INR who work essentially on current problems. Once the Historian had written a draft, we—that is those of us who had been in Seoul at the time—began to work on it. That included Bill Gleysteen and John Wickham. Harry Dunlap had by then returned to Washington to be the Country Director for Korea and he also made contributions. We worked on that draft until everyone was happy with it. Quite by accident, the newly elected National Assembly asked the US government a series of questions about Kwangju. The National Assembly also asked that Gleysteen and Wickham be made available for testimony before one of its committees. That of course was totally un-acceptable, but we said that we would be happy to respond to their questions, which is what they did. Harry then did a superb job of going through the report and excerpting those sections that were responsive to the various questions. If there were lacunae, he provided an appendix which responded to the questions even if it didn't seem to fit into the body of the report. We sent the full report to the Embassy with instructions to provide a copy to the Korean government twenty-four hours before it was to be given to the National Assembly. This process was probably unprecedented because I am not aware of any other circumstances in which the US government was involved or was perceived to be involved in a domestic political issue of another country. We also broke some new ground in having the Department write a report on events that had taken place seven or eight years earlier.

I am glad to say that I found that the written record was a pretty accurate reflection of events that had taken place as I remembered them. In part, this was due to the fact that both Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham had worked on reports during the Kwangju episode which were quite ample. So we had had a access to records written personally by the two principal Americans in Korea at the time. That gave the historian a good base not only for tracing the actual events, but also for the atmosphere within which these events were taking place. The historian drew on those reports, but supplemented

them with interviews with people such as myself. The largest gap was probably in an explanation of the military command structure, which all of the American writers in Seoul assumed that all readers would know. In fact, that was not the case; the command rules were so complex that probably few in Washington and probably in Seoul as well ever understood them. There were some fine points of that structure and the responsibilities of the UN Commander that were indeed somewhat murky. The question of control of Korean forces in peace time had never been seriously examined, leaving some doubts about the CINC's rights and authority. I think that the UN Commander was clear in his own mind what his authorities and responsibilities were; whether the Koreans had the same understanding was an issue that had never really been examined. Wickham certainly was clear in his own mind what the rules were; that is one of the reasons his contribution to the final report was so important. He was quite certain what he could or what he could not do as UNCINC. He viewed his role as being in charge of the defense of South Korea from outside aggression; he was not in charge of policing Korea. That was the role of the Korean government. So Wickham was never in doubt what the US should do in the Kwangju situation.

I should note that by the time all the participants had a crack at the original draft that the Historian's Office had written, it did not have much resemblance to the original product. It took us over three months to redraft the original text. We had to build into the report the circumstances within which the actual events had to be examined. That was not an easy task because for example, my view was somewhat different than that of the Ambassador or the CINC. But we tried to get as many of the participants in the 1980 events involved in the drafting as we could find. The original draft also had to be made more readable; that was a matter of style, not content. The report had to read well because we knew it would be viewed with great skepticism by a number of people. Also, the historian, working from documents written by newspapermen at the time, tended to give a sensational flavor to events that we in the Embassy and the Command had not really felt. The reporting gave the impression of a much greater crisis than we believed warranted.

We thought the report was a good one. It was not very complementary of the Chun government. Chun, by this time, was nearing the end of his regime. When his government was given the report by the Embassy it did not show much appreciation. When the government read the report, it started to put together a fairly high level delegation which was supposed to come to Washington to try to pressure us not to release the report. As is often the case in such events, serendipity took over and someone in the Korean government leaked the report to the press. That of course wiped out their plan to come to Washington. That benefit was in part offset by the unhappiness of the National Assembly which resented that the report appeared in the press before it was delivered to it. Once the report was made public, it caused very few ripples. Gleysteen had been right. Such a report was essential and it became the basis for examination of the Kwangju incident ever since. It became extremely useful in explaining the US role and why we did what we did or why we didn't do some things. It essentially undercut all the “US plot” theories that some Koreans had bandied about for those many years. Our document became a vital part of the Korean debate and remains so to this day. If we had had an opportunity, I think we might have released the report before eight or nine years had passed, but such an opportunity just had not knocked on our doors.

The Korean government raised objections to the tenor of the report. It did not like the strong suggestion that the Kwangju uprising was in large measure provoked by the actions of the government. There was never any dispute about the facts as we had stipulated them in our report. It helped to clear the air. It was also helpful that the report was issued just as the Chun government was phasing out a new government was taking over. The new President, Roh Toe Woo, could start his regime without having to engage in the debate over Kwangju. In Washington, there were a few revisionists, mostly in the academic community, who thought that the report was not complete and may have left out some salient details. But the reaction in the US was rather muted. We had briefed certain Congressional members before the release and there was no reaction from Congress.

I enjoyed my tour in Korea. Strangely enough, it was very useful to me later when I was in Egypt.

Q: Bill, tell us how your next assignment was arranged?

CLARK: My work in Seoul became known to Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary for the Far East. For one of the few times in my career, I didn't have a clear idea what my next assignment would be. Holbrooke had suggested that I return to Washington, but did not mention a specific assignment. Two possibilities appeared: either Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs or Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. As it turned out, Holbrooke was not able to find an onward assignment for Bob Rich, then the Korean Office Director, and extended his tour on that job for a year. Therefore, I became Director for Japanese Affairs, which turned out to be a very useful assignment for my career. I would have gladly taken either assignment. I should note that during my tour in Seoul, I received an inquiry on whether I might be interested in a direct transfer to Tokyo as Political Counselor. The question came from a friend who thought that that such an assignment could be approved if I were interested. I gave that idea considerable consideration, but finally decided against it because it would have been essentially a lateral transfer. In fact, there was more action in Seoul at the time then there was in Tokyo. In retrospect, it was one of the best decisions I have ever made.

So I returned to Washington to immerse myself in Japanese affairs after a six year absence since 1974. However, I had been close enough to Japan not to have missed the major themes and trends. Copies of messages between Washington and Tokyo on major issues were often sent to Seoul which permitted me to stay current. I may have been somewhat surprised by the degree of concern exhibited in Washington over the automotive trade issue. As you will recall, my last assignment in the Department before Korea was in the special trade office. So I knew something about the issue and the debate over Japanese protectionists policies. In the mid-70s, the issue was specialty steels. But I was startled in 1980 by the level of the tensions over US-Japan trade. The first debate

that I became involved in was whether the Prime Minister of Japan should be invited to the United States and if he did come, whether the President would receive him. The problem was that of a meeting would be held, the President would have to take a very hard line on the automotive trade issue. That view in Washington appeared to me to have come from a sharply increased level of concern for trade issues from even four years earlier. There was no question that in that period, the trade tension between the US and Japan had increased measurably. The automotive issue was the principal one, but there were other commodity problems as well. We were upset, to put t mildly, by the ever increasing Japanese penetration of the American car market.

I spent a lot of time on this issue with the USTR, Treasury and Commerce Departments. I saw some people on the Hill, although the Department's Congressional Relations staff did its best to keep Departmental officers as far away from Congress as possible. Most of the Congressional liaison work is done at the assistant secretary level; country directors could join in seminars or talk to people on the Hill with whom they were acquainted. I saw some industry representatives, but that was minimal.

As I said, Holbrooke was the Assistant Secretary. Tom Shoesmith was the first Deputy Assistant Secretary for Northeast Asia I worked for and he was followed by Mike Armacost, after Reagan succeeded Carter. Both of these officers gave me considerable latitude in the management of Japanese affairs, except on trade issues. There, because the issue was of interest to the President and the Secretary, many others more senior to me became involved. This was particularly true in 1980 as Presidential elections loomed, even though trade did not become a focus of attention. After that political event, top level interest waned a little. In early 1981, the first Japanese “voluntary restraint” regime went into effect. That of course is a euphemism, but it has been used since then and has become part of the lexicon. The Japanese never filled their quota, but it their “restraint” stood them in good political stead. I became involved to a small degree in the negotiations of these “restraints”, but since the levels agreed upon were based on history of imports, there wasn't much of a debate within the US government or with the Japanese. This is not

to suggest that the Department was marginalized in trade negotiations in the early 1980s. In fact, it was much more involved then than it is today. State officials spent a lot more time with the USTR then, in part because USTR was then a much smaller organization which relied on State and other agencies for analysis and support. Today, that organization works much more independently, much, I believe, to the detriment of the US effort on trade issues. In the early 1980s. the USTR was a coordinating agency, which led US efforts, but worked cooperatively with other departments and agencies. It made other agencies compete within the US government, which produced considerable creativity. Then the departments and agencies were deeply involved in the implementation of USTR and Presidential decisions. So I and my State colleagues felt part of the US team.

In the brief ten months period that I was the Office Director, there were a couple of other major issues that engaged my attention. One concerned a Navy nuclear submarine that sank a Japanese freighter after having rammed it right off the coast of Japan. The submarine did not believe that it had caused any major damage and therefore left the scene. Unfortunately, that was a bad call. It took us a long time to convince the Navy that apologies were in order. Being a litigious society, the Navy was concerned that admission of error might prove to be a costly policy. But we were clearly at fault. The Japanese Prime Minister at the time was an unlikely choice, Suzuki Zenko. The headline in one Japanese newspaper when he became Prime Minister was “Zenko Who?”—a take off on an earlier American headline. That situation in Tokyo made matters somewhat easier. In any case, eventually we squeezed an interim report out of the Navy which Ambassador Mansfield gave to the Japanese Foreign Minister in New York; I was present for that occasion.

Suzuki came to the United States. He rode around Manhattan Island an a boat owned by Malcolm Forbes, the Highlander. At the end of that cruise, Forbes, as was his standard pattern, made a few remarks. He wanted to give a present to Mrs. Suzuki. It was a lamp that she had allegedly admired, which to my tastes, was the ugliest thing I had ever seen. It was made of blow fish skin—a fish that the Japanese liked to eat. Forbes presented it to Mrs. Suzuki, because, according to him, she had said that the lamp had reminded her

of her husband's career when he was the Fishery Minister. When she took the lamp from Forbes, she said that she had been misunderstood. She in fact had said that the lamp had reminded her of her husband—not his career! During the Suzuki visit, we hammered out a unique communique; for the first time, we got the Japanese to admit in a communique that we were allies. That was a concept that had always been troublesome for the Japanese. But this time, they agreed to have it in an international document, referring to “an alliance between the United States and Japan”. Suzuki was criticized by the Japanese press at home for the way the communique was handled. He had come to the US for a two day meeting with a formal dinner at the end of the first day. The second day was reserved for a presentation by Suzuki; the first day had been ours. At the White House dinner, some members of the Japanese delegation came to me asking whether they could release advance copies of the communique to the press before the end of the bilateral talks. I said that that was not acceptable. The Japanese said that that was their normal procedure. I continued to demur. So they left and found someone who worked on the NSC, who told them to go ahead. Before releasing the draft, these Japanese came back to me and told me that they had NSC approval. I told them that they should not have told me because I would not change my mind and if they were looking to me for the official US government approval, they would not get it. So they gave out advance copies to their press. Naturally, for the first time in my memory, the press violated the embargo which it had always religiously observed and wrote stories about the communique which appeared in the next day's Japanese papers. Of course, the draft included the phrase about “the alliance”, even before Suzuki had an opportunity to make his points to the President. That didn't play too well in Japan. The stories really appeared as Suzuki was on his way home. When he landed, he held a press conference in which he said that he didn't know that the text would be released prematurely and in draft and that it was all the fault of the Foreign Ministry officials. That led to the resignation of the Foreign Ministry, who in any case was looking for an excuse to leave the government. The Foreign Minister knew all about the process. As a matter of fact, while we were in New York, we were a little late to a meeting because the presentation of the Navy interim report had taken a little longer than anticipated. In

going to this meeting in a car were the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Mansfield, the Japanese Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN and myself. The Foreign Minister didn't speak English; Mansfield didn't speak Japanese. So the Deputy Perm Rep and I did the interpreting—he for the Foreign Minister and I for the Ambassador. During the ride, the Foreign Minister mentioned to Mansfield that I liked the communique; he thought that—jokingly, I believe—we all were therefore in difficulties. After translating for Mansfield I told the Foreign Minister that I thought the communique was good for him. Little did I know that three days later he would be forced to resign over that piece of paper. That was an interesting by-play in the communique process. The communique stood untouched with the "alliance" phrase in it.

The other result of the Suzuki meeting was a speech that the Prime Minister made at the press club. In that he declared that the Japanese were responsible for the protection of the sea lanes as far as 1,000 miles from Japanese shores. That had never been said before. So the visit became significant in a number of ways by advancing positions that we had long held.

I should note that between the end of 1980 and early 1981, I experienced my first transition, but not the last one by any means. The last time, just to jump ahead, I was an Assistant Secretary not of their choice and probably not of their point of view either. I have to say that the Carter administration did not quit after November 1980; we continued to receive guidance from the political leadership until it actually left office. Holbrooke continued to be active. I have heard that when he took over four years earlier he told all of the deputy assistant secretaries that he wanted them out of their offices by January 20, 1977. He moved his choices in on that date. He actually began to manage the Bureau even before having been confirmed and sworn in. That I think could not be done today. In those days, that approach was expected; today it would be subject to severe criticism. I think that Holbrooke's approach was the right one; you shouldn't leave a vacuum for as long as it takes now for confirmation. Holbrooke stayed until the last day; his successor did not give the deputies orders to vacate their offices; they all stayed on for a while. That

is the way it worked eight years later when Bush succeeded Reagan when I was the principal deputy. Of course, that was an intra-party transfer which is quite different from a change in parties. But in early 1981, we still received guidance from the Department's leadership; Armacost stayed as acting Assistant Secretary. The new leadership had some difficulties in selecting a new Assistant Secretary. Once Holdridge was selected, he was confirmed rather expeditiously. He had just retired from the Foreign Service, after having served as national intelligence officer. Armacost is a strong personality; he made sure that no vacuum would be created after Holbrooke's departure. Al Haig, the new Secretary, knew Mike and respected him. That helped considerably and we didn't loose any momentum in the transition. For us, at least, it went rather smoothly with no shift in US policy.

During the transition, I spent a lot of time with the transition team. I worked with Ken Adelman, who had been assigned to study Far East issues by Robert Neumann, the head of the transition team. Ken and I spent a lot of time together talking about Japan and our policy towards that country. He told me that he had joined the transition team as a labor of love and that he was not interested in a position in the government. So I was not surprised when he took a job at the UN! I did write a briefing paper for Al Haig, but I never knew what happened to it.

Soon after Haig moved into his office, I met with him to brief him on Japan. The Japanese Foreign Minister was about to visit Washington. I remember that I pulled an old bureaucratic trick, which was not well received by many of my colleagues in the Department. This was a time when the Japanese were pushing for one of their officials — Mr. Iwami—to become Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. This man was a leading expert on nuclear energy and a physicist. He at the time the Japanese Ambassador to one of the Gulf states to give him the appropriate credentials. I didn't think that he had much support beyond his own country; there were nuclear experts in the US government who didn't like him—he was very outspoken. Since he was not going to win approval in any case, I thought we could well afford to support him, since it certainly

would have had a positive effect on US-Japan relations—at least it would have kept one more issue off the agenda. So when Haig asked me whether there was any positive steps that the US might take in the relationship, I suggested the support of Iwami for the IAEA position. I told him that he Foreign Minister would probably raise the issue and that I thought that a positive response from Haig would be very helpful, without incurring any costs because very few others would follow our lead. So when the Foreign Minister raised the question, Haig promised US support for Iwami. The bureaucracy reacted very negatively because they were opposed to Iwami, but it never had an opportunity to make its views known to Haig. My advice was the only one that the Secretary received on the subject. In the final analysis, Iwami did not get the directorship, but the Japanese were grateful for our support. I got a few negative comments from the US nuclear community, but I survived.

Haig had a particular interest in Japanese matters. He was married in Japan while serving with the occupation forces to the daughter of an American general. He considered himself to be an expert, even if minor, on Japan. So I had good access to him and our discussions quite open. He was willing to listen to both sides of an argument. But I didn't stay on the desk for too long after inauguration. My next assignment developed during one of Mansfield's trips to the US to accompany Suzuki on another visit. While Suzuki was in New York, Reagan held a meeting of his senior advisors in preparation for his meeting with the Prime Minister. Mansfield came to Washington for that. That meeting took a solid three hours discussing all the Japanese issues of importance at the time. I don't think I have ever seen another President take that much time on a single country, but Reagan used to do that. He may have used his 3x5 cards, but his staff made sure that the President was completely prepared for these high level meetings and that all the relevant issues had been thoroughly discussed and that the conclusions were generally acceptable to all senior members of the administration.

It was during this time that Mansfield was looking for a new DCM. When he returned to the US, I spent all of my time escorting him around. At the end of his visit, as I took him

out to National to board a Northwest Airline plane, we were walking to the plane. I was one of two candidates for the DCM job, although technically I was too junior to fill that position. Personnel had sent Mansfield a list of candidates and told me that they made an exception in my case by putting my name on it even though I was not at the right rank. I told him at the airport that, although I had not raised the subject, that he should not interpret that as an indication of lack of interest on my part in the DCM job. He said: Yup!". End of discussion! The day after he returned to Tokyo, he called me and said that he would like me to join him as his DCM. That was all he ever said about it. It was up to me then to inform Personnel and other interested parties of the Ambassador's wishes. There was never any argument; what Mansfield wanted, Mansfield got. I should also note as a footnote that Mansfield always flew Northwest because, I think, it was the only major airline that served Montana; it also always took good care of the Ambassador. I was delighted at the turn of events. Although I enjoyed the Washington job, I had had my eyes on the Tokyo DCM job for a long time.

Mansfield was a unique man; I enjoyed working for him immensely. He was older than most ambassadors and by this time had formed certain views that he held firmly and from which he could not be shaken. He knew what his goals were; he had been in Japan for four years already and was firm in the policy course that he had set. His first DCM had been Tom Shoesmith, very briefly, who was followed by Bill Sherman for almost four years. I stayed four years. I was followed by Anderson for another four years. I refer to myself as Mansfield "middle Minister". Mansfield did not like staff meetings, particularly long ones. He held them; if they lasted for five minutes, that was long. He used just go around the table in the conference room to see if anyone had any comments; it was wise to have something important to report. I saw Mansfield leave the room if the presentation became long winded; he would first fidget and then when he couldn't take any longer, he would just decide that he had more important things to do in his office. So the staff kept its comments very brief as did the Ambassador. He expected the DCM to deal with most of the people in the Embassy. He dealt directly with a few—the Political Counselor, the

Economic Minister—but for example, he would not hold meetings with the Station Chief, which was very upsetting to that individual, as I am sure it would have any Station Chief at other posts. We had three Station Chiefs during my tour and they all finally came to terms that they could not see the Ambassador, but had to talk to me. I saw everything that he did which was related to his Embassy role. He had a voluminous correspondence network with which he corresponded personally, but that was never seen by anyone. His secretary did make copies of these letters and put them in he file for record purposes, but these letters dealt with matters mostly unrelated to his Ambassadorial job. Mansfield got a lot of mileage out of his hand written notes because people appreciated the time he had taken in writing to them. He also used that personal touch by personally giving his visitors a cup of coffee in his office.

The management of the mission was left entirely up to the DCM. Mansfield seldom got involved. I remember one time that he did get involved. It was a time when we had gap between Administrative Counselors. Sherman suggested that the person who had worked for him return to Tokyo to take up the slack. I thought that was a good idea and agreed. What I didn't realize was that that person and Mrs. Mansfield had not gotten along very well. Since this I had always been responsible for the administrative support operations of the Embassy and the assignment of the person was to be of short duration, I did not check with Mansfield. That was a big mistake. He let me know that I had made a mistake and that he was still the Ambassador. That was one of the few times that he got involved in the management of the mission, although he did pass on the assignment of every senior officer in the Embassy; that is the people that he would most likely be in contact with.

The Embassy was too big. Even the State Foreign Service contingent could have been smaller had we been better organized. For example, the Department's decision to provide administrative support for all components of the US government stationed in Japan—which by the way was not fully implemented—required us to have too many people in the Embassy assigned to the running of the Embassy and the constituent posts. I thought we did not devote enough State resources to finding out what was going on in Japan,

in the political, economic and security fields. This is an observation that is not exclusive related to the staffing of the Embassy in Tokyo; there were and are many other posts which suffer from the same imbalance of effort. The Embassy in total consisted of about 280 Americans; approximately one fourth of that staff was State. I not only wanted an overall reduction because we just didn't need all those people to achieve our goals, but perhaps even more importantly I was interested in a realignment of resources to increase the Embassy's ability to handle economic issues. My goal would have required shift of resources among agencies, but that is an impossible task in light of the way the US government was and is organized. Mansfield agreed that there were just too many Americans in the Embassy. He had a firm rule, which I fully supported, that there would be no increase in that level. So if an agency wanted to assign a new position, it had to offer up an off-set. That policy put an end to the increase of staff. We did manage to even shrink the size of the Embassy, although it was rather modest. We kept trying, but could only reach about 10% reduction. It must be remembered that even in the early 1980s, Tokyo was not an inexpensive post. We had 143 families in the Embassy compound and the rest in the village, where the rents were expensive. Mansfield was also very good in supporting the size of the State contingent. We ran into the usual and pervasive problem: the State contingent had always been thin, but when it came time to tackle the size of other agencies' staffs, the answer was always “We would be glad to do so if State is willing to offer up cuts in its own contingent”. That was practically impossible because the largest part of the State contingent was devoted to administration which supported all agencies. The Consular staff had a legal mandate to process applications; that meant that any cuts to be made in the State staffing would have to come out of the Political or Economic Sections, which were too small already. A flat cut across the board for all agencies was not a very effective management technique since the basic staffing had never been determined on the basis of policy priorities, but had grown up over years depending primarily on the whim of the various Washington agencies. But it was very hard, if not impossible, to reduce the American presence except through a flat percentage cut across the board.

Our representation outside of Tokyo had been cut before my arrival. I think that in some instances the cut may have been too deep. Sapporo was down to a Consul, a Vice Consul and a branch PAO. Fukuoka was about the same. Osaka was larger primarily because the consular workload was heavier than in the other posts. I think it was the largest visa issuance post in the world before we eliminated the need for non-immigrant visas for Japanese. But Osaka was the second largest economic hub of Japan and we had only one reporting officer and that was the Consul General, who had many other duties as well. That staff, I thought, was just too small. I think an economic officer should have been assigned to Osaka. In general, all remnants of our occupation-days staffing was long gone. The only exception was Okinawa and that staff could have been reduced, but there was always the argument that the size of that CG was justified by the workload that the American military presence generated, which was certainly true to a major degree.

The US-Japan relations in 1981 were pretty good. Trade tensions were at their usual high level; that was and is a constant in those relationships. The first trade talks between the two countries took place in 1972. Since then, those issues have been a major factor and perhaps even a factor of increasing importance as years passed. In the 22 years since the trade problem was first addressed, there were some years when the issue did not dominate our dialogue, but those were few and far between. Mansfield took a very balanced approach; he thought, not too surprisingly, that Washington might not always be correct either in its analysis or its tactics. The tensions were not always the fault of the Japanese. He used to say periodically that “the mote was in our own eyes”. That view was not well received in Washington, both in the Executive and Legislative Branches. But Mansfield was a very principled man; he had spent fifteen years as the Democratic Majority Leader, but when he became an ambassador, he became the President personal representative, regardless of the President's political views. He used to say that he was somewhat surprised by the role reversals that the political parties had exhibited: the party of protectionism had become the party of free trade and vice-versa. He used that comment frequently. He was also a firm believer in the thesis that “one catches more flies

with honey than with vinegar". That maxim is as applicable today as it was over twenty years ago; the debate within the US government, and particularly between the Embassy and Washington, was over tactics, not strategy or goals, although the debate is much more vehement today than it was then. This continuum of tensions is not too surprising given that the issues are only grudgingly settled for a while and that some of the players remain the same. For example, one of the vocal "Japan bashers" is Clyde Prestowitz, now out of government, but working closely with the Clinton administration, but then the Special Advisor for Japanese Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce. He has been advising Republican and Democratic administrations for over twenty-years.

By 1982, I had not lived in Tokyo for seven years. Tokyo has always been a large metropolitan area, but in the intervening years, I noticed a lot of new construction, which has continued to this day. The ten period between 1972 and 1982 was the beginning of the modernization of the city. More subways were build, roads had been widened; it was just an easier city to live in. It was also somewhat more expensive and much more prosperous. That was true for the whole country. The economic boom was clearly visible. The smaller towns were not as rural as they used to be; all cities and towns were becoming more and more alike. Ten years earlier, one would notice thatched roofs on country dwellings; one could see quaint rural scenes. By 1982, such vistas were becoming rare; the country was becoming homogenized.

On the political side, the Liberal Democratic Party was still in power, the Socialists were not a threat, Komeito was a factor at times and not at others, the Democratic Socialist Party was small and not growing. The only question was which LDP faction would next rule the country. There was a difference from the 1970s when one could make a pretty good guess on who the next Prime Minister would be. By the 1980s there was no certainty because the factional alignments had become less predictable. That started in the Tanaka regime. I think in part this new development stemmed from certain LDP reforms such as the membership voting for the Prime Ministerial candidate rather than the back-room process that had been in effect. There were events such as Fukuda while running against

Ohira saying that if he were not elected he would not run again. Ohira bought enough LDP votes to deny Fukuda a clear mandate forcing him to resign him from the Prime Ministership to be succeeded by Ohira. Kissinger liked that because Ohira listened to him.

We were aware that money was flowing between business and politicians, but was not up to the level that it became later when it became a scandal. We were never certain about the magnitude of that flow and in the 1980s it was still possible to plausibly defend a system of cash support for politicians because it did cost money to run elections. As far as we knew, the factional leaders did not collect money for themselves; all the contributions were devoted to election process and the operations of the faction. This all fell apart with the discovery of $50 million in walls with Shin Kanemaru. Tanaka lived quite well, but it was plausible to believe that his life style was primarily supported by the construction work in which he was involved before entering the government. When he was forced to resign, the family did not seem to have much money, which suggested that he did not profit from his political activities. In fact, most of the factional leaders lived somewhat modestly. They had to entertain frequently, which obviously cost money. But there were no indication of venality or politicians becoming personally rich from the financial support they received from their backers. In the early 1980s, such personal enrichment was not supposed to happen.

The relationship between the politicians and the bureaucracy was pretty much the same as it had been seven years earlier. Different politicians were identified with different ministries. Some had worked in a ceratin ministry and then had entered politics, but still had close ties to their former colleagues. That was particularly true for the Ministry of Finance and MITI. Those politicians who were known to be allied with one ministry or another were assumed to be following the guidance of the Minister with whom they were allied. Conversely, they also exercised some influence over that Minister. All of the senior bureaucrats had supporters in the Diet or in the LDP. Some bureaucrats had contacts with the Socialists, but that was more for form than for substance. So the politicians and the senior bureaucrats scratched each other's backs. Sometimes the politician played the role

of protector; I would assume that the bureaucrat would be expected to be helpful in return, although I personally had no knowledge of such interplay.

This intricate relationship always was a challenge for the Embassy. In the political-military field—that is security issues—the Diet played a role, but that was a straightforward public debate and we knew who was interested in such issues. Economic issues were harder to track. This was one of the reasons that I tried to get closer coordination between the Embassy's Political and Economic Sections. I thought it was important to know which Diet members had walnut growers in their districts so that we could make a better judgement on the political impact of our pressures for tariff concessions. In the walnuts case, when the tariff was lifted we quickly found out who in the Diet was interested. Had we known those interests beforehand, we could have done some ground work which might have eased the shock. And that was true for all economic issues. I thought it was important that the Political Section, which had the best relations with the Diet, be knowledgeable of the economic interests of various politicians. I think we made some progress on this front, but I would have liked even more coordination. On all major economic issues, the Embassy tried to explain its position to both bureaucrats and politicians. That was not as prevalent on international affair issues; most of those were discussed with the bureaucracy only. The Japanese Diet tended to more focused on domestic matters; very few members had a real interest in international affairs. I think there were wide agreement that as far as Japan was concerned, the United States was still the leading power in the world and certainly Japan's closest ally.

We viewed Japan through the prism of a bipolar world, but talked about it in other words. We used to discuss “equality” at great length, but we believed that when necessary, Japan would follow us without question. We viewed Japan as a “stationary aircraft carrier”. That phrase came from a Nakasone visit to the US. While in Washington, he portrayed Japan as a “stationary aircraft carrier”. His interpreter translated as “unsinkable aircraft carrier”. “Unsinkable aircraft carrier” was a phrase that Japanese naval commanders had used during World War II. So the misinterpretation was seen by the Japanese as a Nakasone

reversion to right-wing revisionism. If the interpreter had used the word “stationary”, it would not have caused the uproar that it did. It was Don Oberdorfer of The Washington Post who finally looked at the original text of Nakasone's remarks and noted the error. I later asked Nakasone about the episode and asked him whether he intended to correct the record. He said that he wouldn't because if he raised again, the issue would be debated once again; as it was, the incident had past and had been forgotten. It was that Japanese atmosphere that allowed the interpreter to go unpunished for his grave error. In fact, he was a good interpreter; he had just heard the phrase “unsinkable” so often that the English words almost came out automatically. The phrase has considerable meaning in terms of the Japanese Constitution, which is very much oriented against military matters. I mentioned Suzuki accepting responsibility for the protection of the sea lanes for 1,000 miles from Japanese shores. In fact, if one draws an arc 1,000 miles from Tokyo to the east and 1,000 miles from Osaka to the south, one will find that there are Japanese territories at those distances—little islands. We were working on other defense concepts. For example, the US Navy were patrolling from Okinawa in the Persian Gulf; that raised a question in the Diet. The Foreign Ministry responded that the US-Japan Security Treaty permitted the US to provide for the defense of Asia and patrolling of the Persian Gulf was consistent with the Treaty because that was the source of oil for Asian countries, including Japan, which was an essential commodity for the defense of Japan and other Asian countries. What was happening, which continues to today, was that the Japanese were broadening their interpretation of their Constitution and their military responsibilities. There were never any large leaps, but gradual creep which I thought showed great skill and imagination. We of course kept up the pressure on Japanese defense posture and particularly the issue of devoting only 1% of their GNP to defense expenditures. This was a constant theme, but there were a number of us that were uncomfortable with our position on this issue. The logical conclusion of our pressure would have forced the Japanese to rearm and would have forced the Japanese defense budget to our levels. But our pressures were not driven by security concerns; in fact, our interest in increasing Japanese defense expenditures was primarily trade-driven on the grounds that the

more Japan spent on defense, the less it could devote to increased trade and civilian production, thereby improving the balance of trade between us and Japan. There was some interest in increasing Japanese support for our military presence in Japan, but that was not a continuing issue and could have been accommodated, I believed, within available resources in the Japanese defense budget. We were asking that Japan pay for 50% of our military expenditures in Japan; the Japanese maintained that was just too high. Now they are at about 70%. The US position was more based on the view that the Japanese were just not spending as much as others on defense which gave them an advantage on trade issues and economic development. The casual relationship between defense expenditures and economic growth is somewhat suspect. South Korea, which had percentage- wise a higher level of defense expenditures than we had, also had a much greater growth in its GDP than we had. But no one ever brought this fact to the discussion. So every once in a while, I would argue against pressuring the Japanese on defense expenditures, but there was solid support for US policy both within the Embassy and the American military establishment in Japan. I did note on those occasions that I had grown up in a world that had a fully armed Japan and that I was not particularly enthusiastic about the consequences of that situation; I didn't think it was wise to return to those days. The question of Japanese expenditures was not a major issue in the early 1980s, but we kept it on our agenda and would periodically raise it. The Japanese would promptly reply that they were doing their best and promptly ignore us. The Japanese contribution to our military expenditures began to climb after the Okinawa reversion which required us to rehabilitate some of the sites that we maintained. Up to that time, the Japanese paid for some relocation costs—if they wanted a building that we were occupying, they would pay for anew one somewhere else. But they never paid for upgrading our accommodations. After reversion, those guidelines changed and the Japanese paid for infrastructure improvements. That started an ever escalating rise in Japanese support for the US military. The Japanese bureaucracy of course would scream, particularly, as I have mentioned, that the support of US forces came out of the defense budget. That meant less money for Japanese forces. The Self-Defense Force appreciated our presence and was

very supportive of our presence, but have preferred that Japanese resources be spent on Japanese forces. There was also a view that once the 50% level was reached and breached, then who could tell where the support would end up. And of course that was correct. The resistance to increasing financial support to the US military was not a public problem; it was primarily a bureaucratic opposition that had to be overcome.

I should note that the American military presence in Japan by the early 1980s was quite slim; it was considerably smaller than that I had encountered six-seven years earlier. The main forces were the Marines on Okinawa and the Air Force at Kadena and Misawa. In general, the relationship between the Embassy and the US military was very good in this period. Mansfield was always very mindful of their presence and was interested in any case in strategic issues. When I arrived, the Commanding General, who is always an Air Force General, attended Embassy staff meetings sporadically; most of the time, he sent his deputy. I wanted to foster closer coordination. One day, after the arrival of a new Commander, Chuck Donnelly, I suggested to Mansfield that he be invited to make a presentation to the senior Embassy staff. Mansfield gave his classic answer: Okay if it wasn't too long. So we proceeded and it was very interesting because Donnelly had just been transferred from Saudi Arabia where he had been the Chief of the MAAG. He gave his version of the Middle East situation, cast somewhat from the Arab point of view. Within minutes after the staff meeting, the PAO, Dave Hitchcock, was in my office demanding that he be given equal time at the next staff meeting to set the record straight. He had just come from tel Aviv and saw the Middle East somewhat differently than Donnelly. I told him that I thought that it would not be appropriate for us to get involved in that issue; we had enough problems of our own. We had asked Donnelly to make the presentation to build bridges to the military, not to fight the Middle East battles in Tokyo.

We often discussed the nature and extent of US pressure on Japan. There were those of us in the Embassy who considered ourselves knowledgeable on Japan who viewed our efforts as essential because the bureaucrats who would be on the receiving end of the pressure—except the Foreign Ministry—all had alliances and allegiances to domestic

pressure groups. Our demands would have some negative consequences and no bureaucrat would welcome that, much less initiate such actions. So our pressure enabled the bureaucrat to blame us for new policies because he certainly would not wish to take the onus himself. We understood that outside pressure was needed if the bureaucracy were to move in areas and directions of interest to us. We of course were not the only pressure point; politicians were another as well as Japanese consumers, in some cases. But a pressure had to be applied to the bureaucracy; for many years we were the main pressure group and still today we are one of the major ones. But we also we quite aware that the application of pressure had to be handled with skill and at the right time and within acceptable limits. Our problem was probably that we did not have sufficient focus. My main plea to Washington in this period was not to send us long list of demands. The Japanese would pick those which were of least importance to us and take credit for being responsive. But that plea fell somewhat on deaf ears because the US bureaucracy was also responding to its constituencies and was not willing to favor one over another. So our “wish list” just became too long and did not allow us to focus on the key and major issues; our pressure was diluted because of the range of issues that someone in Washington was concerned about.

I considered perfectly legitimate the general approach of putting pressure on the Japanese bureaucracy although I should note that we did reach agreement on some issues without applying that pressure. For example, the Japanese expanded their defense role and mission without very much urging from us. They did it because they felt it proper and did have a beneficial impact in some respect on the intra-Japan debate on defense issues. The general thesis developed that Japan had primary role in defending Japan and we had the principal role in maintaining stability in Asia. Once that thesis was generally accepted, the Self-Defense Forces had a much easier time acquiring the necessary resources. I think we were right in changing our policy of setting an arbitrary percent of Japanese GDP to be devoted to defense efforts to the concept of establishing agreed upon roles and missions. It was a much more effective way for the Self-Defense Forces to present their

requirements and therefore being allocated increasing resources. They could argue that if someone were to invade Hokkaido, for example, the Self-Defense Forces would be able to slow down that effort long enough to enable the US to bring its power to bear on the situation.

Before ending the discussion on my tour as DCM, I should mention the Koreans in Japan. They had always been an issue and remain so to today. Their treatment by the Japanese was always a human rights issue, even before Carter and Clinton made it a center piece of out foreign policy. In the early 1980s, there was a big debate in Japan about fingerprinting "aliens" which in Japanese eyes included the Koreans, although many had been there for decades. We were opposed to that policy as a violation of human rights. On the other hand, some of those Koreans also had strong connections to North Korea. At that time, we were not greatly concerned by that linkage. We were interested in the traffic between Japan and North Korea because we hoped that it would provide us some intelligence on what was going on in that very close society. But I don't think we ever got much out of that traffic. I used to talk to Koreans when they returned to Japan from North Korea, but I can't say that I gained much insight and I don't think anyone else in the Embassy did either. I don't know whether it was true, but the travelers maintained that they had been sequestered when visiting North Korean and could not observe much. Of course, the Koreans also had constraints because members of their family still lived in North Korea, whom they did not wish to endanger. Furthermore, we were Westerns and therefore not entirely trustworthy. That was particularly true for the supporters of Kim Il Sung.

Q: I would like to finish our conversation about your Tokyo tour with some questions about Ambassador Mansfield, whose name is mentioned in other oral histories. First of all, what was your relationship to him?

CLARK: It was probably not as close as those enjoyed my either my predecessors or my successors. In keeping with Bill Sherman's practices—he was my immediate predecessor—, at the beginning, Mansfield and I would have coffee in the morning at about 7:30 a.m.

But that ritual faded over a period of time and so I would see him in the morning when I needed to and not when I didn't have anything on my agenda. Our relationship was very good. I tend to manage without requiring much supervision and Mansfield left the running of the Embassy entirely up to me. The one time I did get into difficulties I mentioned earlier and that was over the assignment of a temporary administrative officer. That was the only time we differed on anything.

There were times when I would press him on some matters that I knew he was reluctant to address. For example, at one time, the Japanese Foreign Minister was going to visit the US and Mansfield didn't want to accompany him. So I suggested that he might wish to send me instead. That didn't resonate with him but he agreed. But by large, I found the working relationship a very rewarding one. He taught me a lot about how to handle people. When I first arrived in Tokyo, I was struck by Mansfield's complete confidence in his own policy views, even when he would champion an unpopular policy. For example, I had been with him in New York when the interim US Navy report was presented, as I have discussed earlier. A few weeks later, he received the final report and was to take it to the Foreign Minister. I asked him who he wished to have escort him. He said he wanted the Naval Attach#, who was less than thrilled to be involved. But Mansfield knew that the presence of the Naval Attach# was important for symbolic reasons. He also said that when he presented the report, he would bow to the Foreign Minister. I pointed out that if reported that gesture would not be welcomed in Washington. He said he knew that, but that the Japanese, for all of their vaunted literacy, did not necessarily read, but they would be greatly impressed if my picture bowing to the Foreign Minister appears on the front pages. They will understand without having to read the articles that I apologized for the sinking of the freighter and that he said, was the appropriate gesture under the circumstances, Washington not withstanding. As predicted, everyone in Japan knew that the American Ambassador had apologized for the sinking, which was greatly appreciated, and there was some carping in Washington about Mansfield kowtowing.

This use of symbols came to Mansfield almost naturally. He did consider everything thoroughly. One time, he was scheduled to give a press conference at the Press Center. It was during another debate in the US of troop withdrawal, which had at an earlier period given Mansfield great visibility as the author of the “Mansfield amendment” which called for a reduction of troops in Europe. The debate at this time revolved around our military presence in Korea. I predicted that he would be asked about that issue. He said he had prepared for it; he had asked the librarian to do some research, which he did not use in his remarks. He was asked about troop withdrawal from Korea; he gave, as customary, a very brief answer to the effect that he had been in error in his previous position. The audience gave an audible gasp. The reporter didn't believe that he had heard correctly and repeated the question. He got the same precise answer again. On the way out of the room, one of Japanese reporters mentioned to Mansfield that he had been surprised by his answer. Mansfield looked at him and said: “Remember that a “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds”. He knew where the quote had come from, but for the following days the buzz word in Tokyo was their version of “hobgoblin”. But Mansfield knew exactly what he would say and had a great feel for how it would play. His speeches usually tended to be the same, except for one or two paragraphs which covered his views on the issue of that day. The Japanese soon knew how to read Mansfield's speeches and would target these special paragraphs. The rest of the speech they practically knew by heart, but Mansfield would always slip in a comment or two which was topical on the day he delivered the speech. He was a master of public relations. He may have been a very private man, but his public appearances were always so well prepared and considered that I came to believe that he in fact enjoyed them.

I also learned from him that the worst advice is that which is not sought. People in Washington would ask him to intercede with one of his former Congressional colleagues on one issue or another. They would ask Mansfield to let the Congressman or Senator know where he stood on the issue in light of US-Japan relations. Mansfield answer was invariably the same: if he were asked, he would be happy to give his opinion. He would

never volunteer it. He was very careful with his Hill relations which paid great dividends. Washington never seemed to learn that Mansfield would not take the initiative. Dick Holbrooke, then the Assistant Secretary for FE, particularly never learned. I remember one episode particularly which occurred while I was still the Country Director for Japan. When Mansfield left his post, he firmly believed that the Charg# was then responsible. Mansfield did not like being called on Japanese matters once he was not physically in Japan. He felt that if he did not have confidence in his deputy, he never would have left him in charge. So his position was that if an issue had to be decided, the Charg# was the person to do it. I understood his point of view, but others didn't. In any case, on one occasion while he was vacationing in Florida—in Jane Englehart's guest house—, Holbrooke wanted to talk to Mansfield. That was a double mistake: a) the Ambassador didn't like to be called when on vacation and b) he didn't like to talk on the phone. But Holbrooke was insistent and asked me to find the telephone number. So I called the Englehart residence in New Jersey and was given the Florida phone number by the butler. So Richard got in contact with Mansfield; the conversation did not turn out to be very satisfactory. Mansfield suggested that Holbrooke call the Charg# in Tokyo—Bill Sherman. Holbrooke ended the conversation and told me that the discussion didn't get very far. I reminded him that I had told him that calling Mansfield was not a very good idea.

In addition to establishing the premise that once he was not in Japan issues should be decided by the Charg#, as I said, Mansfield detested telephones. When I was to Tokyo, there was no way to get in touch with the Ambassador if he were caught in traffic, which happens often in Japan. So I suggested that we install car telephones in the Ambassador's and the DCM's cars. Mansfield resisted, even though I promised that I would not let anyone else call him. Mansfield's Japanese guard had a walkie-talkie and Mansfield thought that was enough. I pointed out that that enabled the guard to be in touch with the police or the diplomatic security service, but it was absolutely useless if I needed to get in touch with him. I thought that Washington would not be pleased if it called for the Ambassador only to be told by the DCM that he didn't know where he was. This argument

went on for six months before finally Mansfield agreed to have a phone installed in his car and we only managed to get that approved by installing the phone in the front seat so that anyone riding in the back could not reach it. We never used it, but I felt better because at least in an emergency, I could be in touch with my Ambassador. Mansfield just didn't like telephones.

The other comment I would make refers to the Mansfield team. Mike was the “front man”, but Maureen was a formidable member of the team. It was one of the best political teams that I have even observed. He would seek her counsel on many issues; sometimes he would come back to the Embassy and change his views, obviously after having been counseled by Maureen to do so. If he didn't remember a name, she would. Watching the two working together was both enjoyable and instructive. I was certainly aware of that team operation and I am sure that many of the senior Embassy officers were also aware of it. That doesn't mean that we tried to influence Mrs. Mansfield; that would not have worked and would have been inappropriate. In connection with this discussion, I should note that often Maureen was ill. She was allergic to MSG, as many are; unfortunately MSG is used widely in Japanese foods. When Mansfield accepted an invitation to dine at some fancy Tokyo restaurant, it was not unusual for Maureen to send her regrets at the last moment because she didn't want the risk of eating MSG. The funny part was that restaurants to which they might be invited would not have used MSG under any circumstances, but Maureen was always concerned about the possibility because in fact the use of it was very prevalent in Japan. But these last minute regrets would generate great concern in the community because “poor Maureen was ill again”. She also used that excuse to get out of going places when she didn't want to. It didn't take long for all the Japanese hostesses to understand that Maureen didn't tolerate MSG and would make sure that she was never served any food with that additive in it. Sometimes, the Ambassador would do things that Maureen liked such as going to fashion shows. She knew the designers and had good tastes. So often, one would see the Mansfields at the leading Tokyo fashion shows, which was obviously a major boon for the designer and something that she enjoyed doing.

Mansfield was a master in handling Congressional delegations. He is the only ambassador I have ever seen receiving standing ovations after his briefings. It was almost unbelievable. I remember one Congressional delegation that visited Korea. It was not going to stop in Tokyo. So Mansfield flew to Seoul and briefed them there on Japan. Ambassador Bill Gleysteen, who was an excellent briefer himself, didn't stand a chance; there was no one who could make a presentation like Mansfield's. No one ever talked back to Mike Mansfield. He never used notes and could brief for as long as he thought it was necessary—anything between 10 minutes to an hour. He had absolute command of facts and figures; sometimes he would repeat himself, but that was a rare exception. We would always provide him with updated figures. I then would watch this master at work and learned how to use statistics in a meaningful way; I could never do it as well as Mansfield could. When he was finished with his polished presentation, he would ask :"Any questions?". After the applause, some one in the audience would first thank him for the excellent briefing. Then the questions came, most of them relevant, but none in the same category that other ambassadors received. They were always politely worded!

Mansfield guarded his connections. He used them, but in his own way. He would take advantage of visitors. He had an extensive correspondence and used that. He used to send hand-written notes to people; that was a big deal for the recipients. He could have dictated them, but he understood how much more appreciated these notes were when they were in his own handwriting. I found people really appreciated that extra efforts that a hand written note takes. He did a lot of that and he worked his contacts very well. But he did not take the initiative; he would respond when asked. He worked very hard on his relations with the American business community in Tokyo. All of at the Embassy did that, but he was by far the best contact that we had. Although he didn't like long staff meetings, that didn't apply to his sessions with the American Chamber. He would sit through those regardless of the time involved. He would listen carefully to their presentations and they knew that they could count on a receptive ear. Mansfield held the view that the US needed more and better work by the American business community if we ever hoped to achieve

some better trade balance. He was anxious to have more American business in Japan and that made important for him to understand the Chamber's perspectives, which he would factor in his analysis of economic policy. Mansfield was convinced that if the American business community were willing to invest time and money, more US imports could be brought into Japan. He used to say, as I think I already mentioned, that often “The mote was in our own eyes”. He was critical of some of our domestic policies, particularly those that tended to increase our budgetary deficits. He also criticized some of the positions of both political parties; after all he had been the Senate Majority Leader for fifteen years. He noted, as I have said, the parties' role reversals on free trade, which often aligned him with the Republicans. In some ways, he had more clout in the Reagan White House than he did in Jimmy Carter's. Some of his critical comments on US domestic policies were not always welcomed; he was criticized for bashing his own country and not the Japanese. He did not buy the thesis, which was being discussed then and his alive and well today, that the way to move the Japanese on trade issues was to publicly berate them. I have never thought that that approach had much success. We in the Embassy fully supported Mansfield in his trade views. I certainly believed that greater American effort would increase US imports into Japan. We made some things easy for the Japanese. For example, on automobile trade, the American companies, until very recently never tried to sell cars with a right hand drive. That is what the Japanese drove and would be hard to expect the Japanese consumer to change just for the sake of driving an American car. In fairness, I should note that I talked to the Yanase people about Mercedes sales; that was a very successful import program. They were the original Japanese distributors and it was true that over one half of their sales were left-hand drive Mercedes. I was told that the reasons for that were two fold: a) people drove left hand drives just to show that their car was foreign made and b) the most important consumers of Mercedes were companies' presidents; for them, it was more convenient for the driver to open the left hand back door, which was the curb side, if he drove on the left hand. I was also interested why large European cars sold better in Japan than large American cars. In Washington, I had used a little Audi Fox station Wagon—really a Volkswagen. We took it to Tokyo, but soon after we arrived I

looked around for a Cimeron, which was a Cadillac car. I asked the local representative whether he had one that I could see. He didn't, but he encouraged me to order one. I then asked about spare parts. He thought that would not be a problem because I could always order them through the APO. In the final analysis, if the local representative didn't have one in stock, if there had not been any demand to bring some into Japan and if spare parts were not available in Tokyo, I concluded that it didn't sound like a very attractive deal. As an alternative, the dealer suggested that I buy a Mercedes which he said he could guarantee would not use its full value two years later if I were to trade it in then for the next higher model. He said that a lot of Embassies were doing that, but he noted that the American Embassy was not taking advantage of that opportunity. I told him that I wasn't about to do that either. This is just an illustration of attitude a dealer of imported cars took on their wares; he was pushing Mercedes in preference to an American car. American business was not doing all it could to push American wares.

Mansfield was a very good customer for statistics. He was also a voracious reader. He read all the time. If some one had access to the list of books that USIS was requested to select for him, one would find undoubtedly a long list tailor made for a person who was an ambassador to Japan. He read as many books on Japan, economics and other important disciplines as he could get a hold of.

Mansfield expected the Embassy to perform up to his expectations. When he thought an officer had failed to meet his standards, he or she rapidly lost access to him. He just wouldn't call on that officer, but seek his information from someone else. As I mentioned earlier, he had an aversion to staff meetings. He held them because I guess some one convinced him that it was good for staff morale. But they were over in a hurry; a five minute staff meeting was a long one. I think I also mentioned that I had seen him walk out on presentations that he considered too verbose which certainly did not delight the officers making them. He would ask me to take the chair and walk out.

Mansfield relationships with other ambassadors was very good. When he arrived in Tokyo, he received and accepted some very good advice from Bill Sherman. He was told that he was the most visible ambassador in Japan not only because he represented the United states, but because he was an important figure in his own right. Sherman told Mansfield that protocol required a new ambassador to call on all of his colleagues. And that is what he did—every ambassador in Tokyo who was available, in the alphabetical order of country. It is a lesson that I took to heart; I did exactly the same thing when I became Ambassador to India. It took me six months and I was delighted when I got to Yugoslavia! After that initial spade of calls, Mansfield maintained contact with the diplomatic community. He of course saw all the representatives of the major powers, but he also went to a lot of receptions and therefore didn't slight anyone. He attended one reception almost every evening and sometimes two or more. Ambassadors of other countries would come up and talk to him during these events. He did not pretend to remember their names; it was always “Your Excellency”. He included members of the diplomatic corps in his dinners which further cemented his relationships. He had certain favorites; he invited the Moroccan Ambassador more than once, for example. Morocco was the first foreign country to recognize the independence of the United States and he liked the Ambassador. He often invited the Mexican and the Philippine Ambassadors in part because he liked both countries. So he reached out beyond the major powers. In fact, I saw more of the Asian ambassadors than the British Ambassador, for example, at the Residence. Mansfield made a point of inviting representatives from smaller countries. He thought that that was appropriate and good politics and also it gave him an opportunity to have different points of views and information. It was a wise policy.

Mansfield was a master in the usage of the media. I mentioned his press conferences, which were not frequent, but perfectly timed—once a month or every other month. The media loved these press conferences. He always spoke on the record, an approach which I then used later in New Delhi. He never made any pretense of speaking Japanese, but he would fill a room anytime he wanted. He held the conferences when he thought they

were necessary. Sometimes, he would limit attendance to American press only. As far as I know, Mansfield never gave a “backgrounder”. He rarely appeared on TV; that had been Reischauer favorite media. Mansfield didn't really like TV, but he would appear from time to time. He made frequent public appearances. He visited every prefecture; by the time I arrived, he had almost completed the circuit of Japan. He traveled less after his initial forays. there were parts of Japan that he liked very much. He loved Kyushu and Sasebo, for example. Sasebo had a Navy guest house on the US base which fronted right on the water; he liked to stay there. When he was there, there was usually another purpose to his visit. One time he visited Nagasaki, which was close by. In his speech there, he said that his first visit to Japan was in the early 1920s aboard a troop ship which was coming from the Philippines on its way to China. The ship stopped in Nagasaki for three days to take on coal, which was brought on board a basket at a time carried up the gangplank. He mentioned the dates he was in town. Later, some of the citizens came back to him telling him that his dates were not quite correct and their records, which had survived an atomic bombing, indicated slightly different dates. He was impressed that the Japanese could reconstruct that little piece of history.

While mentioning Nagasaki, I should comment on Japanese attitude toward their suffering, Over time, they did not show much bitterness. To today, they feel that they are unique because they are the only humans who were subjected to atomic bombings. So when one talks about nuclear war, the Japanese are in a very special position. But there isn't special bitterness. In fact, one old general when asked whether Japan would have used an atomic weapon if it had one, replied without hesitation :”Of course!”. That caused a major uproar in Japan because it is really contrary to the national mood, but I think he was probably right; in the mid 1950s, the Japanese Imperial Army would have used the bombs if it had it. This is not say that the Japanese have forgotten their history; if you go to Nagasaki today, you can go to the museum and see some horrific sights resulting from American actions. I think I mentioned previously the Hiroshima Study group, now run by the Japanese, but which originally was a joint effort. It is a continuing study of the victims of atomic bombing.

But by the early 1980s, the subject was not really discussed, except for example when the Chinese test one of their weapons, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the first to condemn these efforts to “disrupt world peace”. They have assumed a self-manufactured mantle of responsibility for all nuclear issues around the world.

While I was in Tokyo, we had a Presidential visit, as a return for the Suzuki visit, which I described earlier. Reagan came; it was great fun! This was somehow different from others we had suffered through. It started with an advance team headed by Mike Deaver, which came about three to four months before the visit. We visited the sites that the Japanese wanted to use. They were particularly interested in having Reagan to go to Kyoto, which was one of their ancient capitals. In addition, I think the Japanese were anxious to get Reagan out of Tokyo. Deaver and I discussed the Japanese interest; I pointed out that a Presidential visit should not look like a tourist trip. I thought that we had to do some things in Tokyo. Deaver saw the situation the same way and so we got along very well, especially since we were both graduates of San Jose University. But we flew down to Kyoto and looked over the possible sites. We finally told the Japanese that we didn't think Kyoto was such a hot idea; then relations became a little tense. Finally, we all agree that the visit would take place entirely in Tokyo. I made two contributions to the planning of the visit: 1) when it was suggested that the President do something with the Crown Prince—the Emperor was getting along in years—, I recommended that we have the two watch a horseback riding and archery exhibit in which the riders would be dressed in old court costumes. Both Reagan and the Crown Prince had an interest in horseback riding. I wanted to have that done in Tokyo, but the Foreign Minister, when consulted, mentioned Kyoto again. I said that that was not possible, so the Foreign Ministry suggested Kamakura, where the Great Buddha statue is located. I said “No” to that as well; I told the Foreign Ministry that shows of the kind we were discussing had been put on in Tokyo. I mentioned that there was a horse park in Tokyo that the father-in-law of the Emperor's second son had participated in developing. So that was a natural location. Then I suggested that a better place yet would be the Meiji shrine. That didn't immediately

draw a favorable reaction. I said that the Japanese government had for many years tried to get an American President to the Meiji Shrine without success because the missionary community had always objected since that was a Shinto shrine. I suggested that here was an opportunity for the Japanese to have an American President visit a major shrine without giving it a religious connotation which we always found unacceptable. That argument seemed to sway the Foreign Ministry; they were willing to go with us to look at the site. In fact, when we went there, the head man gave us a brochure, which included a section on horseback riding and archery. There was a special field for it which seemed to be news to the Foreign Office types. So President Reagan went to the Shrine with the Crown Prince, didn't entre it, but walked around it to the archery field. The day was somewhat overcast. One of the reporters said :"I hate you, Clark. I don't really want to take these pictures but they are the best shots of the trip".

The second contribution concerned the white tie and tails affair to be hosted by the Emperor. The President had his own which made him look very elegant. For the rest of the delegation and us who resided in Tokyo who had been invited, the challenge was daunting. Trying to rent white tie and tails in Japan is almost impossible; one could find them at Matsuaki, an old store. But they looked as if they had been cut thirty years earlier. So we ended up getting them at the Prince Hotel, which had a section devoted to weddings. They all looked fine, except they all had velvet lapels. I refused to take on with velvet and got a regular one—I didn't want velvet lapels.

Security for the Reagan visit was unbelievable. If anything, it was even more suffocating than that which the Japanese had developed for the Carter visit. The Secret Service had its own advance team which negotiated with their Japanese counterparts. As often happens, the two services argued about whose responsibility the protection of the President it was. One of the points of contention was whether the Secret Service car could be as close to the Presidential limousine as it wanted. The Japanese wanted their protection car immediately following the limousine. The Ambassador was instructed by Washington to call on the Prime Minister to discuss this very "high level" issue and

presumably to make sure that the Secret Service car followed immediately after the Presidential limousine. As you can well imagine, Nakasone was not at all pleased with having to deal with matter of this kind; Mansfield was also not very happy with the instructions. So the two of them plus us and the Japanese staff spend half-an-hour or more talking about the order of cars in the motorcade. At one point, Nakasone suggested that the Chief Cabinet Secretary, an old LDP man named Nokota who had been a police officer, and the Embassy's DCM get together with their experts to settle the problem. Mansfield readily accepted. So we continued the meeting in the Chief Cabinet Secretary's house which was right in the Prime Minister's residence's compound. That meeting took another three hours with my side threatening to walk out on a couple of occasions. In the final analysis, the Secret Service did not get its way, but by that time, they believed that we had been as forceful as we could have been and they awarded me a commendation. Recently, I attended the Emperor's arrival ceremony at the White House and wondered what would have happened if the Japanese had been as obstinate as we had been.
The Reagans were staying at the Akasaka—the Japanese version of Versailles with indoor plumbing—which used to be the Crown Prince's Palace and is now the official guest house. Visitors always reviewed troops in front of that Palace; the Emperor drives over from his Palace for that ceremony which is the official arrival ceremony. The chief of the Secret Service detail insisted that he had to stay with the President at all times. The Japanese would not permit that; no one could be that close to the Emperor. The newsreel of the Reagan arrival ceremony will show an unknown figure in morning coat walking a few paces behind the President. That was the head of the detail who decided to completely ignore the Japanese; fortunately, the Emperor did not accompany Reagan in his review because by this time he was getting along in years and could not walk that far. The head of the Secret Service would not allow anything to come in between him and his President! Fortunately, the Japanese did not react; it could have been a serious problem. Our Presidential visits, wherever they may be, are always subject to controversy and frictions because we insist on so many of our ways of doing things. So security was even more heavy handed for Reagan than it had been for Carter, which as all will remember

completely isolated the President from the Japanese people. It is true that the Japanese did not marshall as many troops for the Reagan visit, partly because Reagan was just not that interested in mingling with crowds or holding town meetings. So the visit centered on functions at the Akasaka; he went to the Diet to give a speech and to the Imperial Palace for the formal call on the Emperor and the banquet. The motorcades were quick; he did not spend much time in the road eliminating the need for the massive security that the Japanese mounted for Carter.

The visit was more than just ceremonial. Reagan was accompanied by Shultz and Sigur, some of the White House staff and other high ranking US officials. As with all Presidential visits, much work is done on the side especially by those responsible for drafting the communique. In that paper, a lot of substantive issues are resolved. Usually, the initial drafts are prepared before the visit, but the thorny issues, if resolved at all, are hammered out during the visit by senior officials from both delegations. The DCMs, in Presidential visits, are responsible for the smooth progress of the visit, but usually are not involved in policy debates.

As always, the President is accompanied by a large media contingent which travels on its own plane. It occupied two wings of the Okura Hotel. That is always a major workload for an Embassy, particularly the USIS component. Before leaving Tokyo, Reagan met the Embassy staff. In fact, he did something quite unusual at the suggestion of one of the White House staffers. His stay in Tokyo happen to take place on November 10, which is the birthday of the Marine Corps. Because our Marine contingent had to be on duty for the Presidential visit, the Marine Corps ball could not be held. So Reagan invited the Marines to the Akasaka to share their birthday cake with him; he had a little party for them and only them. The senior American military men in Japan could not believe it; here were some lowly soldiers invited to a party with the President of the United States and they were not invited! That resentment got back to the White House, which then invited the generals and some of us civilians. It was a very amusing show to watch!

The White House staff was quite easy to work with. I think it helped that I knew them all, having worked with them in Washington in preparation for the Suzuki visit. That staff also had a nice touch. Although Suzuki was the one of the first official visits and the staff was just learning the ropes, it handled the protocol as if they had been at it for years. For the State dinner, there was a guest list, which didn't include low level types like myself. For us, they hosted a smaller dinner in the Garden Room which included most of the people who had spent time on the preparations for the visit. The White House included some people in the Japanese Embassy. After dinner, we were invited to join the formal dinner guests for the entertainment. I thought that this gesture was a great touch and greatly appreciated by all the working stiffs, who usually work endless hours for State visits and receive no recognition at all. So I knew the White House staff that came to Tokyo. Deaver was in charge of the “photo opportunities” settings. As I mentioned earlier, the President addressed the Diet, which meets in a dark wooded chamber—quite a handsome room. There is a sky-light made of stained glass, which somehow escaped untouched through the war. Unfortunately, teleprompters can not be read with the light coming through the ceiling and shining right on them. Reagan is very good with just a script and that is what he used; in fact, that technique is much more personal and each member of the audience felt that he was talking directly to him or her. It was a superb performance. The Japanese were very pleased with the visit which paid appropriate attention to Japanese sensitivities.

Later Reagan returned to Tokyo for a G-7 meeting. That was easier to handle because he was there as a member of a large group, all hosted by the Japanese.

Before closing this chapter of my career, I should mention that this assignment was my first encounter with the problems of down-sizing US representation overseas. It was by no means the last, but I learned a lot about the process even though we were not very successful in Tokyo, even with the full support of the Ambassador. His unswerving view that US government agencies were assigning too many people to overseas posts; the net result was that there was an unbalance in representation with the State Department

contingent under-represented and other agencies over-staffed. Although he didn't manage to reduce the Embassy staffing, in his eight years Mansfield did manage to hold the line; it could have increased substantially had he not taken such a firm stand against it. One just needs to see what happened in Bangkok! Every agency wanted to assign its people to Tokyo; some of the assignments had to be settled at the Secretarial levels in Washington. I recall the FAA case. It wanted to assign fifteen people to Tokyo to work on airline safety to be quartered in the Embassy or downtown Tokyo, although they would be working out at Narita and Nahata. I thought that was insane since the commute between Tokyo and those airports was even then at least two hours each way. I suggested that they be located out at Narita and fly to Nahata when they had to work there. FAA thought that was entirely unacceptable and in the final analysis, never did assign a staff to Japan. FAA of course used the argument that their work was vital to airline safety, but most US government can make a case that their work is of the highest priority.

Q: In 1985, after finishing four years as DCM in Tokyo, you were available for re-assignment. How did your next assignment come about?

CLARK: After I had been in Tokyo approximately two years, I was asked whether I would be interested in returning to Washington as Deputy Assistant Secretary for FE. At that point in time, I was not. Towards the end of my four years in Tokyo, Paul Wolfowitz, then the Assistant Secretary for FE, asked me join him as his Deputy for Economic Affairs. That suggestion did not interest me. That position had never loomed large in the policy process in the Bureau not to mention the Department as a whole. Fortunately, Bill Pease, who was the Embassy's Economic Minister was interested and he was a first rate officer. So I told Paul that I was not really interested and filled out my “wish” card, which in the mid-80s asked for an officer's fifteen top choices, but you were not allowed to list ambassadorial or deputy assistant secretary positions. I gave the Department two choices: a) DCM, Bonn since I had learned German when I entered the Foreign Service and b) DCM, Cairo because I was interested in learning something about the Middle East. I had hardly sent my list in, when I got a call from Cairo from Nick Veliotes, who was our Ambassador

there. He wanted to know whether I was serious about Cairo. I told him that I had never been there, but that I would be delighted to work together with him. I had never even met Nick, but we knew each other by reputation. This was one of those rare instances in the Foreign Service when an Ambassador selects a DCM without having known him personally. Furthermore, I had never served in the Middle East and certainly had no expertise in the area. Since there were so many unknowns, I suggested that I fly to Cairo so that we could talk to each other and I could look at the environment. He thought that that might be worked out and I agreed with that. Soon thereafter, the Department told me that it was against its policy to have an officer go to a post just to see what it looked like. I wrote back that in that case I was not interested in the Cairo assignment. That apparently did it because soon thereafter I received travel orders to fly to Cairo which I did and then returned to Tokyo via Washington. I did that in part because there were a couple of American companies that wanted to talk to me about jobs in the private sector. In fact, going around the world or just a round Tokyo-Cairo round trip was about the same cost.

Nick left April 1, 1986. So we worked together for about six months. I thought it was an excellent relationship, during which I learned a lot from him. After April 1, I was Charg# for six months. The Department took a lot of time deciding on Nick's successor and then putting him in place. Frank Wisner was finally chosen and moved out of the Philippines where he had the DCM for not very long. This was in a period during which the Philippine Senate rejected a base agreement that Nick Platt had so laboriously hammered out. It then just took a long time to extricate Frank from that situation. The Egyptians were very accommodating and did not raise a fuss about the lengthy ambassadorial vacancy. Had it been over six months, they might have protested, but six months seemed acceptable. In any case, by April 1, they knew who I was. I had seen Mubarak often. On one occasion, I took Senator Hart, then preparing for his Presidential run, to see Mubarak. We spent all of the time talking business. As I was leaving, he said something in Arabic; I caught the drift. So I turned to him and said: “You know, Mr. President, I don't do that”. He looked at me quizzically and said: “You won't do that?”. I replied: “I think you asked me to send a

message to Washington. When you asked me earlier, I said that I would do that. What I meant was that I don't do Arabic". He laughed; we always got along quite well.

Being Charg# for six months was not an overwhelming experience. I already knew, by April 1, that I was coming back to Washington in the Fall to be the Principal Deputy in the East Asian Bureau. That was at Sigur's request who by this time had become the Assistant Secretary. That future enabled me to do something I would not have done were I to remain in Egypt after the arrival of a new ambassador. I moved into the Ambassador's office and brought Ed Casey, the Economic Minister, to my office to be in effect the acting DCM until Jack Covey, who was to be Wisner's DCM arrived in summer, 1986. So when Frank arrived, his DCM had been operational for two months already. I brought a secretary up to be Frank's secretary a month before his arrival so that she was familiar with the front office before Frank arrived. I think she has forgiven me for that by now. I left six days before Frank's arrival giving General Services an opportunity to paint and refurbish the Ambassador's office without disrupting the Embassy's operations. So when Frank arrived, he had an on-going operations. That could not have been possible if I had stayed because the various personnel shifts would have become very disruptive and counter-productive. By having a DCM, I was able to avoid over-load, which happens to those Charg#s who then have to return to their DCM position.

I visited Cairo and decided that the DCM job might be challenging and fun. My wife thought I was crazy. The DCM had a house in the outskirts of Cairo, but he also had an apartment in downtown on the twenty-second floor of the Egyptian-American Bank, which was brand new. In Egypt, as in some places in Europe, apartments are built, but not finished. so even though the building was complete, there was interior work being done all the time. That didn't seem too conducive for entertainment; so I suggested that other quarters be found. I was told that I would love the view. I also found out that the building did not have a back-up power source which in Cairo was a very important asset since power tended to shut down frequently. That meant no elevators and I thought twenty-two floors was a little much to walk, particularly going up. Furthermore, there was no parking

for any guests that we might invite. I requested that a conveniently located house be found. If that could be done, I would be happy to join the Cairo staff.

On the way back to Tokyo, I talked to Gaston Sigur who was then on the NSC. I was curious to see what his future plans might be since Wolfowitz had been in the Assistant Secretary position for three years. We agreed that we could work together well if he ever would be appointed as assistant secretary. At the time, that was all there was to the conversation.

So we moved to Cairo. On my first day, I walked into the large waiting room in front of the Ambassador's and DCM's offices. Nick came out and said: " I am glad to see you. You are now the only person in the Embassy that can't say Malesh". I replied:"Mr. Ambassador, that is not true. Now that I am here, you are the only one in the Embassy who can say Malesh!" And that became the common practice!~

I was briefed in Washington before my final departure for Cairo. Much of our policy towards Egypt still revolved around Camp David; we were still pursuing the peace process and paying over $2 billion in assistance every year to help that process. We were beginning to be seriously concerned by the Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt. I heard a lot about Mubarak. Then there was Taba, an issue in which I became thoroughly immersed while serving in Egypt. Taba was the last piece of land in the Sinai which was still in dispute between the Egyptians and the Israelis. This was just a piece of Sinai that the Israelis forgot to return; they would tell me: "But look all we did return".

We had a large assistance mission in Egypt. I was told in Washington that it needed to be down-sized, which was not an easy task. The problem was compounded by the large number of American contractors who worked in Egypt under AID contracts. Most estimates was that there were probably 1,000 of them in Egypt at any one time. Then there was the military assistance mission was also large. It had sub-teams, which also had contractors. When you added up all of the Americans who in one way or another

were US government sponsored, it was huge. The Embassy staff itself was only about 290 Americans representing all agencies and as usual the State Department contingent was the smallest part of the US government presence. AID's focus at this time was on concentration—that is, a few large projects and no small ones. For example, we had helped with the upgrading of the telephone system in Cairo and Alexandria; this system became operational while I was in Egypt and made a lot of difference to the communications capabilities of the country. We and the British were deeply engaged in the modernization of the Cairo sewer system—a project which did not get much visibility. The system had been originally designed by the British for a city of about 750,000 people; in fact, it was designed to accommodate 3 million. By the mid-1980s, Cairo had 10 million people living in it and growing. I must say that the system worked remarkably well given its inadequacy. The modernization and expansion of that sewer system was a very costly job. I think that AID in Egypt was a unique operation. Frank Campbell was the Mission Director after having served as the Deputy Director of AID in Washington. Before taking the Mission Director's job, he had obtained permission to take his own program staff to Cairo with him. I quickly came to the conclusion that that had been one of the worst ideas I had ever seen. Such a staff would recommend programs whether needed or not because that was their responsibility. The staff's presence made it very difficult to shift resources from one sector to another because it was wedded to what it had originally proposed and would not embrace change. One of the most effective Egyptian Cabinet Ministers was Yusuf Abali, the Minister of Agriculture. He had studied Israeli arid farming and believed that that technique could be applied to certain areas of Egypt. So even while there were tensions between the two countries, relationship on technical agricultural issues were maintained. Out of this connection, came Egypt's first and very successful effort to grow strawberries. The Minister was diametrically opposed to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the current Secretary General of the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali was then responsible for African affairs and specifically for issues dealing with the Nile's watershed. He wanted to increase the water flow of the Nile River. Yusuf Wali's view was that more water was not the answer, but better management of available water was the appropriate policy. The

then prevailing water flow was ruining the land because the Aswan Dam had controlled the water flow so that it was constant. That built up the silt level behind the dam and raised the water table on the northern side of the dam, ruining all the monuments that had been built along the Nile. The farmers had not adjusted to the new flows and were still engaged in flood irrigation which together with the high water level, leached the salt out, ruining the fields.

We have to also remember that the AID program was one of the few that was dictated by a level of resources that had been established without reference to project requirements. That meant that projects had to be developed to absorb the amounts of resources already determined. Towards the end of every fiscal year, there was a mad scramble to obligate all the available resources; otherwise they would be lost and we would not have satisfied the obligations we assumed after Camp David. The American assistance went for development aid and to help the Egyptians pay for the debts they had incurred in procuring military equipment from us; had they defaulted in their debts, we could not have continued our military assistance program. So we always scrambled at the end of the year to absorb all the available resources. That was another argument for a large military assistance contingent; we had to have personnel there to push the Egyptians to complete their planning and projects so that we could move on into the following fiscal year.

After having been in Cairo for a while, I came to the conclusion that the economic assistance program was too large. Even though the mission was trying to emphasize concentration, we still had too many projects in too many places with too many people. It was the old story: if the US government has personnel in its mission to do economic planning, then the recipient country will rely on that rather than doing its own. I believed that it might benefit all of us to let the Egyptians come forth with some of their own plans; if some of it was not acceptable or if some of the plans were not produced on a timely basis, then we might just reduce the assistance levels. That certainly would have caught their attention. But we in fact were pushing them in certain directions. At one point, when I was Charg#, I couldn't get to see Ghanzuri, the Minister for Economic Affairs. That was

not unusual; he was always hard to catch. One day I mentioned that to Yusuf Wali. That evening I was hosting a reception to which most Cabinet officers had been invited. When Wali came through the receiving line, I welcomed him. He broke out in a broad grin and said: “Look who I have brought with me!'. Sure enough, there was Ghanzuri right behind him. That was a profitable evening; we got some business done.

The level of military assistance, just like economic assistance, was predetermined. I think that was unfortunate, but it was a given and we had to work with it. But I must say, that I was very pleased by the way the program was structured. The US military had developed a management concept which rested on support teams specifically chosen for its expertise on one piece of equipment or another. So if we sold a high performance fighter aircraft, a support team came to Egypt with the planes. That team prepared the Egyptians to receive the equipment, trained them in its proper utilization and then, on a predetermined time schedule, left the country. So there was no layer after layer of bureaucracy that has developed in other countries where a team is sent and then remains forever while other teams also are assigned. So I thought the military assistance organizational structure was excellent. I tried that approach in other places; I called it “sun setting”. We did not assist directly the construction of government munitions or military equipment production plants; we did procure some of that output for use in other countries—not with military assistance funds. There was some talk of supporting a tank production facility, but nothing was concluded during my tour.

The US government was really of two minds on arms sales. On the one hand, we were trying to restructure the Egyptian army; there was no way that even $1 billion of the $2.2 billion assistance package would re-equip the army. It had nothing but old Soviet equipment, and it would have taken far greater resources than we could ever contemplate to replace all those weapons and systems. So we concentrated our attention of a few aspects: a tank division and modern aircraft. It was a discrete effort which in itself raised difficulties because it forced the Egyptians to maintain a dual supply system because they had to maintain two incompatible weapon systems. By the mid-1980s, the Egyptians were

manufacturing many of the small arms they needed; that helped the logistic problem. They also worked with the North Koreans on the production of SCUDs by reverse engineering some of the ones they had gotten from the Soviets. We gave some thought to assisting the Egyptians in some of their reverse engineering efforts; their need for parts and ammo for their Soviet equipment was becoming too expensive for the Egyptians; we could not provide that at affordable prices. It was cheaper to buy them from Eastern Europe. So I while I was in Cairo, we never pursued the purchase of spare parts and ammo for Soviet equipment from the US. We did buy some Soviet equipment from the Egyptian for testing.

While I was in Tokyo, there had been two US military commanders: one was Chuck Donnelly, who recently died, and the other one was Ed Tiscie, who is now in Texas retired. Ed had been the MAAG Chief in Egypt and Chuck had had the same job in Saudi. Tiscie was in the stands when Sadat was assassinated. He had told me that he had made sure that the Commander of the lead tank—US made—of the review that was saluting Sadat had been thoroughly checked out for reliability and that the wires which guided the cannons on the following tanks had been cut so that they could not be pointed at Sadat. Unfortunately, the planners did not consider the possibility of troops in trucks following the tanks would leap out and start shooting.

During my tour, we considered Egypt as a very important player in the context of Middle East affairs. It was seen as a vital pillar in the construction of a Middle East peace. There wouldn't be a peace without Egypt. Egypt was the only Middle East power that could mobilize a large army; it was therefore essential to keep it in the Camp David framework and in discussions with Israel, which is the reason we spent so much time on that subject. Mubarak was someone we could work with. He could be obtuse at times and I refer particularly to Achille Lauro incident when we had some communication problems.

I already mentioned our concern for the fundamentalists. They were a serious factor in 1985. Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman was in Egypt at the time, preaching his venom. The Sadat assassination had not been forgotten. On one occasion, an Indian, who was the

head of the Union Carbide operations in Egypt manufacturing batteries, was charged that he had favored Christians Copts over Muslims in his personnel practices. He didn't help matters by saying that the American Embassy would come to his defense. After the charges was made, he was injudicious enough to promote three more Christians. That was enough to convince the Egyptian government to throw him out of the country. The Embassy then became heavily involved. We investigated the charges. In the final analysis, we concluded that there was a Colonel in the Interior Ministry who was a fundamentalist. His cousin was employed by Union Carbide and did not receive the promotion that had gone to one of the Copts. I had to discuss this with the Minister of Interior in the presence of the Colonel. We had agreed ahead of time with the Minister what the conclusions of the meeting would be. I knew that Union Carbide was going to transfer the Indian in about two months in any case. I didn't want him thrown out of Egypt just short of his normal departure; it would have sent an unfortunate signal to the American business community. The Interior Minister agreed. So at the meeting, we agreed that the American Embassy would see to it that the Indian left Egypt within three months. The Colonel was furious; he made all sorts of threats after the meeting. It was clear that he did not work only for the Interior Ministry; he had other allegiances as well. The fundamentalists had infiltrated the government; that was of great concern to Mubarak and his Ministers. Over a period of time, the fundamentalists have become much more aggressive; from killing other Egyptians, as they did in my days, they have now expanded their targets to include foreigners. Asyut, a city so much in the news today, was and is 50% Coptic. One can measure the level of religious tensions in Israel by events in that city. A few times we did remonstrate with the Egyptian government about human rights violations, but there was general agreement in the US government that Mubarak was observing protection of human rights to the maximum extent. Democracy and freedom of speech were not up to American standards, but when viewed in light of Egyptian culture, there was progress so that we were not forced to make any major issues out of human rights violations.

I want to briefly mention my involvement in the Middle East peace process. Abe Sofaer, the Department's Legal Advisor, and one of his staff members were the chief American negotiators. Rabie Sabel and Abrasha Tamir and David Bar-on were the lawyers representing the Israelis and the Egyptians. I had met them, most of them, having visited Israel soon after my arrival in Cairo. That was a very worthwhile trip because Taba was the subject of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and I had an opportunity to become acquainted with the Israeli point of view. The details of the negotiations were left to the lawyers; they became very detailed with concerns about location of markers, which maps were to be used, etc. This kind of negotiation could go on forever; in this case, the Israelis decided after many months that the issue was not important enough to drag out over a long period of time. When the Israelis would come to Cairo, they would also talk to us to get a feel of the situation; they used us as conduits for ideas and possibilities. They would also talk to the Embassy in Tel Aviv, so that communications among the three parties involved were quite good. Fortunately, the general atmosphere was quite relaxed for a Middle East negotiation. It helped that we and our colleagues in Tel Aviv were in continual close contact and were in total agreement about various issues. As I mentioned before, I had left Cairo when the final Taba agreement was signed, but there was visible progress towards that goal during the year I was in Egypt.

Because of the Camp David Accords, Egypt had been disowned by the Arab League. The old League headquarters building had been turned over for other uses, but it was clearly being kept ready for the return of the League. The Egyptians never lost their faith in their perception that they were at the center of the Arab world. Egypt was by far the most populous country in the area; it had the largest military force. It would not ask the League to be invited back, but it fully expected the rest of the Arab world to come back to it. Mubarak and I discussed Egypt's position; he was always firm that he would not seek reinstatement in the League. The continuous negotiations with the Israelis regarding Taba were a problem; Mubarak could have taken a very tough stand to please his Arab neighbors, but he wouldn't do that. He was making the point, in a quiet and effective way,

that Egypt was a sovereign country and would pursue its own interests. Eventually, of course, Mubarak strategy worked well; Egypt is now a member of the League and its Secretary General is the former Egyptian Foreign Minister. Even in the 1985-86 period, you could detect some lowering of the Arab antagonism towards Egypt. The Middle East peace process was not moving along very well; Shultz would not come to the region to try to push it along. Most American Administrations—with perhaps the exception of the present one—have operated on the theory that a Secretarial visit was a panacea which would bring immediate concessions from Middle East governments. On one occasion, while I was Charg#, I was instructed to see the Foreign Minister to ask for some Egyptian policy changes. If those were not forthcoming, then Shultz would not be able to come to the Middle East. I cabled back suggesting that the instructions be changed because I might get the wrong response from the Egyptians. That didn't sway Washington. So I delivered the message to the Foreign Minister who, when I had finished my presentation, leaned over, patted me on the knee and said that he thanked me for the message and that the Egyptians would be delighted to host the Secretary whenever he wished to come, but that Egypt had to base its foreign policy upon its own views of its national interests. It was not the answer that Washington wanted to hear, but that is what I reported as it had been given to me. The Foreign Minister was very polite, but his message was firm and clear—the visit of the American Secretary of State would be welcomed, but could not be used as leverage on Egypt's foreign policy. We worked well with Egyptians during the year I was in Cairo; there were no major problems. It was unfortunate that the peace talk couldn't be resumed, beyond the Taba issue.

The Soviets by this time were no longer a player. Their military advisors had been withdrawn at Egyptian request and their diplomatic mission was a very low key operation. We used to see some of their diplomats at receptions, but I never had any discussions with them.

One of the major issues we had to deal with was the Egypt-Libya relations. There were periodic incursions; at one point, it even looked as if war would be imminent. Qadhafi

threatened to send a million people to the border. The Egyptians understood Qadhafi's unpredictability; as with other Arab leaders, Mubarak was outspoken in his comments. Qadhafi's deputy—a Major—used to come to Cairo. During one of these visits, a huge amount of liquor was consumed; Mubarak, as a good Muslim, commented on people who espoused one standard of behavior and then did the exact opposite. He also did not like to pay the bills that the Libyan Major used to run up in Cairo, but Arab hospitality required such gestures. We used to discuss war plans with the Egyptians; I learned something from that. We kept running into disconnects when discussing war plans with the Egyptians and we couldn't understand why. Finally, we understood that we had a basic difference in approach. We used the American way and the Egyptians used the Soviet model. We analyzed a problem and thought up solutions. The Soviets would analyze the problem and then would consider what resources were available to bring it to bear. So we would advise the build up of forces while the Egyptians worried first about how to get the forces to the border.

Egypt and Sudan also had tense relations. Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, the former Sudanese President until overthrown by a coup in 1985, was living in Cairo. The Egyptians did not get much cooperation from the Sudanese; we didn't either. Hume Horan was our Ambassador in Khartoum. While I was in Egypt, he left. We were all concerned about events in Khartoum, but the US was more of a target than Egypt, even though the Sudanese resented the Egyptians giving them advice, usually in a superior-to-inferior mode.

I would like now to tell the story of the Achille Lauro. That incident occurred in the Fall, 1985. On one work day, the Embassy received a call from Washington informing us that the Achille Lauro, a Greek passenger ship had been hijacked. We were told that the ship was heading towards Alexandria. That was our first alert; we were told that we should stand by for further instructions. I immediately called our General Services Officer and asked that he wire up our conference room in case we had to set up a crisis center. In fact, the ship changed course and headed away from Alexandria; it could not be found by the

various national authorities which by this time were very concerned. Nevertheless, I left the conference room in its “ready” mode. When located again, the ship appeared to be heading toward Syria.

Then somehow we heard that someone on board had been killed. Then the ship was lost again and when found again it was heading back to Egypt. By this time, the senior Embassy officials had all been briefed, but we had not yet gone into an alert mode. It was the intention of the authorities not to let it dock at Alexandria, but to try to keep it at sea in international waters, where the Navy Seals might be able to storm it. At the same time, Mubarak's advisors were urging him not to let the ship into Egyptian waters, where it had been a few days earlier before sailing away. I am convinced, to this day, that Mubarak had visions of the TWA hijacking which had taken place sometime earlier. You will recall, that that incident created a major international crisis with the Israelis finally having to give up 1,000 prisoners to retrieve the passengers. Mubarak thought that he might be able to resolve the Achille Lauro more easily because he thought that he could influence the hijackers, as indeed he did. So Mubarak allowed the ship to enter Alexandria port. The Egyptians were, as far as I know, the only people in touch with the ship. We had sporadic contacts with the Egyptians.

By this time, we knew who the hijackers were. The Embassy's crisis room was operational and the staff had been put in a state of high alert. We also by now knew that there had been nine American couples on board; they were headed for a port in Israel. We were informed that a Mr. Klinghoffer, who was a cripple bound to a wheelchair, had been pushed overboard and drowned. We put together a team including the Embassy's psychiatrist, the nurse, a consular officer, the General Services Officer which accompanied the Ambassador to Alexandria. They also took an ambulance. In the meantime, the Egyptians had convinced the hijackers to leave the ship. So when the American team arrived in Alexandria, it boarded the ship. We found out that the hijackers had gathered the remaining seventeen Americans on deck and had surrounded them with gasoline drums. The hijackers were prepared to kill all of them if they felt it was necessary. That meant that

our people were in far greater peril than we had recognized. We didn't understand that situation because the Egyptians had not been very communicative.

It was only after Veliotes boarded the ship that the full scope of the episode became clear. That is what prompted Nick's call to me which was monitored by some reporter who was on shore listening to the communications to and from the ship. Within minutes, Nick's words were heard in the United States and probably in many parts of the world. He was obviously outraged by what he found on board and told me that he wanted “those sons of bitches” arrested. Later I told him that the biggest mistake he made during the incident was not to say: “Clark, I want those sons of bitches arrested”. Having had a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, Nick will always be remembered for those few words spoken in a second. I am sure, had he known, he would have embellished his remarks to me. We had no trouble boarding the ship except that our psychiatrist developed mental problems himself. He just came unglued! But all the surviving Americans were taken off and put on a train to Cairo.

By this time, activity became fast and furious. Washington was on our backs calling on us to demand from the Egyptians that the hijackers be turned over to US personnel. It was clear that our attitude toward hijackers had changed since the TWA incident. We wanted the perpetrators with no “ifs or buts”. Nick was instructed to personally see Mubarak and demand their release to our custody. In my discussions with Washington, I asked repeatedly for an American military medical evacuation aircraft so that the seventeen Americans could be evacuated out of Egypt as quickly as possible to be taken to the US military hospital in Frankfurt. After a long hassle, we finally got approval for the plane. I was told that all I had to was call the base and it would be on its way.

We knew that the Egyptians had the hijackers in custody, but didn't know exactly where. They were facing major problems because they were now caught between some of the Arab brothers and the United States. Mubarak wanted to turn the hijackers over to Arafat in Tunis to be tried there. That would have gotten the Egyptians somewhat off the hook; at

least they would not have physical control of the hijackers. That proposal did not please us at all. When Nick went to make his demands for the hijackers, he was told by Mubarak that they had left the country. We knew from our sources that this was not true. The President of Egypt was not being honest with us! In the meantime, the seventeen Americans were on their way to Cairo. Although all senior citizens, some were very feisty. Their own guide kept promising to get them out of Egypt on a TWA commercial flight. That plane was scheduled to leave at 5 a.m. The American passengers refused that offer; they said they were tired and wanted a rest before resuming their odyssey. When they got to Cairo they told me that they didn't want the military aircraft; some had been in the Army and wanted no further part of that life. So I called Washington to hold up the evacuation flight and I was told that the State Department hoped that at least the American survivors would be given first class seats—as if we had any control over that!. After his meeting with Mubarak, Nick went to see the Americans at their hotel.

All of us were very uneasy by this time. We thought that something was happening of which we had not been informed. The Egyptians were being very evasive; some of the cable traffic seemed a little odd; our US military contingent was very uneasy, although they had no information, but just felt that something was in the wind. Finally, I called Mike Armacost, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and told him that we had a funny feeling that something was going to happen and no one was telling us. He said: “It has happened”. He was referring to the diversion of the Egyptian plane, which was carrying the hijackers to the NATO Air Force base Sigonella in Sicily. No one had told us about those plans. We might never have heard from the Department had I not called Mike! When I heard from Mike, I called Veliotes at the hotel where he was with the American passengers. I suggested that he return to his office immediately, if not sooner.

When he got back, I briefed him. I suggested he talk to Mike on the secure phone to get more information. In the meantime, I told him that I was going to increase security on our buildings, since we didn't know whether the Egyptians knew anything and what their reaction might be when they learned what the US had done. The next morning the Achille

Lauro passengers woke up to the news and realized that their hijackers were on a NATO base surrounded by US troops. The general in charge was making all sorts of threats about what he would do to the plane if the hijackers were not turned over to him in a hurry. These events seemed to have some impact on the Americans because they came to the conclusion that the use of an American medical evacuation plane might not be a bad idea. So I called the White House and reinstituted my requests of a couple of days earlier. The passengers were concerned, as were we, that the Egyptian reaction might be quite forceful and they wanted to get out while the getting was good. Much to my surprise, the White House approved the use of the military plane. A few minutes before it was to land near Cairo, I got a call from Frankfurt. Nick was at the airport to bid our “guests” goodbye. The military commander in Frankfurt was concerned because they had lost contact with their plane. Furthermore, it occurred to them that we had an Egyptian plane surrounded on the runway in Sigonella; they could see the possibility of the Egyptians returning the favor with this medical plane. Frankfurt asked me to call the airport tower to tell our plane not to land, but to return to friendly territory. The logic of that request still boggles my mind: I was to ask the Egyptians to waive off a plane which they might want to capture! Anyway, I went ahead and had our Air Attach# call the tower. He was informed that the plane was on its final approach and could not be called off. The Egyptians permitted the plane to land, refueled it, let the Americans board and then let the plane take off. If the thought of exchanging plane for plane ever occurred to them, it never showed. They put on a class act and the evacuation proceeded very smoothly.

We later learned that the Egyptians knew what was happening as soon as our fighters met the Egypt airliner. That was much earlier than we did, but they never told us. Abu Ghazali, the Defense Minister, was furious at the pilots for following US instructions. He wanted the instructions ignored on the assumption that we would not shoot the plane down. That Defense Minister was later fired for being involved in an effort to smuggle missiles out of the US. Actually, for the most part, he was a very helpful official.

But for a period of time, we did not know that the hijackers had boarded an Air Egypt liner, that the Tunisians had refused to let that plane land on its territory, that Washington knew all that was going on and that the US had decided to divert the plane to Sigonella. I later found out that the US planner was Ollie North. The Egyptians, having told us that the hijackers had already left, could then not turn around to let us know when in fact they left; they also didn't tell us that their plane had been forced down. Washington didn't want or didn't think of keeping us posted. It was only after the fact that the Egyptians let us know that they were not happy with our actions, although if they sent a demarche, they must have done it in Washington because we didn't receive one. The Egyptians were embarrassed; they had been caught in a lie and then of course diverting one of their commercial aircraft was not going to be acceptable, even though it had hijackers on board.

By the time the Egyptian plane landed in Sigonella, we knew who the hijackers were. We knew Abul Abass was on the plane and that he was the leader of that group as well as being involved in other terrorist activities. He had not been aboard the Achille Lauro but he was invited to come to Egypt to negotiate the release of his people. We missed a golden opportunity to capture one of the leading terrorists, as the Italians later admitted . It was their intervention, as you will recall, that forced us to release the plane. The Egyptians told us who the hijackers were and that was confirmed by our intelligence community. I think the Egyptians knew who these people were very early in the sequence of events. There was considerable confusion in part because the hijacking was really unplanned. The terrorists were to disembark with the other passengers in Israel and conduct their attacks there. But they were uncovered by one of the crew members while they were preparing their weapons. That forced a change in their plans and they decided to hijack the cruise ship instead. The whole story was fascinating, but very nerve wracking for all concerned as you can well imagine. In the final analysis, we were lucky to escape with the loss of only one life, devastating as that was. It could have been a major catastrophe.

While serving in Cairo, I also experienced my first police riot which occurred in February, 1986. It was a surprising occurrence at the time, but could almost have been anticipated if one looked in retrospect. The police involved were those that were responsible for such activities as guarding embassies. We had them at our front gate, armed with very shiny weapons which obviously had never been fired. They used to be referred by Egyptians, and especially the military, as “animals” and other terms of denigration. These young men, just like their contemporaries in the regular military, were all draftees. Some went into the Army and others in this police force. It was assumed that the more intelligent were drafted into the Army; the poor uneducated farm boys became policemen. As the bottom of the rung, they were treated abominably. They were camped out near the Pyramids. One night, they just rioted. It was never clear what set them off; some blamed the fundamentalists, but nothing was ever proven. I think essentially they just got tired of being treated worse than some animals. They went on a rampage; they fired at some of the hotels in the Pyramids area. The American School and most of our staff that had families with children were housed in Madi, which also had a police camp near by. When the riot started, it was evening and I received a call from the Chief of MAAG. I suggested that we meet the next day at the Chancery. They never showed up, which I found somewhat disconcerting. All the other Embassy staff came to the Chancery compound, which had offices for all US government components in Cairo; only the US military didn't show up; they stayed with their families at home. During that day, we were receiving periodic reports about firing near the police camps. We had a report that Maadi was in flames, that looting was taking place and that the gas station at the corner of the Cornice, which was a landmark, was going up in flames. Some of the reports were being provided us by eyewitnesses, some of whom I knew personally. As you can well imagine, the staff was on edge. As it turned out, all the reports were greatly exaggerated and completely wrong in many respects. Nevertheless, the continuing reports of troubles were obviously of concern. I was the Charg# at the time; Nick was in the US for consultations. The Egyptian authorities kept reassuring us that the problems were minor, but the staff was not reassured. So I called General Abu Gazala of the Ministry of Defense and told him about my concerns. I wanted the staff which was in

the Chancery compound out to Maadi to be with their families. By this time, the Egyptian military had mobilized and were beginning to take action against the police. The General, in his usual way said :" No problem! I will have one of my Colonels at the compound in twenty-minutes". And indeed in twenty minutes, a Colonel showed up with a jeep, a number of APCs mounted with troops with machine guns. I asked all of the staff which wanted to return home to get in their cars and formed a caravan. The followed the lead jeep and two of the APCs; the other two fell in behind at the end of the caravan. All of the Egyptians who lived near the compound were watching this from their windows; they had never seen anything like it. We kept a skeleton emergency crew at the Chancery. When the situation had been brought under control, we could see that the incidents in Maadi had been sporadic, but that the destruction around the Pyramids had been considerable. Fortunately, most of the tourists had been evacuated before the hotels were burned down. Not all the facilities were torched; for example, Mina House—the Oberoi Hotel—was broken into, but not burned. Only one American was killed—an elderly woman who suffocated in her room. We had opened a telephone line to Washington; by this time, after the Achille Lauro incident we knew how to do that! Washington set up a task force with which we were in constant contact. Fortunately, the riot lasted only one day. It was a very stressful day, even though I had been through many violent demonstrations in Japan. Many of the Cairo staff had not lived through such events and were very upset.

One day, the Egyptian Lawyers Association threatened to march on the Embassy. That didn't seem to me to be a major problem. But many of my staff became quite concerned. I was assured by the police that the demonstrators would be stopped a block away from the Chancery. But everyone else was very nervous despite my repeated assurances that there was really nothing to worry about. I insisted that the Embassy stay open, that the gates stay open as if it were just another work day. I was only going to change our normal routine if advised by the Egyptians authorities to do otherwise. By sheer coincidence, some of the Embassy's secretaries—including mine—were going out to have a farewell lunch with one of their colleagues who was transferring. They left in a car; within twenty

minutes, the MAAG had dismissed all of its personnel for the day. When I called the acting Chief to ask for an explanation, he said: “I saw you sending your secretary home. So I decided to send my staff home as well”. I ordered him to go to the lobby and sit there to see what was going on. Within a half hour, the secretaries returned from their lunch. He was dumb-founded. I then explained to him that they had just gone out for a celebration. His lame excuse was that he had to be very careful. As it turned out, there were about six lawyers who demonstrated and none ever came near the Chancery. But this was good illustration of the extreme tension that some of the staff felt most of the time and that includes even some of the senior officers. I believe that this was the consequence of the general atmosphere in the Middle East, heightened by the Achille Lauro incident and the police riots. Too many of the Americans working in the Embassy saw themselves as potential victims of one threat or another, although I don't think they were anymore exposed than personnel in many of our other embassies. Having experienced many violent demonstrations in other countries, I just could not share that concern; Egypt was no more dangerous than most other countries. I found it interesting that this level of anxiety was particularly high among the military community of the embassy. Our military component was essentially a sales organization with the capacity to support the weapon systems that were sold. So they didn't have much experience in the Middle East or perhaps in any other embassy. On the other hand, the Defense Attach# was a true Arabist and was one of the best military intelligence officers that the Army had. He was great; he didn't get upset. The bottom line was that no official American or his/her family was hurt in the police riot.

In one sense, the police riot had a salutary effect among the Egyptians. There had been concern because of the tensions between Mubarak and the Defense Minister. During the riot, the Egyptian military occupied the streets and did a remarkable job. Soldiers could be seen playing soccer with the kids in the streets. It was a superb performance of peace-keeping. After three days, the soldiers went back to the barracks. The Defense Minister proudly pointed out that the Egyptian military could be used effectively to restore order,

but was not in the business of running the country and therefore returned to the barracks when the job was done. The Defense Minister got a lot of kudos for his troops' behavior. The average Egyptian felt very relieved when the military returned to their quarters. After calm had been restored, we went back to “business as usual”. The same police that had guarded the Embassy before returned to duty still with their unused automatic weapons.

The other incident that I should mention concerned the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner by some fundamentalists—the Egyptians said “Palestinians”, but it was hard to know their origins. One day, we received reports from the Egyptians and from US sources and also from Cyprus that an Egyptian plane had been hijacked and had landed in Cyprus. There were lengthy discussions about what action to take, even though, as far as I can remember, there were no Americans on board. Washington urged patience until special forces could be sent to Cyprus. We wanted to get involved because in 1986, hijacking was a major issue with us. the Cyprus incident came soon after the hijacking of the TWA plane. So our policy was that wherever terrorists struck an airliner, we or the closest NATO ally would bring its force to bear. But our forces never were brought into play because Cyprus refused permission for them to land. We were trying to slow down the activity until what we considered to be appropriate forces could be brought to Cyprus. But the Egyptians decided that they had at least get some of their men to the Cyprus airport. They sent their crack commando unity—the 777—which had trained in the US. They asked if, for liaison purposes, we might send some American officers with that unit. Since the Cypriots were refusing to allow US personnel to land and since we were interested in knowing what was going on, we responded positively to the Egyptian request. So the MAAG Chief and two or three of his staff members—all of whom had had commando training—went with the Egyptian unit. At the request of the Egyptians, these American wore their uniforms. When they met the Egyptian soldiers, they found that they were in mufti, leaving our officers sticking out like sore thumbs. The pictures from Cyprus will show the American officers disembarking in uniforms while the Egyptians were wearing civilian clothes. To this day, I have never found out why this happened; I asked our military when they returned. They

didn't know, but suspected that they had been set up. But I have never gotten an answer, although it was clear that the Egyptians wanted some Americans with them. As it turned out, when the Egyptians commandos landed, the Cypriots were in communications with the hijackers. I was told that the Egyptians moved to the tarmac, while the Americans were shunted off to the side and didn't have any role to play in the drama. After the Cypriots had refused landing rights to the American special forces, the Egyptian commander decided to move against the plane. His soldiers blew the doors off and moved unto the plane with considerable loss of life, including the hijacker. The joke in the Embassy became that the only worse thing to being hijacked by Palestinians was to be rescued by the Egyptians.

I should mention my views of the status of the peace process in the 1985-86 period. This was six-seven years after Camp David. The major activity in the peace process was Taba, which I have already described. We witnessed the beginning of Israeli tourism, not so much in Cairo, but in the Sinai. The Israelis had developed some resort areas there and were now coming back to enjoy them. I can recall one incident involving some Israelis and one very nervous Egyptian guard. He ended up shooting and hitting about seven tourists. Then the Egyptian military moved in and refused anyone else access to the location of the incident. Unfortunately, without medical assistance, some of those tourists bled to death, according to the Israeli government. What made it even more tragic was that the Israeli tourist group did have a couple of doctors with it, but they were not allowed to administer to the wounded. One of the problems was that the Egyptians used assignment to the remote areas of the Sinai as a way of getting rid of some of their less acceptable soldiers. Communications were very scarce and primitive. So the incident could not have happened in a worst case and under a worst scenario.

On the other hand, very few Egyptians were visiting Israel. The Israelis kept emphasizing the desirability for mutual tourist trade now that a peace accord had been signed. But, for their own reasons, the Israelis made it very difficult for Egyptian Copts to visit Jerusalem. Egyptian Copts had been in charge of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher until the 1967 war. After that war, the Israelis put Ethiopian Copts in charge of the Church. I discussed

this policy change with Pope Shenouda—the head of the Egyptian Coptic Church. He wasn't upset by what had happened twenty years earlier, but he had been told by the Israelis to use the right procedure to get the Church back. The Pope had done that; he had gone to the courts, all the way to the Israeli Supreme Court. That Court had ruled in favor of the Egyptian Copts and had ruled that the Church should be returned to the control of the Egyptian Copts. Then the Israeli government refused to implement the court's decree. And that was the situation still in the mid-1980s.

I was frequently involved in Egypt-Israel relationships. We saw the Israeli Ambassador frequently either in our offices or on his. His Chancery was in a heavily fortified building, whose owner kept trying to evict the Israelis. Unfortunately, the Ambassador's wife had Alzheimer's disease, which kept him busy trying to take care of her. He stayed in Cairo for a considerable period, which was fine with him; he happened to be one of Israel's leading experts on the Arab world—he spoke several Arab dialects. He would vary his public addresses going from one dialect to another. The Egyptians appreciated his versatility, although they would have preferred it if he would just express himself plainly in one language instead of playing language games. Of course, the role of an Israeli Ambassador in Cairo was not easy. In addition to the sometimes tense relationships between the two countries, he was not the Taba negotiator, which at the time was the central issue between the two countries. The Egyptians did not go out of their way to make his life any easier; not many would, for example, attend the Israeli National Day, especially most government officials. The Minister of Agriculture, who had a lot of contact with the Israelis on technical matters, attended, but not many others.

This might be an appropriate point at which to describe the Embassy's role in the negotiations. I mentioned that the lead US negotiator was Saefer, the Department's Legal Advisor. The Embassy would attend all the negotiating sessions. We would brief the Washington delegation on the Egyptian views as would our people in Tel Aviv for the Israeli point of view. Rabie Sabel, who was the Israeli Legal Advisor, was the chief Israeli negotiator and Al-Arabi who was the Egyptian legal Advisor. In addition, each

delegation had military advisors who were expert map readers and archaeologists. Some of the advisors changed as governments changed, but the main personalities remained essentially. Most of the sessions were held at the Mina House.

I suggested before that the central charter that we followed was the Camp David Accords. We were promoting the peace process and supporting any steps that would maintain the momentum, little as it was. We were conscious of Sadat's statement that “My generation made peace; the next one will make friends”. Although we always had the peace process in mind, it was difficult to keep the Egyptians engaged in it outside of Taba. We believed that once that issue had been resolved, perhaps other steps could be undertaken. As far as Egypt was concerned it was the sine qua non for further movement.

We worked hard trying to smooth the way for the construction of GM plant. That happened finally four-five years later. It was to be an assembly plant to finish a car, using kits sent from the US as well as components manufactured in Egypt. Those components were to be used both in Egypt and in Europe for an Opal assembly line. That production would give Egypt an export base. The completion of the deal was extended for years because the Egyptians refused to reduce the tariff rate on the imported components.

The Egyptians were very reluctant to have us involve ourselves in intra-Arab affairs. They were still on the blacklist, but they did not want us to try to help them. Mubarak's position was that Egypt was important to the Arab world and that therefore he would not ask to be reinstated into the Arab League; he would of course consider any offer that the League might make, but he would not seek re-admission. He believed that eventually the Arab world would realize that the ostracism of Egypt was a mistake and would seek Egypt's return to the fold. And in fact that is exactly what happened.

I found the Egyptian government very much a government of personalities. The Foreign Minister, Esmat, now the Secretary General of the Arab League, was a very accomplished diplomat. The Minister of State for Foreign affairs was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, now

Secretary General of the UN. Boutros-Ghali was relegated to handling African matters; i.e. the countries that had shores on the Nile and its tributaries. That was the extent of his jurisdiction which did not make him a happy man. He tried to become the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; we recommended to Washington that the US support his candidacy. Washington was very much opposed to the idea. There were many accusations made of a personal nature, which I thought was really uncalled for for a man who had taken a lot of risks over the years to maintain good Egypt-US relationships. His personal situation in Cairo was a tenuous one; he was a Christian married to a Jew in an Arab country. I believe that he was quite hurt by some of the personal accusations he had to suffer. He may have been over-sensitive, but he believed, and I would agree, that he deserved better treatment. The US did not support Boutros-Ghali both because of these personality allegations and because he was an Egyptian; i.e., not a citizen of an aid donor country. It was considered poor policy to have a representative of a non-donor country in charge of the UNHCR program.

The Embassy had a couple of very good officers who followed domestic Egyptian affairs closely. There was a husband-wife team in the Political Section who did some very good work. We concentrated on fundamentalism, but also looked at basic social problems. We were interested in the daily life of an average Egyptian. We did not spend much time worrying about political parties because they were not a factor in Egypt's political life. The social conditions were the important aspect of life that attracted our interest. I already described my closest encounter with fundamentalism as it impacted on the alleged personnel practices of an American firm. The Embassy itself was accused of favoring Copts over Muslims. Before my time, I was told that even the Egyptian government had raised some questions about our employment practices. In fact, the Embassy did have more Copts in high paying positions. I started a review of this issue and found that one of the reasons for this seeming discrimination resulted from the educational process. The Copts were just better educated and were less reluctant to work for the American Embassy. During this examination of our personnel practices, I came to the realization that

all of the people in the personnel office were female Copts. So I issued an instruction that the next person to be employed in that office had to be a male Muslim. I was told that that just couldn't be done. But it was; both the man and the women were uncomfortable with each other, but the employment patterns began to change. Of course, I am sure that the personnel people were also aware that I was watching employments carefully; that surely also had an impact. Everybody knew what my policy was and I think that the Muslim man in personnel was well aware what was expected of him.

I might say, as a final point, that even in 1986 we were trying to beef up the Commercial section of the Embassy in an effort to increase American investment in Egypt and trade between the US and Egypt. That goal in recent years has become fashionable around the world, but we were already making an effort in Egypt in the mid-80s.

Q: As you mentioned, in mid-1986 you were assigned back to Washington as the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for EA. What were your functions and responsibilities?

CLARK: All the regional bureaus operated differently. Most of the senior deputies were alter egos for the assistant secretaries. They didn't have jurisdiction over specific regions or countries. In EA, we have four deputies: one for economic affairs and the other three had responsibility for specific countries. I had watched EA for a long time and had seen it try various organizational arrangements. It was clear to me, and Gaston Sigur agreed, that one deputy could not be responsible for both China and Japan. The work-load would have been too great. So Stapleton Roy returned from Singapore to handle China, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands matters. I was responsible for Japan and Korea, administrative affairs of the Bureau and its public affairs. Dave Lambertson handled ASEAN, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. It was a good division of labor and I think worked quite well. When Sigur resigned in February, 1989, I became acting Assistant Secretary, which lasted for about five months.

The Department at the time viewed a Bureau's Executive Director as a deputy assistant secretary equivalent. He or she was given a document stipulating that rank. But I was always interested in management and took an active interest in administration and personnel matters. I tried to run the Bureau on a day-to-day basis so that the assistant secretary could focus on the major issues as he chose. Of course, I also supervised the Country Directors for Japan and Korea, countries with which I had personal involvement and continued interest.

In the 1986-89 period, which was the tail end of the Cold War, we had an opportunity to move away from our central concern of the previous decades, namely security. This is not to say that we have gave a thought to sacrificing our defense establishment in and around Japan, but the world situation was such that we could begin to focus on other US-Japan issues besides the common defense. We had for a number of years concerned ourselves with the major trade imbalance between the two countries and that remained major bone of contention. But in this end of 1980s period, we were able to begin to engage the Japanese in other issues such as UN, Cambodia, North Korea, etc. Today, I regret to note, we have returned to the “single issue” era—i.e. trade—that all other matters are pushed so far in the background that they are almost unmentioned in the dialogue between the two countries.

On the trade front, I don't remember the situation being much different in 1986 than it had been a year earlier when I was also working on it. There was no question that it was a major issue, which it continued to be for as long as I have been involved in Japanese affairs. At the beginning of the Bush administration, we did obtain final approval of the FSX program. This was not something that a new administration was necessarily comfortable with, but it was essential that it be done. That was the program that permitted Japan to build its own fighter aircraft with US assistance. It should be noted that now, five years later, no aircraft has yet been produced. But in the late 1980s, to get Congressional approval was a major fight, primarily because those that worried about Japanese “unfair”

trade practices, led by Dick Gephardt, were just set against helping that country to develop a competitive fighter aircraft by transferring our technology to it. So the FSX program became a trade issue when it should have been viewed as a common defense matter. I took several “beatings” during Congressional hearings on this issue with the antis insisting that the trade imbalance should be rectified before we worried about security. I was the Department's principal witness on the FSX issue with one exception when Cheney, Mosbacher and Eagleburger—the three secretaries—testified as the final administration witnesses.

On trade issues in general, USTR was the principal administration spear-carrier on the Hill. The regional bureaus were of course involved in setting of the US trade policies—much more than they are today, according to people who are still in the Service. The Bureau for Economic Affairs was also involved, but I am told that the Department as a whole is not nearly as involved in trade issues in the mid-90s than it was at the end of the '80s, with the exception of perhaps Joan Spiro, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. I testified on trade issues as well as security issues, often with representatives of other State bureaus. It was not unusual for deputy assistant secretaries to be the Department's lead witnesses; it was not a role that assistant secretaries sought or enjoyed. Generally, I was part of a three person panel with other representatives from the Department and other agencies. All the witnesses knew each other and had almost daily work contacts, so that the administration witnesses were a congenial group. That was true for trade, security and the FSX issues.

This was my first real exposure to Congressional testimony, although I had been a witness on a couple of occasions when I was the Japan Country Director, when I represented the administration on the issue of whaling. That was not an easy issue to deal with. I was a witness along with someone from USTR and someone from Commerce. There were some members of Congress who wanted to cut off all trade with Japan because of their whale fishing practices. A famous expert had just finished studying the humpback whales who lived off the shores of Argentina. His daughter had made recordings of whale sounds. She appeared at the committee meeting just before we did. It was a tough act to follow.

She gave every member of the subcommittee a copy of the book she had just written on whales. All I could bring to the table was information on the extent of our trade with Japan and what the consequences would be for American business and labor if that trade were severed. That sobered the subcommittee a little!

I was fortunate in one respect when it came to testifying in the late 1980s. Much of my testimony was in front of the Asian subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The chairman of that subcommittee was Steve Solarz, whom I had know for sometime going back to his visits to Korea. I also saw a lot of him when he visited Japan. So I had a known quantity in the chairman. I also knew some of the other members of the subcommittee—e.g. Congressman Solomon (NY) who was a Japanese linguist. I learned early in the game to keep the opening statement short; I would submit a longer and fuller statement for the record. Congressmen tend to become testy and impatient if they have to sit and listen for too long. The more appearances I made, the easier it became, although it was never an experience that I enjoyed or looked forward to. After a while, I became accustomed to sitting in the well with my interlocutors sitting at higher levels so that you always had to look up. At the beginning, it was a little intimidating; you felt sometimes that you were facing a panel of judges. One time, I was lucky. I had been asked to brief the whole Foreign Affairs Committee on China; it was right after Tiananmen. I had told the staff that I could not testify in open session, but that I would be glad to brief the Committee in a closed session. On that occasion, I sat in the Chairman's chair and the Committee sat in the well. During this briefing, Solarz made a comment and I was about to “rule him out of order”, but refrained. I told him later that I had come very close to doing that!

You could never be sure what question might be raised nor could you be sure that your answer was heard with the same meaning that it had when I delivered it. You know what you said, but you don't know what the Congressmen heard. In general, we knew what the questions might be because we had discussed the hearings with the staff. So we usually were prepared for at least the Chairman's questions. Some of the Committee members would wander in and out of the meeting and they were much less predictable; it was not

rare that we had to answer a question that had been asked before when the member was not in the hearing room. But with the Chairmen, regardless what subcommittee was involved, we knew pretty well ahead of time what issues would be addressed and what the objectives of the hearings were. The staff was quite good on giving us advanced notice. It was usually a very good collaboration; we knew what information they wanted and they knew what we needed to know.

In addition, Congressional testimonies are difficult because you are addressing several audiences. Not only did the committees hear your testimony, but the Japanese press certainly covered much of it; even a small number of American press might be present. The Japanese bureaucracy was of course informed of every word you uttered through the ears of a Japanese Embassy official who covered the hearings. Then there was the Washington bureaucracy. Quite often, I would appear at hearings having covered the issue with the Chairman of the subcommittee in private. But the Chairman held the hearings because he wanted to make a specific point. I remember once, when I was testifying together with another administration official, he gave an answer that we had agreed would not be given. The Chairman immediately went after him and the two went off into discussions that were useless and possibly counter-productive. I finally interceded and managed to bring the dialogue to an end. After the hearing, the Chairman told me that he never wanted to see the other witness again. I told him that I had no control over that because he was not a State Department official. Furthermore, I suggested that having that hearing was not necessary and that it ran the risks that in fact developed. He said that after having gotten that wrong answer, he could not let it stand unchallenged, thereby taking the discussion into areas which were not at all profitable and being diverted entirely from the objectives he had in mind for the hearing.

Being part of a panel always runs some risks. I am sure that some of my colleagues from other departments did not always agree with my comments. But in general I think, as I suggested earlier, the administration witnesses were on the same wave length and usually quite well prepared. I did find myself on occasions in tight spots. For example, as the

senior deputy assistant secretary, I was responsible for testifying on appropriations for the Asia Foundation, which got much of its financial support from the US government. That was in part because the Asia Foundation was at times a useful adjunct to the US government overseas representation because it could do some things that we could not. One year the Department's Comptroller was former USIA official—Roger Feldman—and he felt that the Asia Foundation was not worthy of US support because he thought that USIA could do all that the Foundation did. The Foundation had good Congressional support. Every year, the Department was required to write an assessment of the Asia Foundation, which we did as objectively as possible. It was usually quite favorable. The Comptroller would use this assessment as the preface to the budget request, but then would not seek any budgetary authority. We were precluded by Department regulations to discuss budgetary issues during any of our Congressional appearances, which is an interesting experience when you are testifying before a Committee that is responsible for appropriations. Once, I was before the appropriations subcommittee with the Comptroller sitting in a spectators' row behind the witness table. Congressman Obey commended me for my report in the Asia Foundation activities, but wanted to know why the Department was seeking reduced funds to support it. I told him that I could not answer the question, but I suggested that since the Comptroller was in the room, the Congressman might wish to ask him. It was a silly game; the Department would send its budget request to Congress which would show a reduced requirement for the Asia Foundation. I knew that this tactic would not fly and that Congress would add to the amount requested. I told Feldman that he was just giving the Congress control over the Department's budget because it would restore the amount cut by reducing another Departmental account which was probably damaging to the Department. But I could never convince Feldman that he was acting against his own interests by reducing or eliminating the Asia Foundation support.

I should mention that most of administration testimony is public and on-the-record and often covered by the press. There are occasions when the testimony must be classified and then you closet yourself with the committee in one of the secure rooms. That is a little

more intimidating because in a closed hearing the Congressmen can raise any questions they wish. You don't have the protection of an open hearing when you can always say that the matter is classified and that you would be happy to brief the Congressman privately or in an executive session. But in a closed session, you don't have that protection. An administration witness always has to be aware of the Germanness of a Congressional inquiry. Just because it is a closed session, that does not open the discussion to anything that might be on the Congressman's mind. The question should be germane to the subject of the hearing. You just couldn't afford to allow “fishing expeditions”. I always made sure under those circumstances just to say that the issue was not in my purview or the subject of the hearing; I would never try to mislead or talk around the question. Fortunately, this problem didn't arise very often, but you always had to be aware of the possibility. On the other hand, closed hearings had the advantage of not being open to the press and you didn't have to worry about tomorrow's headlines. A closed hearing is likely to require the submission of more documentation, which raises a new set of problems because classified documents are supposed to go through the Intelligence Committees where they are available to members. But Congressmen often chafe at this restriction and would much prefer to have the administration witness hand over the documents right during the meeting. On one occasion, I faced the issue of recursion. The issue was Vietnamese funds frozen in US accounts and whether some might be released. Lambertson was in charge of Vietnam issues, under Sigur. But on this occasion, it turned out that I was the only senior official in EA who didn't have a share of IBM stock. IBM was a plaintiff; so every one else recused themselves and I ended up being the witness on a subject that I did not know very well. I accused both Sigur and Lambertson of buying a share of IBM just so they would have an excuse to recuse themselves. The stock dropped in price soon thereafter, so I am glad I didn't own any.

I testified several times on Korea and especially on security issues. The atmosphere was different than that existing when Japanese issues were discussed; the trade tensions were not present. Furthermore, there was a palpable and obvious military threat. So

the questions were most often directed to the future and the likelihood of a North Korea invasion. So the questions concerned troop capabilities and locations. The Korea question was not particularly acute during the 1986-89 period, but the tensions on the Peninsula was of continuing interest in Congress. In State, we felt, and we were supported by some people in Washington, that some movement towards North Korea might be appropriate. We devised what was known as a “modest initiative”. In 1988, Sigur went to New York and gave a speech which had not been cleared through the bureaucracy, including the Secretary of State's office, as widely as it probably should have been. He said that we would remove regulations against the use of credit cards for Americans who wished to travel to North Korea, which involved a change in Treasury regulations and a notice in the Federal Register. Sigur also said that we would allow “humanitarian” trade which also involved some changes in regulations. We also said that we would make it easier for North Korean academics, clericals and press to travel to the US. Finally, Sigur said that he would authorize American diplomats to have substantive discussions with their North Korean diplomats at third party functions. In the same speech, we told the North Koreans, that in return for the easing of regulations that Sigur had announced, we would like some reciprocal actions and we gave them a list of actions from they could choose. We used this technique because we had found out that the North Koreans were very reluctant—in fact, did not—to talk about quids pro quos. So we used a public speech to communicate with the North Koreans.

When I became the senior deputy in the Bureau in 1986, there had not been any great attention paid to the question of taking some positive steps toward North Korea. However, sometime during the next two years, we slowly developed the idea of taking some initiatives. There had always been a lot of discussions about the North in the Department and in other parts of the bureaucracy. The complete absence of any movement was just unnatural; furthermore, as long as the situation was as frozen as it was and as long the North was as isolated as it was, the possibility of miscalculations was very real. We thought that is we could get some dialogue going, we might be able to raise some warning

flags before it was too late. We just wanted to find some ways of alleviating the tensions that had existed on the peninsula for many, many years.

There were of course the continuing military-to-military meetings in Panmunjom which were part of the armistice agreement. They were very formal meetings which were not really a good forum to raise political issues. We had tried some approaches through the Chinese. There had been some indications that perhaps the North was becoming more interested in a dialogue. We decided to test the waters by using a technique that would not involve us in endless discussions about either the process or the eventual outcome. We used the 1988 speech to give the North Koreans an opportunity to respond; they could have said “Thanks very much. Let's talk about it” or “We are interested in talking about one of the matters you have raised” or “Forget the whole thing. It is just another imperialist plot”. The North could have responded in many different ways.

George Shultz' first response to the speech was that it was outrageous. When the speech received approbations, the Secretary then complained that we never sent him speeches that were that good. Of course, he never would have delivered anything like the speech that Sigur gave because it was so far in front of existing policy.

The speech had some effect. First, the North Koreans contacted one of our Embassy staff in Beijing at the International Club and requested that a meeting be set up. This was not in one of the actions listed in our “modest” initiative; the North Koreans had requested a bilateral session whereas we had stipulated substantive conversations only in a multilateral forum, such as a social occasion. I was asked what our response should be. I mulled it over for a couple of days. I then instructed our Embassy in Beijing to tell the North Koreans that meetings at the International Club would be acceptable at the Consular level on the grounds that the Club was owned by the Chinese government which then would become the third party to the dialogue making it a multilateral one. That in fact became a channel that has operated since soon after the Sigur speech. Nothing much came of the opening, but at least it opened a channel outside the military-to-military

one. It gave both parties an opportunity to discuss political issues. I should add that I of course, in the course of drafting the Sigur speech, considered adding a provision for a direct North-Korea-US dialogue, but I didn't believe that the bureaucracy—in State, in DoD, some in NSC—in Washington would have found that acceptable. A question would have been raised about why we would wish to accede to what we knew the North Koreans had wanted for a long time; they had not shown any great willingness to be forthcoming. The other parts of the “modest” initiative could be defended on their own merits—e.g. humanitarian aid, credit cards, visas to certain North Koreans (which was merely an expansion of a policy already in effect). Of course, the North Koreans never took advantage of the openings we provided; they never sent journalists, clerics or other categories; they have restricted their visits to the US to their own diplomats and some “academics”—i.e. people who worked for the government.

The speech received considerable approval in the American academic community which for a number of years wanted to open a dialogue with their North Korean counterparts, preferably in Pyongyang. Many people used the speech as a jumping off point for their conversations with North Korean representatives; other country diplomats used it to illustrate how the US was trying to be reasonable. There were some academics who opposed our initiative basically on the grounds that we were granting privileges which were not needed or desired. But the speech did not generate the kind of sustained debate in the US that I had hoped for, but it was heard in Pyongyang, which was certainly one of our objectives. Our dialogue at the UN did not increase until much later nor did North-South talks really begin at this time. On the other hand, the reaction to the speech in the United States I think made it eminently clear to my bureaucratic colleagues that mentioning the possibility of a dialogue with North Korea was not a kiss of death.

Although the thaw in US-North Korea relations was barely noticeable by 1989, later it did become easier for Americans to obtain visas to visit Pyongyang. Some went at North Korea's invitation which may have served the North's propaganda machine, but was useful to us as well because it gave us some first hand insights that were not available to us

otherwise. We eased slightly the restrictions imposed on the North Korea mission to the UN by permitting some of that staff to travel in the US to participate in conferences. I think our pace of improvement of our relations with North Korea was glacial at times and incremental at best. I think the Sigur speech opened the way, but it was almost another fifteen years before any major discussions between the two countries really took place. For example, when I was the Assistant Secretary for EA in late 1992, I received a call from Dave Locks who was in charge of the annual Prayer Breakfast. He was planning Clinton's first Prayer Breakfast and wanted to know whether some North Koreans could be invited. I referred him to the “modest” initiative and told him that clerics, academics or journalists would certainly be acceptable. The North Koreans submitted the names of seven participants, six of whom were government officials and the other was their Permanent Representative at the UN. I said that that list was not acceptable, but I finally told Locks that the UN representative would be acceptable. Unbeknownst to me, that North Korean was given a seat at the head table along with General and Mrs. Colin Powell, Senator and Mrs. Ted Kennedy, Senator and Mrs. Sam Nunn and I think the Mongolian Ambassador and his wife. I asked Powell later how it went; he told me that the North Korean didn't seem to have a clue about what the breakfast was all about and didn't have anything to say. I think the North Koreans missed a major opportunity.

The history of US-North Korea relations is a tortured one. Carter tried to open a dialogue using a three party proposal—North Korea, South Korea and the US—when he visited Seoul in 1979, which was summarily rejected by the North. Then came Sigur's speech in 1988, which at least opened another channel for dialogue in Beijing. The North, I think, in 1988 might have been interested in trilateral talks, but then we were not interested. We suggested in lieu that they hold bilateral talks with South Korea. I think that was the appropriate response in 1988 because the North was obviously at the time trying to get us to talk directly to us holding the view that the South was just a US “puppet”. The North was using pejorative language when referring to the South and did not seem interested really

in relaxing tensions on the peninsula. So the atmosphere was all wrong in 1988 for any progress. After that, it was inch by inch when there was any progress at all until 1993.

Our relationships with South Korea had its ups and downs. On the issue of democracy, I was in Seoul in 1980 when its fledgling beginnings were forcefully suppressed. By 1986, Chun Doo Wha, the President, was on his last gasps. Roh Toe Woo made a “grand” gesture to the opposition by agreeing to terminate certain undemocratic practices, thereby assuring his election. In any case, the political process was much more open in 1986 than it had been eight years earlier. In early 1988, I went with Secretary Baker to the Roh swearing in—Sigur didn't go because Ed Dwerinski, who was then the Counselor of the Department, went and Gaston didn't want to be the third ranking State Department official. On the way to Seoul, I kept telling Baker that the name of the new Korean President was pronounced “Noe”, even though it was spelled Roh. Baker was well received even though, since he was not a head of State, he did not rank among the most senior of the guests. Soon after that, President Roh paid a visit to the United States. I told Baker then that his name was to be pronounced as “Roh”. The Secretary said that this was contrary to the advice I had given him earlier. I pointed out that the situation was different; that when in Korea, the name was pronounced as “Noe”, but when in the US, it was “Roh”. In the United States, for public relations purposes, the Koreans felt it was far better to referred to their President as Roh Toe Woo and not Noe Toe Woo—it was too much like Doctor No.

We were encouraged by Roe's election. In addition, we were very active on the “democratization” front. In the last days of the Chun Doo Wan regime, some University students had occupied our USIS offices in Seoul. Harry Dunlop, who was the Political Counselor during this incident, held long discussions with them, permitting them to air their grievances and trying to talk them into leaving the building. He wasn't successful and the police finally had to force the students out. But Dunlop and the students had a long conversation about Kwangju, during which he felt that he had done a masterful job of explaining the course of events as we knew them. After that, Dunlop suggested that we publish a “White Paper” repeating essentially what he had said to the students. The

Embassy supported Dunlop, but we did not see any good reason why the issue should be publicly debated again. I saw Dunlop's report on what he had said while visiting Seoul and did not quite conform to my recollections as a resident American diplomat during the uprising. Secondly, we had some reservations about issuing a paper when a friendly government was in power, particularly since the new President had been involved in the Kwangju matter. It was after my return from that trip that I turned the matter over to the Historian's Office, as I described earlier. That report was issued in part to put our views on Kwangju on a written record, but our action was also designed to encourage Roh to continue on the democratic path he was following and hopefully, even accelerate his pace. In the final analysis, I think Roh made tremendous progress in bringing his country into the democratic fold. During his regime, that was not really a major issue between our two countries.

As further evidence of the great progress that the Koreans had made on democracy, we noted the freedom that both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam had in Korea. When I had been in Korea in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these two men were either in prison or under house arrest. They were seldom free. But by the late 1980s, they had fairly free reins. One could visit them if you were in Seoul. Kim Young Sam was politically very active and Kim Dae Jung was free to tell his side of history. The Embassy did have contacts with the two in the late 1970s, when they were not imprisoned. After the “Seoul Spring”, in 1980, the Embassy had considerable contacts with Kim Dae Jung. We urged him not to address college audiences so that passions would be unnecessarily stirred up; he ignored our advice.

There were some trade frictions between the two countries in the 1986-89 period. Beef was one commodity that was always in debate both with Korea and Japan. I used to tell the Koreans that I was depressed by their position on beef imports because only a few years earlier I used to cite them as a shining example of free beef traders because we used to sell as much beef to “little Korea” as we did to “huge Japan”. The Koreans closed the market for our beef exporters. It was a shameless comment, but then shamelessness

has between a hallmark of diplomacy for centuries. We also had some problems with American companies that were leaving their investments in Korea, like Dow which sold its assets to “Dynamite” Kim. But in general, trade issues were not a major bone of contention.

When I first returned to Seoul in 1986, after an absence of six years, I was struck by the tremendous changes. There was no curfew for example nor were there any troops on the streets. The atmosphere was very different, although I must say that even when the curfew was in effect and the troops were on the streets, we did not feel the heavy boot of oppression. The Korean government did not interfere with our daily lives; I thought it was not any worse than Paris during the Algerian crisis when you could see machine guns on the street corners and troops heavily armed everywhere. That was suffocating. By 1986, the society was much more open and the economic boom was evident. Buildings were going up everywhere, particularly on the south side of the river almost all the way to Suwon. Development had engulfed the farm areas which in 1980 still surrounded Seoul. More bridges had been built as had been Yoido, an island in the middle of the Han River which had been densely developed.

The Han River project was almost finished. This was a water-management project that had been under discussion when I was in Seoul in 1980 and for which the Corps of Engineers had done some planning work. That project made Seoul a different city introducing boats and parks to the entertainment landscape for the citizens. Seoul did not look anymore like a capital under siege; so the change in the physical appearance also made it seem like a freer society.

I might make some comments about anti-Americanism in Korea. It seems to follow closely political unrest in the country. It was quite virulent in 1980 after Kwangju. In 1987, when the Koreans were becoming unhappy with Chun Doo Wha, anti-Americanism rose. When Roh Toe Woo had stabilized the political situation, anti-Americanism abated. But I think it is fair to say that it always existed to some extent in Korea. There was a recent newspaper

story recently about a young Korean, who after having completed academic studies in the US, returned to his country and killed his parents for the inheritance. We have been accused of being the cause for this young man's actions because we somehow educated out of him the family tradition and filial devotion that he would have been taught to strictly honor had he remained in Korea. So there seems to be always a feeling below the surface that somehow the United States, even though praiseworthy for defending South Korea, nevertheless is less than perfect and that some of its cultural patterns were really not welcomed in Korea. My personal contacts from 1980, which I re-established when I visited Korea in 1986 and thereafter, were certainly less anti-American than they had been. This was particularly true of the American missionary community which was much more at ease with their government in the late 1980s than it had been at the end of the 1970s. That can be explained in part by the fact that the missionaries were not as harassed as they had been during the Park regime; their new-found freedoms made them more benevolent toward the US. My Korean friends reacted pretty much the same way. Their views of the US had also evolved.

The Embassy, I thought, was working well in 1986. I was not happy with its physical location which remains a problem even today. We don't own the building or the lot; we had signed an agreement that stipulated that we would vacate the premises when our assistance program had ended and I think after 1979 we could not make a very convincing case that we were still extending assistance, either economic or military. But fifteen years later, we are still squatters. We do own land in Seoul which we have never developed, but never seem to be able to find the resources to build a Chancery. Our position on this issue is unseemly, at best, for a major power. We now occupy an old building, built soon after we began an aid program to Korea, not at all consonant with the modernity of much of the city; the Embassy's switchboard and the heating system is in a building next door.

We had a good working relationship with the Embassy. We were on the phone frequently with both Seoul and Tokyo, although unlike some other deputy assistant secretaries or country directors, I did not believe that a daily telephone conversation with every embassy

was necessary or desirable. When daily calls are required, I believe it seems too much like micro-management and that is not the role of the Washington bureaucracy. Information nevertheless flowed freely and I think both we in Washington and the people in Seoul were pleased with the relationship.

It was during my tour as deputy assistant secretary that the Koreans began to make some headway in their relationships with the Soviet Union. They had for a long time tried to establish contacts with the other superpower, but until the late 1980s, had had limited success. We did not urge them to be more vigorous in their pursuits nor did we interpose any objections. The opening to Moscow was Roh's legacy as were his efforts to establish a dialogue with North Korea. I think the Koreans did a marvelous job on this issue and are rightly proud of their accomplishment. Their timing was good and the establishment of official contacts with the Soviet Union was followed soon by similar successes with the People's Republic of China. We did not play much of a role in these initiatives, which may have been one of the reasons the Koreans were successful!

Now let me move to our relationships with Japan in the 1986-89 period. The Japanese have never been as interested n involving themselves in world affairs to the extent that we would like. Of course, there are some that they say that the average American is also not sufficiently engaged in world affairs. The Japanese, by and large, including the ruling circles, we do not want to be perceived as a world power. Influence yes; their views taken into account, yes. But not the responsibility that goes with being a world power. The Japanese public is certainly not prepared to take on that responsibility. I wonder however what their views were in the early 1940s when the war was going very much in their favor. Since there weren't any public opinion polls at the time, we will never know. The Japanese did what they did in the 1930s and 1940s because their Emperor wished them to do so; that was enough for the average Japanese, although there were some who warned of likelihood of failure. The Japanese theory then was basically that of jujitsu— a small man properly trained could beat a big man. When applied to countries, the Japanese felt even more comfortable taking on a democracy. I think most of the Japanese felt that

way, although history proved them wrong. The Japanese view since the end of WW II is not too different from the isolationism that Japan practiced for most of its life. It was essentially closed to the outside world for 300 years, although it did invade other countries —particularly Korea and later China—in that period. I think the Japanese are happy with their society as it is and are reluctant to have it “contaminated” by outside influences. The Japanese are essentially very conservative and are not seeking much change; they like their present situation, although the strains are beginning to show since labor shortages are forcing them to import people from other countries. That is likely to cause changes in Japan which it will resist; the Japanese believe that their aggressive policies of 1941 was a big mistake; i.e. attacking China was one matter, but attacking the US was just plain dumb. They don't want to repeat the same mistake. Today, the Japanese see themselves as a small country which might be stepped on if it wonder too far off its own shores. This concerned is reinforced by the emergence of a powerful neighbor—China—, which has had more political influence than Japan in the world since the end of WW II and which has a larger military force, although that force has no projection capability. China has not been an economic rival of Japan, but that is also changing. Those who had great insights might have been able to detect the emergence of China in the late 1970s if they had believed Deng Xiaoping's vision for his country. Not many then believed that China would emulate the “Four Tigers”, although we were particularly amazed that Deng included Hong Kong and Taiwan in his list of countries to be emulated. I don't think we paid enough attention to Deng's pronouncements in the late 1970s; the Japanese did not either. In fact, the Japanese corporations were late in trying to make inroads in China despite their providing government-to-government assistance to that country. They are present now, but still not in the magnitude that has been the hallmark of some other investment efforts. Since we couldn't provide assistance, our private economy stepped in with its investments.

One of the continuing problems between the US and Japan is a asymmetry. That still exists today. in the late 1980s, we assumed that the Soviet threat was a major one. The Japanese didn't dispute our view, but since they were not in a position to take any effecting

measures, they tended to be more relaxed than we were. They did not have the same sense of urgency about the Soviets being a regional threat. There was a continual shift in the definition of roles and missions in the national security sphere. I think both sides came to agree that the United States was not in Japan primarily to defend Japan, but rather to insure stability in Asia; that was an important revision in Japanese views which resulted in a force restructure.

In 1986, we viewed the US-Japan and the US-Korea relationship through the prism of the Cold War. That emphasis continued throughout my tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Even in 1989, we in EA at least had not detected that the Soviet empire was collapsing.

Finally, I think I might just briefly discuss my role as the day-to-day manager of the Bureau. I was faced with the perennial problem of insufficient resources. We were always looking at the possibility of reducing the State Department component of an embassy or of closing posts. We had to do some of that. The issue of US representation overseas was always facing us; the contentiousness of it increased during my tour because other Cabinet Secretaries were deciding to take even the minutest issue up with the Secretary of State. That I thought was a ridiculous waste of everyone's time and the issues which dealt with one or two or even three more positions certainly did not warrant the attention of Cabinet level officials. So overseas staffing was always major issue. Shultz used to periodically make some noises about the size of US overseas representation, but it was very difficult for an any Ambassador to make his decision to reduce staffing stick with other agencies in Washington. Just to go back to my Cairo tour, I should note that there I developed a plan which would have required a 10% reduction in the total Embassy staffing. I did that at the urging of the Department of State. When we submitted that plan, we were left holding the bag; the Department gave us absolutely no support at all. My impact was a little greater later when I was in New Delhi, but in general the US leadership in the field is essentially impotent when it comes to the question of the size of US representation. In 1986-89 period, the Washington attitude was that the bureaucracy in the Capital should be reduced first before any cuts were made overseas. But the only Cabinet department that

seemed to follow through in reductions is the Department of State. That was compounded both in Washington and overseas because the Department is a very minute component of the total bureaucracy; therefore any reductions have percentage-wise a much greater impact on the Department than they do on other agencies. Other agencies are so large that a reduction in Washington is barely noticed. The Department's financial squeeze was real in the 1986-89 period. Resources in real terms were reduced with every succeeding year. Costs rose, but the budgets did not rise at the same rate. For example, the costs of our operations in Japan went out of sight during this period without any significant addition to available resources. That left us with the dilemma of whether to reduce our presence in Japan or to take the resources out of another embassy's budget and staffing. The EA budget from 1985 to 1992 grew perhaps 15%. The yen-dollar ratio rose probably 75%; that is a losing formula.

On the personnel front, diversity was a major management objective. In this period, women, who by this time were represented in the Foreign Service in large numbers, won a law suit which stipulated that a certain number of the higher level positions, such as DCM, be reserved for them. That caused some minor difficulties for us. It wasn't that there weren't qualified women available, but Personnel, in its management of the over-all assignment process, would at times come down to the last few assignments for the year and realize that it had not met its established quota for women. That forced all bureaus to begin to shake things up, canceling assignments already made, moving people before the end of their tours, etc. Had Personnel planned better, these last minute adjustments would not have been necessary and the assignment process would have been much smoother. We also had to manage a couple of problems relating to African-Americans. We had an excellent black officer who was very good in the function that he knew. The powers-that-be decided that he should be assigned to another function because that would have increased diversity. He and I had agreed on a career development program, but he was under great pressure from some of his colleagues to move into another area. As we predicted, he found himself floundering and received some very damaging efficiency

ratings. The whole assignment was unfair to this individual; it put him a position where he had to have language and reporting skills that he did not have. It was a poor assignment for an excellent officer; he survived, but that assignment set back his career unnecessarily. In general, the Bureau was under pressure to place more African Americans in the Far East; there had been and still was a great imbalance among bureaus with AF having the greatest proportion of African-American staff than any other bureau. Of course, there were more Asian-American staff in Far East posts than there were in other parts of the world. The Department had decided that these concentrations based on ethnicity were not good and made an effort to spread its ethnic personnel resources more widely. It worked alright, but everyone interested in the issue must realize that it is a long term process and that immediate results could not be expected.

The Bureau's relationships with the central Personnel Office were good in 1986. They went downhill from there. George Vest was the Director General until the Spring of 1989. Bill Swing was the senior deputy. In my first year, Personnel was very cooperative in making appropriate assignments. We did a lot of things that according to the rules were not allowed, such as “stretched” tours. Sigur was interested in personnel assignments as were all the deputies. Personnel had the formal responsibility for making assignments, but there was an assignment board which actually made the assignment recommendations. Of course, most of the process was based on the “bids” that every officer made for vacancies when his or her tour was coming to an end. All bureaus were represented on this board. I had been in the Service for many years and by this time knew a lot of people. I sometimes counseled people not to bid on certain specific jobs because I thought that the assignment would not have been good for his or her career. I said that I would try to help the officer, but that he or she was making a mistake bidding for the particular job they had in mind. Personnel might well have made the assignment because the officer was the right age or had the right credentials, but I knew that it would probably not work because of the nature of the job or because of the personality conflicts that might arise at the post. So in my first year, I was very pleased by our personnel management accomplishments. The

next two years were an entirely different story. Personnel became very uncooperative and blocked many of our assignment desires, despite the fact that I had been friends with both Deputy Directors General: Bill Swing and Larry Wilson. But I found that increasingly, the Personnel's front office promised to take certain actions which the staff below did not carry out; if the staff felt that an assignment was not within the rules, it tended to ignore the stated guidance from the Director General or his deputy. So the personnel operation became very rigid and calcified, which it continues to be today. I believe that even as we speak, Personnel is about to assign someone to the Political Counselor position in Seoul who has never been in Asia, much less knowing anything about Korea. It makes absolutely no sense at all, even if you give the individual language training which is not likely to be very effective given the age of the officer. This is the kind of assignments that were beginning to happen in 1987; the justification seemed always to be that the central office was trying to break “the old boy network”—that was Ron Spiers' expressed intention. He had held that view for many years. I always considered the “old boy network” as a management tool. I think that part of the Department's problems stem from the tendency to turn management over to the people in “M” (the Under Secretary for Management). The officials who should really be responsible for management are the senior people in the operating bureaus, but they don't pay enough attention to problems. When they do pay attention to management, it is usually through the “old boy network,” which is then criticized as being the enemy of good management. It is a vicious circle; I feel rather strongly about the whole management process of the Department, as you may have noticed!

We also faced the perennial debate of functional vs geographical specialists. For much of this period, Ron Spiers was the Under Secretary for Management. Ron has always upheld the importance of functional specialists; I have always leaned towards geographical specialists. This is a time honored debate. Ron always referred to us as the “regional Barons”. We were in the 1986-89 period able to keep regional specialization as the most important ingredient in the assignment process. I insist that the Department of State deals

with cultures; that requires deep knowledge of country or regional history which is more important than global environment, etc. In fact, there cannot be one approach to our foreign relationships; each issue has to be addressed on its own merits bringing in most cases the best regional and functional experts together. Some issues might be resolved by functional experts alone; some by regional experts alone, but most, I believe require the closest cooperation between experts on different matters. The artificial distinction that many make between function and geographic doesn't make any sense in most instances.

In general, I must say that the Department of State is not very proficient in the management field. It is a very difficult job, even if you know what you are doing. To do it well in the Department is very tough; to do it the way the Department wants it done is damn near impossible! We had one major challenge during my tour: a staff reduction which required a meeting of all of the assistant secretaries with the Under Secretary for Management. That meeting with Spiers on the first issue was interesting because no bureau wanted to point a finger at a sister bureau, even if it felt that more of the reduction should come out of somebody else's hide. I attended because Sigur decided that that I should represent EA. The meeting must have lasted two hours trying to make the case that an across-the-board reduction applicable evenly to all bureaus was not the appropriate approach—it certainly wasn't “management”. We all thought that the senior levels of the Department should establish some priorities and then let the bureaus decide how the reductions might be applied to their own operations. Spiers listened to all of the arguments, nodded his head periodically and at the end of the meeting told all the bureaus to tell him how they would apply a 7 1/2% reduction to their own operations. As far as I know, “management” in the Department has not progressed beyond that simplistic and unthinking approach to resource reductions. The relationship between policy objectives and resource utilization has never really been developed in the Department of State. The Department seems to be unable to prioritize its objectives and functions. Everything seems important to everybody every day! That of course is not the real world, but that is the way the Department exercises its “management” responsibilities. The debate between

functional and regional bureaus has been active for many years. I would say that today the functional bureaus seem to have priority, although I don't know how long that is going to last. Clearly the Clinton administration came in with a bias toward looking at the world on a function by function basis.

Lateral entry at mid-career levels was not a problem in the 198-89 period. It had been a problem when I was Country Director in the early 1980s when, as one administration was coming to an end, political appointees of that administration were trying to enter the career service before their party left power. It was very poor timing for the individuals involved. But during my tenure as a DAS, I do not recall any great pressure to take into the mid-level positions of the Service any people from the outside. We did face the issue of politically appointed deputy assistant secretaries, although EA was not directly involved. We did not face that because Sigur was a non-career appointee and he wanted to have career people as his deputies. After Sigur, the pressure increased and the Clinton administration is even more eager to fill some deputy positions with non-career people than the Bush administration was. I have heard that even positions below DAS have been filled by non-career people. That was done in a couple of instances during the Carter administration; those people are now part of the career service.

Q: In 1989, you were appointed as US Ambassador to India. How did that come about?

CLARK: It was one of those interesting events in one's career. When the Bush administration came to power, it had some difficulty finding an suitable candidate for the Assistant Secretary for EA position. For a variety of reasons, Gaston Sigur had decided that he wanted to leave before Bush's February trip to Japan. So he resigned, leaving me as acting Assistant Secretary—a situation that lasted until June 1989. In that first half of that year, we faced the Tiananmen Square episode and we went through a successful fight with Congress on the FSX program with Japan.

We handled Tiananmen about as well as it could be given all the circumstances. It occurred on June 3, 1989 which was a Friday night here and spilled over into Saturday. When we got the news, we put a task force together and wrote some talking points for the President. In a rare occasion, Bush used the talking points almost verbatim. He struck the right tone. Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was the titular head of the task force, but the day-to-day management was left to me.

On the FSX issue, I already mentioned my frequent Congressional appearances. I believe I appeared before 18 committees and subcommittees and held innumerable meetings with members of Congress and their staffs. In the final analysis, our proposal was approved by one vote in the Senate. The FSX program called for a transfer of American technology to Japan to help the Japanese to build their own fighter aircraft. This program was started when the Japanese came to us and told us that they were planning to develop their own next generation of fighter aircraft. Washington didn't take much time before it told us in the Embassy—this happened while I was the DCM—to inform the Japanese that their idea was not a very good one, but if they were interested in developing their own plane, they should base it on an FS-16 frame. That would permit us to stay involved. A big debate ensued because there were many American firms that were ready to sell their equipment to the Japanese which could have been hung on the frame. I am referring to such items as avionics. The whole discussion didn't get very far while I was in Tokyo. I picked up the issue when I became the senior DAS in EA. Then I had to tell firms that most their offers would be rejected. Finally, we and the Japanese signed all the necessary agreements which called for the transfer of some US technology particularly on materials, in exchange for primarily production technology from Japan. For example, in exchange for composite carbon material from the US, Japan would show us how to manufacture a solid form airplane wing and fuel tanks without rivets from that carbon. Also we were building state-of-art radar, but the Japanese were confident that they could bring down significantly the cost of production. Each unit in a phased array display was costing us something like $2,000. The Japanese thought they could help us manufacture it at a

cost of approximately $200. So the concept called for an exchange of technology which would improve our manufacturing capability while at the same time protecting the high end of our technology—e.g. we would not provide the codes for the flight boxes. When the Bush administration came in, it decided to review the whole program. It was not satisfied with what it saw. That required some reworking of the draft arrangements to provide even greater protection for our very sophisticated technology. I think even our earlier draft arrangements protected us well; I don't think we ever contemplated or would ever have transferred our most sophisticated technology. The Japanese have been working since 1945 to maintain a “warm base” for aircraft production, whether it was the US-1 —the “flying boat”—or the F-1—their fighter aircraft. It has cost them a lot of money to maintain an aviation industry, allowing them to manufacture, for example, about 40% of Boeing 737. Some of the F-16s are built in Japan—in fact, after having bought the first air wing from us, they replaced the planes' wings because they did not feel that they were up to their standards. That was expensive, but the Japanese were willing to spend the money. They were going to build an aviation industry, regardless of costs or what contribution an American manufacturer might or might not make. This FSX program is still underway, although at a pace slower than anticipated; I am told that it is coming along well and close to completion, event though there seem to be some disagreements between the American and Japanese manufacturers about some of the technology exchange. A prototype may take to the air very soon. The rivetless wing technology has been acquired by US manufacturers; under the agreement, American manufacturers were to build a certain number of these wings for the Japanese plane so that we could learn the process. The phase-array radar's costs have not decreased as much as anticipated; we didn't give the Japanese any codes to be used in the black boxes. I believe that it probably turned out to be fair deal for both sides. Neither side will have gained any great advantage over the other, although the Japanese will, if they wish, be able to build a front line fighter plane. The F-16 is now twenty years old and the next generation of US fighters will be build based on Stealth technology; that will leave a gap in other countries' arsenals. I believe that the FSX program is a good model for future cooperative programs. It enables

the Japanese to build their own fighter aircraft, but at the same time still makes them dependent on certain US technology, which is vital to insure that the US-Japan security agreement will be maintained. In 25,000 years of Japanese history—which is their claim to the trace of their ancestry—have only have had two treaty agreements similar to the security treaty. One was with the British back in the early 1900s and the other was with us, which is only 42 years old. So treaties are not a normal pattern in Japanese history.The process for obtaining Congressional approval of this FSX program was interesting. We finally assigned the task to a three man team: one was from State (me), one from Commerce (Joan McEntee, an Under Secretary) and one from DoD, which was at time represented by Glenn Rudd from DSAA and at other by a three-star Air Force General. The latter was superb; he awed the Committees. As I mentioned earlier, the three of us did all of the testifying except for the final session before the Foreign Affairs Committee when Secretaries Mosbacher, Cheney and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger testified.

In any case, through the FSX program and the China problems, I became better acquainted with Secretary Baker and his close entourage. I had met Baker first when he was the Secretary of the Treasury and part of the US delegation to Roh Tae Woo's inauguration. I also had known Eagleburger for a long time; I had also known Ross and Zoellick earlier. I got to know Margaret Tutwiler through my work on the FSX program. So by mid-89, I had many contacts with the “closed” Baker circle; in fact, I think I had more contacts with Baker and his staff than I had later on with the “open” administration of Warren Christopher. I guess it must have been in June of 1989, during one of my late evenings with Baker, when he turned to me and asked me what I would like to do on my next assignment. I told him that I would certainly enjoy being an Ambassador. He told me to look at the vacancies—by this time, the new administration had already made many appointments—and to pick one. I knew which I would chose, but I told Baker that I would look at the list and then give him an answer. I went home to discuss the decision with my wife and the next day I let the Secretary know that I would like to go to India.

I picked India because it had fascinated me for a long time. I has passed through on a number of occasions, often just at the Delhi airport. But early in my career, I had come to the conclusion that people who were assigned to India soon became part of a South Asia corps, who would serve much of their career on the subcontinent. That did not interest me, but by 1989, the relationships between the US and India had developed sufficiently that I thought that I might be able to push them closer. So I was interested in India both because of the country and the contribution that I might be able to make to relationships between the two countries.

I had some competition for the job, although I don't know who it was—I was told later that Abe Sofaer, the Department's Legal Advisor, may have an interest. He had been born in Bombay in an Indian-Jewish family. Chuck Percy has told on a number of occasions that he could have had it, which suggested to me that he tried, but failed to win approval. John Hubbard, who had been the Ambassador for less than a year, wanted to remain. He was a recess appointment made after Senate told Reagan that it didn't want any more nominations. The sole exception that the Senate made to that rule was when Arnie Raphel was killed in an airplane crash in Pakistan and Bob Oakley was nominated to replace him. I was told that Hubbard's nomination was sent at the same time. When the Committee met, it heard Oakley's and Hubbard's statements, questioned Oakley rather vigorously for a couple of hours. Then they thanked both Oakley and Hubbard and told the latter that if they had time, the Senators would get back to him. They never did, so that Jack went to Delhi with a recess appointment. I understand that when the Bush administration began to review its ambassadorial nominations, there was a lack of interest in sending Hubbard's name to the Senate again. But it did take the White House a long time to reach a decision. Fortunately, I had a good number of people who supported my nomination.

I had never seen the Chancery or the Residence, but I did remember a comment that I read in the State magazine when these two buildings were opened. One of my colleagues noted at the time that these buildings, with all their glass and open spaces, would be a

security nightmare. Since the opening many fences have been built around the property. By the time I arrived in Delhi in December, I had been thoroughly briefed on those buildings. My first impression was that they looked a little like the Kennedy Center. There were too many ducks in the pond that was in the middle of the Chancery and the fountains didn't work. The Residence was like many of the ambassadorial homes that we have built: for show—great entertainment areas, but with very inadequate living areas.

Since I had to remain in Washington for much of 1989, I did have an opportunity to become familiar with Indian issues. As I mentioned earlier, the administration had difficulties finding a suitable Assistant Secretary. Jim Lilley at one point thought that he might get the nomination and then there were others. Dick Solomon was finally chosen, but it took time to get him through the appointment process. But despite FSX and Tiananmen, I did have an opportunity to learn about India. At that time, the Department was very nervous about letting any nominated candidate act as if he or she had already been confirmed. But the Indian Ambassador was leaving and I decided I should see him even though I had not been blessed by the Senate. I called Senator Moynihan's office and asked for an appointment. I was told that I could be squeezed in on a “courtesy” call. I told the staffer that I didn't want to take up the Senator's time unnecessarily; I wanted to talk to Moynihan about India, since he had been our Ambassador there in the mid-1970s. The staffer said he thought that the Senator would be very pleased to do that. When I got to his office, Moynihan had left for a vote; another staffer was very apologetic, but suggested that I wait for a short “courtesy” call. So I went through the same drill again, with that second staffer admitting again that the Senator would be very pleased to have an extended conversation about India. So a meeting was finally arranged; I spent about 45 minutes with Moynihan, listening to his experiences and his views of the current situation. As chairman of the South Asia subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had managed to stay up to date on Indian matters. He had always held very strong negative views of the Indians' “non-alignment” policy. It was one of his pet peeves. When my formal hearing was held, which Moynihan chaired, it lasted 45 minutes and was essentially a

replay of our conversation in his office. He asked me the same questions he had asked me before; he knew what the answers would be. Frank Murkowski, the ranking Republican, walked in the middle of the hearings and asked me a couple of easy ones—he was an old friend. He wished me good luck and left. That was the essence of my confirmation hearing.

I knew something about many of the Embassy' staff. I knew the DCM, Grant Smith, from reputation; he was at the time one of the two leading South East Asia specialists. I knew the Economic Counselor. The Political Counselor, George Sherman. had worked for me in Cairo. I knew I had a good INR man there—Walter Anderson; he was there on a temporary assignment and was one of the Department's leading experts on India. I was very lucky: the PAO was first class and he was replaced an equally good man. There were about 280 Americans and 1500 Indians on the Embassy's staff.

As usual, I ran into the “we have always done it that way” syndrome. For example, I mentioned earlier that the fountains in the pool were not operating. I asked why only to be told that the medical staff thought they were causing damage to the ducks. The ducks had a large fan club in the Embassy; they had been residents in the courtyard since the opening of the building. Fortunately, one day the pool sprung a leak. It had to be drained; that meant that another home had to be found for the ducks. It took about six months to fix the pool. I asked that while the leak was fixed, the fountains also be put back in operating condition. When told that the pump had been taken out, I suggested that it be replaced. When that was done, I was then told that the new pump was very fragile and that it could only be put into operation on special days. I told the staff that that was not satisfactory; I wanted the fountains on all the time and if the pump broke, then we would fix it. The pump never broke; the fountains are still running and were doing so when I visited the Embassy a few months ago. The ducks never returned, as I hoped they never would. My answer to those who kept asking about the ducks, I always said that I would be glad to make one available if the inquirer would keep it at his or her house. One employee came to my office and demanded to see me to talk about the ducks. My secretary suggested that he go away because she knew that I did not want to discuss the ducks. After about fifteen minutes, he

did leave. I heard all of the dialogue from the next room. After he left, my secretary told me who it was. I called the guy's boss—the Station Chief—and suggested that he had a staff member who obviously didn't have enough work to do. I told the Station Chief that perhaps a review of his staffing might be appropriate; I never heard another word about ducks from that organization.

The final part of the duck saga concerns a plaque that had been placed on the side of the pool which read: “On this spot, Ambassador Keating fed his water fowl thereby demonstrating his humanity to us all.” I was assured that it had been given to him with tongue-in-cheek; he was known to have kicked a couple of ducks that had gotten in his way. I asked that that plaque be removed. Along the same lines, and this has been confirmed to me by Moynihan himself, I heard a story that one day soon after his arrival, Ambassador Moynihan found one of our Marine Guards standing by the pool with a brown bag in hand. Upon seeking clarification, the Ambassador was told by the Marine that it contained his (the Ambassador's) duck food. Moynihan told the Marine that he didn't have time to feed the ducks. Upon his departure from New Delhi, Moynihan was presented a plaque which said: “On this spot, Ambassador Moynihan said he didn't have time to feed the Goddamn ducks.” That plaque apparently was never mounted on the pool. Such is the life of an ambassador!

The size of the Embassy did not concern me greatly. There were many agencies represented in India; each seemed to be about appropriately staffed. The total was large, but I did not think that the components were overstaffed. The usual large groups—AID, the Station—were relatively modestly staffed. We had an FAA component, a DSAA group, an Agriculture Attach#, a Commercial Section and the Defense Attach#s. Soon after my arrival, the Defense Attach# came to see me with a request that I approve a new position of Deputy Defense Attach#. He needed a deputy, he told me, because the Army and the Air Attach#s had deputies. I told the officer that the solution did not lie in adding a new deputy position, but in abolishing the deputy position already in existence. That ended that conversation and any further request for staff increases from the military. In the end, I did

manage to abolish one deputy position, based on some decrease in work-load. We had a large communications unit. But Delhi was essentially the size of the Tokyo embassy and I didn't find the staffing in India egregious or out of line with other embassies in which I has served.

On the other hand, I did think that some of the constituent posts could be reduced. Bombay was about right; it is the financial center of India and we had to have representation there. It was not a large post; we had a Consul General, a commercial officer, one junior reporting officer, a large consular staff—the third largest visa issuance post in the world—and an administrative support group. The Delhi consular operations were almost as large. Most of the work was non-immigrant, but there was also a considerable immigrant visa workload. During my time, we discovered a visa fraud operation, as happens perhaps too often when the demand is so great.

Madras was about right in terms of staffing. On the other hand Calcutta had 18 Americans, six of whom were Marine Guards. Since we didn't do much business in Calcutta—consular or economic—I had serious reservations about having a Marine Guard contingent there. We didn't have that in Bombay or Madras, both of which had a much heavier substantive work-load. After lengthy discussions with our regional security officer, our Marine Sergeant, the Guard's Company Commander from Singapore and the Washington Marine Headquarters, I finally got agreement to withdraw the Calcutta contingent. That made some difference to that Consulate General's operations—e.g., they had to store their classified material in a different way—but that was not a major problem. In any case, this joint recommendation went to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Sheldon Krys, who turned it down. He and I argued about this with Krys maintaining that Calcutta was different because the state in which it was located had a communist government. I didn't understand that at all because it made absolutely no difference to our security interests. It is true that during the Gulf War, our USIA Library in Calcutta was shut down for three days—the only post in the world where that happened. The Communist Youth League just blocked the entrance to the library and the state

authorities did not intervene. I threatened to close all of our establishments in Calcutta; that finally got the authorities' attention and they removed the demonstrators. A long time before, the street that our building was on was renamed to “Ho Chi Minh Serani”. That was about the extent of the threat that a Indian state communist government presented; it was perfectly harmless. I would have reduced the staff even more, but USIA had built a large marble mausoleum on the city's main street which was so designed that it could not be used to house the Consulate General's staff as well. The office space in this large edifice was marginal; useless space was everywhere. In any case, our recommendation with Krys' dissent was sent to the Under Secretary for Management, Ivan Selin who sided with Sheldon. Two weeks later, we got a circular telegram which said that the Marine Corps Security Company was having staffing problems and it would welcome any suggestions for reductions. That is all I needed; I sent the shortest telegram in history to Selin and Krys which said:” You just got Calcutta”. And that is all said. Two weeks thereafter, the Department approved the termination of the Calcutta Marine Guard contingent. Eventually, I managed to reduce the size of Calcutta from 18 Americans to six. If I could have, I probably would have moved it to Bangalore. Calcutta was a big city, but it was of little interest to us. It was there because our first Consul to India, Benjamin Joy, was sent to Calcutta in 1896. Unfortunately, his credentials were not accepted; the Governor General, who had left a few weeks earlier, had left instructions to his successor that under no circumstances was an American representative to be recognized. The name of the departed Governor General was Lord Cornwallis, a direct descendent of the British General who left the US shores in late 1700s with somewhat less than honor. After that, it took us sixty years to have a Consul recognized in Calcutta.

Some of the Calcutta reductions went to opening a commercial section in Bangalore, which is India's “Silicon Valley”. There were a number of American firms working there and our representation in that city was absolutely necessary.

I probably spent more time than most ambassadors on management issues because it is a subject that interests me. I would guess that I probably spent about 20% of my time

on those matters. When I say “management” that includes everything from establishing “Housing Boards”—to make sure that the allocation of government owned or leased housing was equitable—to adjudicating personnel matters, such as the case of sexual harassment. That took considerable time because by the time it was closed, many other issues became involved such as substance abuse, family problems, etc. I finally had to ask the Department to evacuate the individual for medical assistance. Of course, staffing levels were always a concern. I also got involved in a construction problem, stemming from US ownership of two duplex residences that it had constructed in Delhi before my arrival. We had taken possession of one of the buildings and then found that the ground floor on the other had sunk because the Indian construction company had used cement too heavy for the ground. Also cabinets had fallen off the wall in the other building. Those events raised a question of whether the contractor was building to the agreed upon specifications. That generated a law suit which by the time I had arrived had been in court for eight years. We were paying a Bombay lawyer US-level fees to pursue the matter, but he never seemed to able to bring the case to settlement. The two buildings just sat there deteriorating from lack of use, guarded by one person. I was anxious to bring this matter to a close, but all I got from FBO in Washington were warnings to be careful. I finally went to the Under Secretary for Management, pointing the stupidity of the situation. We were spending approximately $100,000 per annum for renting quarters for the officers that might have occupied the two buildings under dispute and probably about $50,000 for the lawyer and the value of the buildings was decreasing sharply. I threatened to occupy the buildings and challenge the builder to toss us out. John Rogers, the Under Secretary, finally took an interest and the closed our dispute with the contractor and now they are occupied by two families. I was sent pictures of the buildings after they were rehabilitated and as people were moving in. So I spent a lot of time on management/administrative matters.

In some respects, I did become involved in matters which normally might be left to the DCM. My first one, unfortunately, was not comfortable making difficult personnel decisions. He was very South Asian in his approach to personnel matters! Of course, there were

matters on which the DCM and some other agency disagreed; that left the final decision to me, as it should be. My first DCM was one of the best South-Asia experts in the Foreign Service and I regarded his substantive views highly. But as I have suggested before, the whole Embassy had taken on a very Asian attitude: “This is the way things have always been done”. The outside wall needed repainting, but I was told that it had always looked that way. I thought the Bombay Consulate General looked terrible; I wanted it spruced up, even if it had been like that for many, many years. People just did not notice deterioration or if they did, they accepted it as a natural phenomenon. Habits develop and they become very hard to break unless some eyes are brought to bear. Women for example cut and raked the lawns; when I suggested using lawnmowers, I was told that that was too expensive; using women was the “traditional” way. I suggested once that some protection against the sun be provided for people standing in the visa line only to be told that they had always stood that way. It is true that there were rotations among the American staff, but I noticed that both in Cairo and in India, that since these posts were not among the highly desired, the vacancies tended to be filled by specialists in the area who tended to accept local culture and customs without challenge. The culture did not regard change highly; it had its own tempo and its own pace. In addition, Delhi was a very comfortable post for our staff; the school was very good, the housing was more than adequate, food was plentiful and many families had servants. It didn't require much effort to live well and I don't think when American supervisors felt comfortable with the status quo, the local staff wouldn't upset time honored practices. I don't think the American staff had as much drive as might have been the case in other posts. I think I need to note that the Administrative Counselor whom I inherited was selected out, and he did not perform at all satisfactorily the year that he was with me. He was followed by a good man; he and I developed a list of actions that needed to be taken and we got a lot of things done. So I believe that the management of an Embassy depends on having good persons—preferably people that the ambassador has known favorably—and an ambassador who cares about management/administrative matters and who expects improvements to be made all the time. If the ambassador doesn't care, very few on his or her staff will.The

second one, Ken Brill, was superb and he, by the time I left, functioned as a normal DCM should.

I should mention that not only the Embassy was finding it difficult to change. I had a similar criticism of the Department, particularly in the computer field. I was not satisfied that it was taking advantage of the new information technologies; I hadn't been when I was in Tokyo or Cairo or Washington. I thought the Department's use of computers was antediluvian. I finally managed to get two terminals in my office in Delhi because the Department had two systems: a classified one and unclassified one. That takes two terminals. I used the unclassified terminal to retrieve and use the management base and the classified one for most messages to Washington. It was a very unsatisfactory process. The Department's system is basically designed by and for the technicians. When the Housing Board was setup, I wanted a data base that would permit to see what assignments were being made. I told the technician that I did not want to manipulate the data base, but just be able to retrieve the information. That was done, but when I asked how I could look for a particular piece of information, I was given a thick stack of papers which was a print out of the data base. I asked why I couldn't retrieve the information on the terminal. I was told the system would not permit to seek just one piece of information; I would have to go through the data base until I found what I wanted. That is what I mean by a system established for the technician's use and not for the users. It was very difficult to get an overview of the housing situation which is what a supervisor needs. This was a State wide program which we installed while I was in Delhi; we also installed an inventory program also developed by the Department. Fortunately, we had Burt English as our General Services Officer and he had been involved in a pilot project and therefore was familiar with the programs and knew how to use them. The new inventory program was a major step forward because until its installation, every inventory was taken by human beings, with some unexplained losses.

Before leaving for Delhi, I got the standard briefing. I was told that we were not doing much in military cooperation, that Gandhi had managed to take a small step towards economic liberalization in 1984 which had not progressed very far and that Indians were

not easy to deal with. By 1989, Gandhi had reversed himself and had run a campaign against further liberalization; he lost that election. Nothing was said to me about Kashmir; I heard a lot about the Punjab and the rebellion that was taking place there. Commerce didn't show much interest in India, but I did talk to a lot of corporations—all of whom told me that they were watching, which, translated into plain English, meant that they had no intention of looking for business in India. The American private sector was interested, but only over the long run. One of the best briefings I received was from representatives of the academic community, funded by INR. That took place at the Meridian House and I found it extremely useful. In general, I think that India did not rank very high on anyone's agenda in Washington.

At that point in time, even the responsible regional bureau looked on India as a step-child. The Middle East always consumed so much time of the NEA leadership that no other issue ranked very important on a day-to-day basis. Basically, the NEA Assistant Secretary was then, and had been for decades, essentially the Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs. During Murphy's tour as Assistant Secretary (1983-89) he appeared once at a Congressional hearing on Southeast Asia. He will tell you that he wasn't prepared and took a real beating from Solarz. There were a few Members of Congress that were concerned about Southeast Asia—Solarz and Moynihan. Much concern about the subcontinent stemmed from the danger of a nuclear armament. Furthermore, since both India and Pakistan came under the jurisdiction of one deputy assistant secretary, any policy initiative towards one of the countries immediately triggered concern about the other's reaction. I used to argue about this constant “coupling”. Under those circumstances, it was impossible to develop the best US position towards India—or Pakistan—and then worry about the impact on the neighbor. The concern of not upsetting either country was uppermost in the policymaker's mind right at the beginning; that warped our policy towards both countries and in fact blocked making much progress even on bilateral issues.

It was Washington's view in 1989 that India was on the side of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, although people did admit that it did not support the Soviets on all issues.

Nevertheless, India was linked to the Soviets since it was using Soviet weapons and equipment, traded heavily with Moscow and could be counted to support the Soviets in the UN. I should note however that this view, that had prevailed for so long, was beginning to be amended in 1989, primarily due to changes taking place in Moscow under Gorbachev's guidance. The Indian Chief of Staff had paid a visit to his American counterpart and vice-versa.

I found that when I reached Delhi and had a chance to acclimate myself that the Washington views as expressed to me during the briefings were somewhat outdated, particularly concerning stated Indian government attitudes as perceived in Washington. I was extremely fortunate because when I arrived, a new government under V.P. Singh had just been formed. The Prime Minister had employed in his immediate office one of the best Indian foreign service officers, Ronen Sen, who is now the Ambassador to Moscow. He was very bright and an agile and adept operator. The Director General for American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry was P.K. Singh who is now the Indian Ambassador to Israel. He was also an unusually competent operator. Both Sen and Singh were a real pleasure to work with; I used to chat very privately with them about issues that had not yet even risen and about improving US-India relationships. I found those contacts very rewarding. Both had worked for the Gandhi government, one in the Foreign Ministry and the other in the Prime Minister's office. The fact that Singh kept someone in his own office who had worked for his predecessor was not highly unusual, but it tells you something about Sen's reputation. I found that in the Foreign and Defense Ministries, with some rare exceptions, the officials were favorably disposed towards the US. The Finance Ministry was mixed—many of the anti-privatization ideologues still resided there; the domestic ministries could be downright rude. Of course, the Finance Ministry had a bunker mentality because they were sure that when the sorry state of the Indian economy would become public, they were sure that they would be blamed. In fact, when the current Finance Minister took the job in 1991, he admitted that as a former member of the Finance Ministry bureaucracy, he was sorry what they had wrought and that, as he was coming to the end of his career,

he would like to redress the damage done by his former colleagues. And he proceeded rapidly to do just that!

The tensions between the US and India were caused in part by the Indian bureaucracy with the support and sometimes with the leadership of the politicians. While I was Ambassador, Indian bureaucrats, during the GATT talks in Geneva, were not well received by other representatives. The head of the Indian delegation was a) bound to talk too long and b) would lecture the West in general and the US in particular. The Indian bureaucracy shared with some politicians some anti-US sentiments. I must say that the Indian “administrative service”—as the top 3500 bureaucrats are called—and the Indian Foreign service were staffed with some very bright people. You might not have agreed with their analyses, but it was usually very intelligent. I came to have a lot of respect for them, even if I didn't always like them and even, as I often did, disagree with them. They are in general extremely competent and well educated.

I arrived in Delhi during a period of change. There was a new government headed by V.P. Singh. He promised economic liberalization, but never seemed to get around to it. I had been in Delhi for a couple of months when I found out that the Air Attach# had a plane in Islamabad—a C-12 twin engine, propeller driven. I asked my DCM to raise the question of my using this plane with the Foreign Ministry so that I could take some trips within India. He told me that the Indians would certainly not approve the use of the plane. I accepted that advice at that time, but I kept going back to the issue with the DCM. Finally, I told him that I expected him to take the matter up with the Indians; at worst, they could only say “No.” He finally, and very reluctantly, raised the question with P.K. Singh. Much to the DCM's surprise, Singh said, “Fine. No problem.” No one had ever asked before; it was the first time that such a request had been made since 1971 when the Indians asked that the plane be withdrawn from their country after it had by mistake flown over some Indian troop concentration just before the Bangladesh war. But the Embassy had always prejudged the answer. My predecessors had used the plane, now stationed in Pakistan, for trips to Nepal or Sri Lanka. But the issue of using the plane internally in India had never been raised

in twenty years and assumptions—wrong ones, as it turned out—had been made by our staff. In fact, by the time I left India, I am sure the Indians would have permitted our own Air Attach# to have his own plane stationed at the Delhi airport. This is another illustration of the ingrained practices that I encountered when I became Ambassador.

I believe that in this period of transition in the world away from the Cold War the Indians were reviewing their relationships with us. They were also giving serious consideration to the restructuring of their economic policies, but unfortunately they were also reviewing their domestic political policies. That latter review doomed economic liberalization under Singh. He got caught up trying to gain the support of the “other backward” castes. These were not the “untouchables,” but were people still at the bottom of the economic and social ladder. Singh resuscitated a report that had been submitted over a decade earlier which had recommended that a larger share of government jobs be set aside for these “other backward” castes. The government had already set aside 27% of its jobs for “scheduled” castes—i.e. what had been known as “untouchables”— and tribes. Singh wanted to add another set aside of 27% for other lower caste members. This meant that almost half of all government jobs were reserved for people of little education and social skills. That left little for everyone else; as could be expected, there was a major backlash. University students, who were likely to be the biggest losers in this new policy, burned themselves in the streets. There were a lot of tensions generated by Singh's “set aside” policy.

In addition, Singh had to face the beginning of the dispute over the mosque at Iodia, which gave the Hindu National Party an opportunity to demagogue. So Singh had a lot of domestic problems on his hands. Then the Kashmir issue raised its head again in late 1989. So Singh had his hands full with domestic issues. There was turbulence inside India, although it was not as virulent as it has been at other times. In early 1990, Washington became quite concerned that India and Pakistan might once again be involved in hostilities. That concern stimulated a trip by Bob Gates in May to both Pakistan and India. Seymour Hersch wrote an article about that trip, which makes for fascinating reading, although erroneous. The international tensions between Pakistan and India

affected the Indian internal politics. By this time, our relationships with India were good enough to permit me to talk to the head of the Parliamentary BJP group, L.K. Advani. I told him that he was inflaming the population—he had just made a strong anti-Pakistan speech in Calcutta—which I thought was unfortunate. Advani, who had participated for many years in the militant organized wing of the party, denied that he had done any such thing. He was a very precise man and pinpointed all that he had said and what had been said in a communique that he had issued after his speech. I admitted that he had not inflamed the passions, but that the speaker who had followed him had called for war on Pakistan. Since Advani had been on the same platform, it was reasonable to assume that he agreed with that sentiment. He accepted that perception and the rhetoric did cool after that. The key element of this story is that an American Ambassador could counsel Indian politicians and be heard; that had not happened very often before. So the relationship was changing. I had good access to all sides of the political spectrum.

The Indians do use the Pakistan issue to rally political support, but I do not believe it is used as widely or as often as it is in Pakistan. There the calls for “freeing Kashmir” are frequent. Benazir Bhutto does it all the time. In India, it is an issue that the opposition will raise in the hopes, never publicly pronounced, to curry favor with the Indian Muslims. I don't believe that it has been a very successful tactic; the Kashmir situation is not one that seems to be uppermost in the minds of Indian Muslims. The tensions with Pakistan were always present; they reached fever level in 1990. When I first arrived in India in 1989, I was assured by all to whom I spoke that Kashmir was a “manageable” issue and that the real problem was the Punjab. By the time I left in 1992, everyone said that Punjab was no problem, but that Kashmir certainly was. The Indians were surprised by the Kashmir developments. Bob Gates' visit was helpful in containing the tensions, although I should note that neither Bob Oakley, our Ambassador in Pakistan, or I thought that war between the two countries was imminent. It was true that slowly, but surely, the tensions were being heightened; if a mistake had been made by either side, major combat could have resulted. During this tense period, I went to see General Sharma, the commander

of all Indian forces, with my Defense Attach#. He was a nice man from the Punjab. He asked his operations officer and his intelligence officer to join us; they showed me on maps where the Indian forces were deployed along the border. The General emphasized that his troops were not in a war-like position. They were training in the Mouthy, which was not the an appropriate attack-launch area. He added that that his troops didn't have any heavy equipment with them and therefore certainly could not be expected to go to war. I asked whether our military attach#s could make a reconnaissance of the border areas to verify the situation; he readily agreed and allowed the inspection to proceed. It is interesting to note that Bob Oakley was receiving similar reassurances in Islamabad from the Pakistani. It is true, I believe, that his Air Attach# in Pakistan was more pessimistic about likely events, but most of the military in my Embassy agreed with the assessment that neither side was really preparing for a military engagement. The Indians had a very good commander of their troops on the border, General Rodriguez, who later succeeded Sharma. His troops were on alert to respond to any Pakistani attack, but certainly did not seem to have deployed his forces in an aggressive mode. I think that was also true of the Pakistani forces.

The politicians, however, kept shouting at each other, which always has some risks. Much of the debate was over the Kashmir. The Gates' mission went to Islamabad and suggested that the Pakistani stop training Kashmiri rebels. He was told that 31 training camps were being closed. He reported that to the Indians, who welcomed that news. Pakistanis subsequently denied that they had passed that information to Gates; whatever happened, the fact that the Indians heard the report eased the tensions. I believed that the importance of the Gates mission was in the symbolism that an American official was welcomed in both Delhi and Islamabad on the same trip who was perceived by both sides as an honest broker and not a partisan for one country or the other. Neither Pakistan nor India saw Gates as a proponent of its point of view. The Gates mission gave both sides an excuse to disengage gracefully from an escalating situation and both were thankful for that.

There have of course been other US efforts to mediate or at least reduce the tensions on the subcontinent. We can play a constructive role if the process is well and carefully managed. Also it is important to have the right American. Bob Gates was good and should get full credit for his efforts. Sy Hersch only saw the dangers of a nuclear exchange; that was not really in the cards. Bob Gates did come at a key juncture and performed a valuable service; he set the stage for further US efforts on improving India-Pakistan relations which came subsequently. Sending a high level US emissary is a good process if the timing is propitious and if the person is skilled. I did not resent the intervention of a Washington representative; if done correctly, it can be helpful to an Embassy.

I like now to return to my observations about the Indian economic scene. In my three years, I think that the changes were more psychological than real. The GDP growth rate was 3%, as it is today. That is better than the 2.4% that it used to be which matched the birth rate, but it is not adequate. In order to have an impact on the lives of an ordinary Indian, that growth rate has to be in the 10-12% range. As it is, the 3% rate can be attributed in large measure to the good fortune that the Indians enjoyed from their weather; they have had good monsoons for four years in a row, which is unprecedented. That allowed a major increase in agricultural production. There was a shift in attitude among the economic experts. The pre-1989 concern about the risks of multinationals investing in India and thereby “taking over” was replaced by a confidence that the country could manage foreign investment without losing its sovereignty. For example, when Pepsi Cola showed interest in developing a bottling capacity in India, there ensued a long drawn out negotiation. Finally, that company went into partnership with the government of the Punjab. As part of the deal, Pepsi had to establish an agricultural research station which explored ways to improve tomato production. Those tomatoes then were turned into paste which was canned and made available, for example, to pizza producers who used it for a topping. In exchange, Pepsi was allowed to make soft drinks and snacks. The major problem was that a Pepsi manufacturing facility in the Punjab was quite acceptable, but that was not really an appropriate area for tomato growing. But that is what the

government wanted and Pepsi had to go along. I visited the area and was given a briefing by a Punjab government official. He told us about the research facility and about the additional crop that the farmers could grow. Not a word about the bottling plant. When I asked why that had not been mentioned, he said that he had nothing to do with that. He, like many of his colleagues, found it very difficult to link American investments in consumer goods with programs that they considered worthwhile. To add to Pepsi's burden, the Indian government refused to let Pepsi use its own bottles; the labels had to have an Indian name on them. So all the bottles had to be repainted, which cost several million; they now read “Lar Pepsi”—”Lar” being the Hindi word for “wave.”

I saw this same attitude one day during a party given on Holi—an Indian holiday, which I sometimes thought was sponsored by Indian tailors, because the custom is that on that day you pour some colored water on people who are theoretically wearing new suits, thereby ruining them. I don't think that anybody wore new suits, but the custom continues. We were in the garden of a rather modest house under a tent. The table had on it all sorts of imported whiskeys and scotches and food. One Indian gentleman came and sat down next to me and started the conversation by saying that he was not sure that he even wanted to talk to me. I told him the decision was up to him. I found out that he was an economic advisor to Rajiv Gandhi. He told me that Pepsi Cola wanted to sell potato chips for 60 paisee; he was incensed because one could buy the same nutritional value for 10 paisee worth of ground-nuts, which were plentiful and available to all. Of course, at the gates of the house there were lots of people begging which was also one of the Holi customs. I noted that he was sitting under a tent, enjoying lots of food and imported spirits, saying that every Indian had all the nourishment he or she needed. I suggested we go to the gate and ask the beggars whether they had all they wanted or whether they wanted to come in to share in the spread under the tent. That of course ended the conversation, but enabled me to make the point that people should have a choice on how they might spend their money. He stormed away, but I saw him again on several occasions and we got along well. There is an attitude of “big brother” knowing best which inhibits a true

performance of an open market. The view was that the upper class could tell others how to behave even if it itself did not conform with its own dictates. It was a very paternalistic view, but I think that is changing, albeit slowly.

At another party, I ran into another gentleman who was raving about how the Indian constitution should be enforced. One of his Indian friends asked whether that was really what he wanted, noting that the first man had an alcoholic drink in his hands, which was contrary to the constitution. So we often noted contradictions in the Indian attitudes. But as I said, changes are occurring. Coca Cola when it first considered investing in India was to be part of a joint venture with a cookie-maker; that didn't work. So it finally bought up the largest Indian soft drink producer which had been campaigning against allowing Coca Cola to open production facilities in India. That avoided the necessity of investing in social "good" deeds, as Pepsi had done and Coca Cola is now prospering in India. Coca Cola did not have to repaint its bottles; those sold in India look the same as the ones in the US. India now has Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken and other American food chains which is a recent development indicating considerable shifts in Indian attitudes on economic development.

The Bhopal accident had occurred five years earlier. It was not a major issue any longer by 1989. The Indians had requested that the plant be built where it was built and no Americans were involved in the actual operations of the plant. But no American had been there since 1984 and I decided that I would visit the site. When I got there, I was told that I was only the second American Ambassador who had ever visited Bhopal—the first having been Galbraith and that was in the late 1950s. Periodically, the Bhopal explosion is raised partly because the settlement of $740 million dollars still just sits in a bank account. Some stipends have been paid from it, but the bulk of the payment remains untouched. The Indian government has refused to run any tests to see what the extent of the injuries and personal permanent damages really are. Anyone who says that he or she was in Bhopal at the time of the accident—even if unverified—has a claim on the settlement. The government seems to be unable to reach a decision on how to distribute

the proceeds. The settlement was made on the basis that the monetary compensation of $740 million would cover all civil and criminal penalties. That was an excessive amount in Indian terms, in light what the fines are if an Indian is killed in a motor accident. By US standards, it was a pittance. The Indian Supreme Court found, as a result of a suit started by one of the many lawyers in India, that while the government could settle civil damages, it could not agree on a settlement on criminal damages. So a warrant has been issued for Mr. Henderson, the former head of Union Carbide, by the Bhopal court which can only be served should he ever return to India. Recently Union Carbide sold the rest of its property in India, but the settlement remains frozen. Unfortunately, the whole Bhopal process dampened enthusiasm for American investors to a degree. It affected even some Indian investments because it became clear to all that Indian law did not limit corporate liability; it permitted suits to be petitioned to parties in a foreign country that had no longer any involvement in the management of a facility. Of course, the Bhopal accident and subsequent settlement was caught in the political upheaval that caused Rajiv Gandhi's fall; he, after agreeing to the settlement and having the courts approve it retroactively, had a plan to sell it to the country, but was never able to do so because he was defeated. So potential investors became wary in light of the Union Carbide experience; they saw the possibility of similar fates for them. Indian corporations have talked about finding some ways to limit liabilities, but haven't been successful as yet. There are still legal impediments to foreign investments, but at least India has a body of law and a functioning legal system and more lawyers than we have. The barriers are primarily caused by the fact that the laws don't spell out every detail of every investment process, leaving open questions that can only be resolved in court. But then India is not the only country that suffers from that defect.

I should mention briefly how I spent a normal day as Ambassador. For the first six months, I spent part of almost every day calling on people. I called on all the Cabinet Ministers, of which there were many—32, if I remember correctly. I also decided that I would call on all of my ambassadorial colleagues, a practice that many American ambassadors do not

follow. I was advised to call only on those that represented major powers, but I wanted to cover all of them. I called on them in precedent order, starting with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and finished with the Yugoslav Ambassador who had presented his credentials just three days before me. He is now the Slovene Ambassador in Washington. I called on 77 ambassadors; there were more countries accredited, but some were represented by charg#s or by ambassadors who had arrived after I had. When I got to the Yugoslav, I took a bottle of champagne with me so that I could celebrate my last call. I think it was time well invested; my contacts stood me in good stead for the rest of my tour. I had become acquainted with many and I could take to all of them. Those ambassadors had appreciated that I had called on them and it made a difference—far more than I had thought. I made it clear that no return visit was required and only a few did so. One who came to see me was the new Papal Nuncio; when he drove to the gate of the Embassy, he was asked to open the trunk of his car, as we did with all visitors. He felt insulted and turned around and left, but he never mentioned the incident to me. I used to see many ambassadors frequently. The Dean of the Corps, who is now the Mauritius Ambassador in Washington, lived nearby and I used to attend his “welcome and farewell” functions. In general, the ambassadors were very good. One of the first social events I attended was at the Soviet Embassy, which was also just down the street. The Ambassador was Victor Isakoff, who had spent eleven years in Washington as the Congressional Liaison officer for the Soviet Embassy. After Washington, he went to Brazil, which he thought he would hate, but actually became fascinated by the culture. After 18 months or so, the Soviets sent him to India which he hated. The end of that story was that Isakoff was pulled out of Delhi a year before retirement and assigned to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow which, as I understood it, made considerable difference to his pensions and other benefits. I think Victor was not well treated by his government. He was not a bad ambassador; we got along well, but I don't think that he was among the best of the Soviet foreign affairs officials. His successor was abler—he had been the director of the Soviet Union's foreign service personnel and was the one who maneuvered Victor's early reassignment out of India so that he could succeed him in Delhi. The assignment of an ambassador such as

Isakoff did not indicate a lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union in India. As a matter of fact, while I was serving in Delhi, the Soviets constructed a four story apartment building for their personnel which was right behind the Swedish ambassador's residence. So the Soviets could look right into the Swede's gardens, which was a violation of the rules of the diplomatic enclave which barred the construction of structures that would interfere with the privacy of other neighbors.

When I arrived in Delhi, the Indians had a retired foreign service officer, Eric Gonsalves, who was running their international house. His brother was the Indian ambassador to Moscow. I remember that one day in 1990, Eric was hosting a seminar to which he invited me. He told me that the Soviet Ambassador and the Japanese Ambassador were expected. He asked me to be provocative—the subject was “Europe over the next twelve months.” I accepted and I thought that the Japanese would be speaking after Victor and before me. I arrived just as Isakoff was finishing, which was unfortunate because I didn't get a chance to hear his full remarks. Eric, when he saw me, asked me to make my presentation next so that the audience could contrast the Soviet and American points of view. I could have killed him! In any case, I proceeded and suggested, that based on current events, I thought that Germany would be reunified within the year. It was a lucky guess, but I was just trying to be provocative. Victor in response said that he basically agreed with my analysis, but he thought that Germany would not be reunified within a year. When the discussion was opened to the audience, Victor was severely criticized, particularly from some Indian professors, for not defending socialism. He argued that the world was changing and so was the Soviet Union. All of the defects of the old system would be thrown out and the good aspects would be kept. He admitted that the way socialism had been run in Eastern Europe had some major problems which would have to be corrected. I was accused of “imperialism” which I said was really no longer—if it ever was—the direction of US foreign policy. I found the whole exchange very educational because it was clear evidence how far the Soviets had come in their thinking and how little progress some Indian professors had made in their understanding of the new realities of

the world. Not too long after that, the Downtown Rotary Club invited Victor and myself to make a joint presentation. We were introduced by the Indian Foreign Minister who was the past President of the Rotary Club. Victor and I got to the Club a little early and had an opportunity to chat. All of a sudden, we heard a stirring behind us. Victor thought that the guests were commenting on the fact that the Soviet and American Ambassadors were talking to each other.We gave our presentations; they were so similar that it would been hard to tell which one of us had made them. The Indians were nonplused by the whole event; they had a difficult time adjusting to the new world. I commented that the joint Soviet-American appearance was evidence that the Cold War was over and that the Indians had better adjust their sights if they were to be world players. When the coup against Gorbachev took place, Albert Gonsalves, the Indian Ambassador to Moscow, is said to have commented back to his Foreign Office that finally the Soviet people had taken control of their own affairs. That brought a comment from the Prime Minister to the effect that people should be careful about commenting on situations because things might not be all they seem. He may have been right because of course, the coup didn't succeed and Gorbachev returned to power—some saying that he had fostered the coup in the first place. After that the joke in Delhi was that the only way that the Indian Ambassador in Moscow could get close to the Soviet government was if he were assigned to Mongolia! The point I wanted to make was that the Indians had a difficult time accommodating to the changes in the world and particularly the end of the Cold War.

I traveled a lot through the country. I had decided from the outset that India, being as large as it was, needed to be seen as completely as possible. Furthermore, if I wanted to understand the country, I needed to see it. Delhi was not India, just as Washington is not the U.S. I decided that one week of every month would be devoted to traveling. I got to almost all of the Indian states; I did not visit the Kashmir out of concern for stirring up potential violence; I did not get to Eastern India—Assam and that area. Otherwise, I think I saw a considerable amount of the country. Almost always, these visits gave me an opportunity to make some public remarks; in fact, I found that I could give the same

speech in three different locations and have it published in Delhi as a new news item every time. The Delhi papers picked up the story from the local papers, so I would get considerable mileage from the same speech. The coverage by the local papers was usually objective and I was satisfied with their coverage. When I first arrived in India, I would receive every morning a stack of news clips coming from the English language press all over India. One day soon after my arrival, I asked the Public Affairs Officer why I was not seeing any items out of the vernacular press; I was only getting summaries of those stories. He said that it would obviously have to be translated; I suggested that that might be a worthwhile effort and the PAO hired a couple of translators. Then I had a much broader picture of the press coverage of all the items of interest to us. I also insisted thereafter that whenever the Indian press was invited to my residence or the PAO's house or to other functions, it would include representatives of the vernacular press. That paid big dividends. That part of the press that had been virulently against the U.S. started to include our point of view; it didn't necessarily change their point of view but at least the readers had an opportunity to be exposed to a wider spectrum of opinion.

My availability to the press and for public appearances soon became known and I had more invitations that I could possibly accept. I was asked to dedications and openings and many other events. I tried to do as many as I could, but I just didn't have time for all. Because of my personal view that the business community was the key to many other doors, I paid special attention to it. I saw all the leading politicians in Delhi and the states because I always paid a call on the Chief Ministers of the states that I visited. One day, I went to Delhi University to make a presentation. I had visited the campus before and never had any problem. But when it was announced that I would appear, some students —about forty out of 25,000—staged a demonstration. The administration called me in a panic and asked that I postpone my appearance. The students were members of the “Muslim Student League.” It was the only time that I was barred from making a public appearance. I talked to University groups during periods on internal tensions—the quotas for the other “Backward Caste”, which I described earlier. I went to St. Stephen's—a small

Catholic College—and ate with the students who were quite upset by the new policy. The school had actually closed because of the student sit-ins and other demonstrations. I talked to them about foreign policy and then I asked whether I could ask them some questions. There ensued a fascinating hour during which they explained to me why they opposed the new policy. I found that the students' explanation was different from what others were saying; they were very articulate and were trying to be fair and objective. They didn't object to the policy, but to the process which gave preference to members of a certain group, whether qualified or not. The government was not trying to educate the high school members of that group to rise to University levels; rather the University levels were being brought down to fit the qualifications of the members of that particular caste. Later, those caste members were given preference for government jobs, but even after having been given employment, the caste member's children were still given preference when it came time for them to enter university and later government employment. The St. Stephen students were willing—even if reluctantly—to have preference given to one generation of caste members, but saw no rationale for giving that same preference to succeeding generations. They saw it as reverse discrimination against them. One preference per family was all that they saw as justified—a point of view which I thought had some validity. In fact, a lot of preferential treatment was given to caste members who had graduated from their low social and economic status and were in fact part of the Indian middle class. That session with those students was one of the events that made the ambassadorial job so interesting, even if the event was not of any interest to Washington. It was however an illustration of the difficulties the government was encountering in the pursuit of its domestic agenda. In fact, it was this caste preference issue that barred V.P. Singh from doing much about privatization and eventually caused his government's downfall.

I should say that Washington's interest in India waned and heightened during my three years in Delhi. There was of course the 1990 Pakistan/India tension which caused the Gates trip that I have already mentioned. Then came the Iraq invasion and “Desert Storm.” That period started rather badly. The Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral, was the only

senior official of any government that visited Baghdad; not only that, but while there, he gave Saddam a big hug and flew to occupied Kuwait. When he returned to Delhi, I asked him what he thought he was doing; after all, a coalition of countries friendly to India had been assembled to oppose Iraq and they certainly could not be happy about his actions. He said that he had to go to Kuwait because there were some Indian citizens there; in fact he mentioned that he had brought some back on the plane with him. I suggested that was a lame excuse that the Philippines and Kuwait would hardly appreciate, not to mention the U.S. I knew that he had not brought back many Indians who worked at menial tasks in Kuwait, but rather some well paid professionals. So Gujral did not endear himself to us. But we did manage to get V.P. Singh's approval to move some aircraft—C 130s— through Agra at the start of our military build-up in the Gulf. After Singh's fall, we continued this practice under the brief regime of Chandra Shekhar, who was an old line socialist and a thug—I liked him and he was good to deal with, whom I had known for sometime. The Indian Air Force cooperation in fueling our planes could not have been better. We had our people at the airport assisting with the landing, fueling and take-offs. As we approached the war, I was called by the Prime Minister. He told me that the refueling operation was becoming a domestic political issue. Rajiv Gandhi had just spoken out against it; he had been briefed at my request from the beginning. So I went to see Rajiv to find out why he was all of a sudden taking this new line. He told me that Washington shouldn't be concerned; he was speaking out for domestic purposes. I told him that that wouldn't wash; I would be glad to report that he had “lost his marbles.” Washington would not accept such a flimsy excuse from a world leader. People usually did not talk to Gandhi that way, but I had found out that one could be frank with him. In any case, Shekhar told me that we would have to end the operation, which by this time was down to one flight each way a day. I asked him not to make that request then. I said that I would be back to him in two days. I cabled Washington and pointed out that the Indians had been very cooperative and that I had hoped that the operation would not need to be brought to a close at the Indians' request. Since there were so few flights using Agra by then, I suggested that it be rerouted so that the refueling would not become an issue. Within 24 hours, Washington told me that

the flights would no longer land in India. So I was able to tell the Indian government that we had stopped an operation on our own; it was the first time that our two governments had done something cooperatively. Shekhar appreciated our action. As soon as the ground war was over, the refueling operation began again without any difficulties.

Let me spend a few minutes talking about the non-State Department contingents that were stationed in Delhi. Let me start with AID. By the time I arrived in India, all plans had been set for the AID staff to move out of the Chancery to a new building of their own. That mission was responsible for an annual program of $22 million in direct grant programs and about $80-85 million in PL 480 food grants, two-thirds of which was administered by CARE and one-third by Catholic Relief. The PL 480 program did nevertheless require some AID supervision. In any case, the AID mission moved out to a huge complex which now belongs to the Ministry of Science; that was about half an hour away by car. I was not too happy about the arrangement but since all the contracts and necessaries had been done, I couldn't stop it, but I did require that the Mission Director maintain an office in the Chancery and that he spend eight hours each week there so that I could talk to him if I needed to. Both of the AID Directors who worked for me were very good and I did work closely with them. I worked with them in getting a new population control program reestablished. I urged that the $22 million be spent more on such activities as feasibility studies and other planning operations which might in the end result in greater American/ Indian private sector cooperation. I became involved in both program planning and project approvals. I enjoyed my collaboration with AID.

I was also blessed by having two very good USIA directors during my tour. I kept them quite busy and I saw them every day, even though they were also in a separate building ten-fifteen minutes away by car. The USIA operation was very good; we did have some problems with their branch offices, but managed to correct them over time. I used USIA in conducting our public diplomacy; I asked the PAO to make speeches—the second one was so good on economics that I would let him address that issue in public fora. As I mentioned before, I made an effort to be available to the press myself and always on

the record. My experience was that if I said anything “off the record” it would sooner or later find its way into public print and often garbled. I didn't have any secrets and I wasn't afraid of being quoted by name. I have never understood how “senior officials” of the U.S. government could make pronouncements on U.S. policy and then demand that they remain anonymous. That doesn't make any sense to me at all! If you' re willing to talk to the press, then you should be willing to let the world know to whom it was talking. I learned that from Mansfield, who was always “on the record.” When I first arrived in Delhi, the press was not accustomed to meeting with the American ambassador; it took some coaxing and I asked the PAO to host some social occasions so that I could meet the local press. When I returned to Washington, as I did on many occasions, I always made sure that I got an opportunity to meet at the Foreign Press Club. I met the Indian press there. I would brief the press upon my return from Washington consultations, usually in a press conference. In 1990, I had just returned from the States after some minor surgery, just at the time that the Gulf War was at its height. I wanted to have a reception to show people that I was alright; the DCM thought that was not necessary, but I insisted. In any case, the reception was held on the evening when we stopped hostilities in Iraq; everyone thought I had been very prescient. The press was there. When I traveled in India, I always talked to the local reporters no matter how small their newspaper might be. I let it be widely known that I was always available to the press. I felt that it was important that even the smallest local newspaper heard and carried our message and as I said earlier, I knew that my comments would also be replayed in the Delhi papers. Repetition is always useful. My staff was very supportive of my public relations efforts; I used to discuss my appearances with them. My first Political Counselor, George Sherman, was an old journalist and he of course thought that my approach was great. His successor, Robin Raphel, now the Assistant Secretary for South Asia, was also very much in favor of my openness. I should say that I would not recommend that every ambassador follow my pattern under all circumstances, but in India, during the period I was there, I think an open approach to the press was the right strategy. There were times during my predecessors' periods when, even if they wanted to, they would not have attracted any interest from the Indian press.

The Station was fairly small and relatively inactive. I am sure that I knew all that it was doing. Commerce was represented in Delhi and that worked well. When I first got to Delhi, the Commercial Counselor was someone I had known previously, Mel Searal, who is now in China. He had a small three-man staff. He was replaced by one of my choices, Jim Morehouse, who had been at the War College in my class. I think the commercial work being done in the late 1980s was different than that I had done twenty years earlier. There was considerably more high-level attention paid to it and that meant that there were more people involved beyond the reporting officer and his or her backstopping office in Washington. In fact, I used the whole Delhi Embassy to push American commercial interests; whoever I thought could be effective in pursuing our interests. It was a field that always had been of interest; furthermore, by this time, the Department of State had come to the conclusion that commercial work was a worthwhile effort and urged every ambassador to be, in fact, the chief commercial officer in a country. It was not clear in the late 1980s and early 1990s that India was yet ready to be a fruitful market for American investment and sales, but we felt that it was worth pursuing. We knew that others were selling goods that we produced and felt that we should be in competition. Most of the private American efforts were in the sales business, although some companies like Caterpillar and Timken had made investments. Dupont was trying to do something and finally did manage to get an investment off the ground after I had left. We, including me personally, worked with the American companies and the Indian government. Before I arrived, Air India had signed a contract for six 747's with some additional follow-ons later. It had signed a letter of intent to GE for the engines. For no reasons that we were able to divine, that letter was withdrawn and the contract awarded to Rolls Royce. I found that unacceptable and spent eighteen months first slowing down the procurement and then having the whole bid reopened. By that time, unfortunately, the GE representative in Delhi had made some nasty comments about the head of Air India which effectively knocked GE out of the running. But fortunately Pratt Whitney won the new competition; I was pleased by that development. That is just an illustration of my personal and the Embassy staff's involvement in commercial matters. I think it is was then and is now an appropriate role

for an American ambassador. At the time I was in India, it was especially appropriate because India was in an economic liberalization process and the visibility of the American ambassador in this issue I think was helpful particularly for American enterprises that wanted to take advantage of the new Indian economic policy. On one occasion, I flew for one day to Janshedpur in Bihar to cut the tape when Timken Bearing opened a plant there. I also went to the Punjab to see the Pepsi-Cola plant despite some political opposition. I believed that at that juncture in Indian economic development, the visible support of the American Ambassador might be helpful. I also became involved in the sales of American products and would periodically personally take up the cudgels with the relevant Indian Minister on one product or another. This was not a day-to-day activity because I tended to get involved only in major sales, such as aircraft or engines for their military tanks. On the latter, the Indians wanted to get a few samples for free “for testing purposes;” that didn't get them very far.

My Military Attach# staff was very useful. We had representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Indians had a large military establishment and our Defense Attach# Office maintained good contacts with it. That staff was invaluable in 1990 as I have described earlier. Although their function was essentially intelligence, our military attach#s had such good relations with the Indian military high command that when I decided early in my tour that US contacts with the Indian military should be increased, it was easy to do because the attach#s just opened the doors for me. Some of the friendly relationships I had in India were with the three Indian Service Chiefs. Surprisingly, the military gave no indication of any anti-American feeling. It was probably that part of the Indian society which was most separated from the rest of the world. Every once in a while, they might be permitted to go to the Soviet Union, but no other military in the world made any efforts to establish contacts with them. The US government has some programs that never get much attention, but can be very useful to foreign policy. One such program was the International Military Exchange Training program, which allowed us to invite senior Indian military officers to attend the senior American training institutions like the War Colleges.

It had been going on for twenty years. This went on even during US/India tensions; then we didn't stop the IMET program or cut off economic assistance entirely. Reciprocally, we had American officers at the Indian Defense University and their Command Staff College at Wellington. I found that exchange program extremely useful. Two of the Indian Navy's Chiefs of Staff had been at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. which raised some eyebrows in Delhi which often imagined the darkest motives. The Indians liked the IMET program; they were anxious to participate and enjoyed their experiences and always sent their best personnel for such training.

I always passed on each agency's annual budget request. There were some debates about the size of some budgets or personnel levels. As I think I have indicated, I tend to believe in as small a mission as possible; I'd rather have fewer people who are actively engaged all the time. That view, of course, was not always accepted by other agencies. I did manage to reduce the size of some staffs, like the Station, AID and the Defense Attach#s. I reallocated within the State complement. I don't think my management improvement opportunities would have been enhanced if I had been given full control of all U.S. resources and been able to allocate them as I wished to the different programs. I was satisfied with the arrangements then in place although I must say I might been able to reduce the State complement somewhat if I could for example reduce the communications or consular staffs. But they were really untouchable. For example, I never felt that every applicant for a non-immigrant visa had necessarily to obtain it immediately. I would not have resisted having some applicants wait for a day or two or even three. That might have resulted in some personnel reductions, but that approach is just not acceptable to the Department. So when you look at the State staffing at a post, there are parts that are untouchable leaving any reductions to come out of administrative, political or economic sections and that is a very small component of any large embassy.

We had central administrative staff to service all US components in India, although each agency also had some administrative personnel on their rosters. For example, the central staff was responsible for building maintenance, but we never had a unified motor pool.

That was just unacceptable to the other agencies primarily because a number of them were in separate buildings at some distance from the Chancery. We were never able to find a way to avail ourselves of the efficiencies of a centralized motor pool without reducing the effectiveness of the operations of the US government units that were located away from the Chancery. The disparity of perquisites was no longer an issue in India at it had been some years earlier. The internecine warfare that disparity of treatment created among US personnel was essentially over by 1989. There may have been some occasional skirmishes, but in general the fundamental problems had been resolved. I insisted on the establishment of a Housing Board consisting of representatives of all agencies, just to minimize frictions and to allocate resources—housing—in an even handed fashion. That eliminated the periodic fights between the Administrative Counselor and some US personnel in Delhi. There were still some problems when I got to India with the furnishings that each agency wanted for its staff. All of it came out of central pool, but naturally some staff members felt they deserved to be treated like some other staff member, even if the latter was of higher rank. It was never a major issue and we always tried to settle it using fair treatment as the fundamental tenet. One of the assets that the Embassy in Delhi had was its very good school; that helped unify the community and provided a first class education.

On country team management, I would make one final comment. Not only is it important for an Ambassador to visit the constituent posts periodically, but also other senior officers, some of whom may be reluctant to travel and need to be forced. For example, Administrative Counselors should not believe all is well because the post has some administrative staff. The Consul General must visit, the political staff must visit, not as supervisors, but so that we all knew that we were one team in India, all talking from the same script and approaching similar problems in similar fashion. It is interesting how over a period of time some particularities slip into the operations of a constituent post and then you run into “This is the way we have always done it” syndrome. So a close relationship between Embassy staff and the constituent posts is very important and I always made

sure that our budget request included sufficient travel funds. I held the PAO responsible for the USIS operations throughout India, the AID director for his programs, etc. The DCM was the overall supervisor, although I expected him to leave the day-to-day supervision of the operations of the Embassy's sections or other agencies whether in Delhi or at the constituent posts in the hands of the agency's senior official in India. This system can run into some “turf” battles. For example, the officer in charge of the consular operations in Delhi was a Consul General, the same rank as the person in charge of a constituent post. It was hard sometimes for the constituent post to take direction from an equivalent in Delhi. Whenever such a problem arose, my position was that I really didn't care about who was senior to whom; I was interested in standardization of treatment to any Indian whether he sought a visa in Madras or Calcutta or Delhi. To do otherwise might have encouraged “visa shopping” and that was not acceptable. I encouraged constituent posts, if they had a question on a consular matter, to call the Embassy first before seeking guidance from the Department. There had been situations where the same question had been asked of Washington by different constituent posts; that seemed to me to be entirely unnecessary. One answer should serve the needs of all US government establishments in India. My whole goal was to have a more structured operation throughout India, whether it was the administrative or consular. I wanted the economic and political officers to travel to: a) see for themselves what was going on in the various Indian states and b) to provide guidance to the Consul General and the younger officers who were still learning their craft. The Consul Generals had the right to communicate directly with Washington on all matters; I only insisted that the Embassy be provided a copy of the message. There is no point, in my view, of assigning a seasoned officer to a constituent post if you are not going to have confidence in him or her. They have to be given responsibilities; if they can't carry them, then you take action, but you should not assume anything but confidence and that includes direct communications with the Department in Washington. I know of embassies who have taken the opposite view, but that was my philosophy. I, of course, expected the CGs to use common sense and judgement; if the Embassy was engaged in an analysis and if the CGs knew about it, I expected them to contribute their views to us rather than

sending them to Washington. We made sure that if a CG had an input into an major study or analysis, he or she received due credit. It is important that the CGs be told from time to time that they were doing a good job; they must feel appreciated, as any human being does. I leaned to doing that more than less. My system worked well for me; I never had any problem with my CGs even if they saw an issue differently from me or members of my Embassy staff. I might have challenged the CG's view, but I certainly would not have resented him or her having a different point of view from mine. I would make a general criticism of the Department's system: it tries to accommodate so many different points of view that a final position is so watered down that it is sometimes meaningless. If there are sharp differences, let them be known publicly.

Now let me get to policy issues. When I was sent to India, I understood that my first priority was to see whether relations with India could not be improved. That was a general direction; I was not given orders on specific issues nor was I instructed on how to implement the general guidance. Occasionally, I would be requested to discuss UN issues with the government, although most of the time our delegation at the UN preferred to conduct the US/India dialogue in New York. We did raise specific UN issues with the Indian government and on a couple of occasions even convinced the Indians to abstain on some votes that they had made against us for many, many years—e.g. Afghanistan. But the late 1980s and early 1990s was a curious time in India/US relations. There were some Indians who even apologized to me because they only abstained; they wished they could have voted with us. That was a new approach. The UN issues were among the most difficult ones in US/India relations. Under this category I include the NPT and the IAEA, which is a UN agency; there the Indians were still adhering religiously to Gandhi's view that India would only sign the NPT after the two superpowers had surrendered their nuclear weapons; it would cease its nuclear development efforts once other nuclear powers had surrendered or destroyed all their weapons. That was a different view of the world from us, but I think at least in the late 1980s, a more rational dialogue on nuclear issues was initiated.

I think it is fair to say that India/US relations were improving even before the break up of the Soviet Union. Certainly the fall of the Berlin Wall spurred the growth of those relationships. I think the Indians were a little surprised by the international developments. For example, I think they did not expect the US to be so sympathetic about the internal collapse of the Soviet Union and the difficulties that Gorbachev was encountering. I think they were surprised that the American and Soviet Ambassadors in Delhi seemed to be along well. Of course, not many knew that Victor was an old “Washington hand” and therefore was not inhibited by talking to Americans, as some of his predecessors undoubtedly were. So I think US/India relations were beginning to improve even before I arrived, but international developments during the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly accelerated the process. I can't say that the end of the Cold War brought any greater interest in Washington in India. I think that interest really didn't become a priority until around 1991 when India changed its economic policies. I thought the establishment of a new South Asia Bureau was a mistake, even though I knew that getting the attention to India by the Assistant Secretary for the Near East was very difficult. Tezi Schaffer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia, gave us enough support, but our issues didn't usually go up beyond that level. Her husband had been our Ambassador in Bangladesh and she is now our Ambassador in Sri Lanka. She had been the Egyptian desk officer and when Howie retired, she succeeded him as the DAS. I have no doubt that the economic opportunities that a large nation like India presented when it changed its economic policies greatly accelerated the US government's interest in India. I refer here to a continuing interest; there had always been a sporadic interest as arose in the May, 1990 during the Pakistan/India tensions. I remember well that when Washington would annually ask us for our priorities for the next year, my staff would invariably list stability on the subcontinent as the first priority objective. I would return the paper with a notation that I strongly disagreed with that assessment because by saying so they were also stating that US interests in India per se were of secondary importance. I believed that we had other major interests besides preventing a Pakistani/Indian war. I asked my staff to rethink the issue and consider that the US might be interested in India as a fruitful area to develop our

economic interests. I thought that other foreign policy goals would lead to stability, but I was not prepared to accept that was our first and over-riding concern. The Embassy's list of priorities therefore might have changed during my tour, but I am sorry to say that even today, the South Asia experts will still maintain that stability is the over-riding US concern in the region. That is wrong; it is not. That is a negative interest. We have many positive interests in India which, as I said, hopefully will lead to stability. We need to pursue a balanced policy which has many interests, all linked perhaps, but separate and distinct from “stability.”

I can understand why in 1989, our experts were thinking primarily in negative terms. They had “suffered” through 45 years of Indian independence with both sides shouting at each other during most of that period, after an initial “honeymoon” period. From 1965 on, there were frequent tensions between the US and India. Most people saw India as a surrogate for the Soviet Union—not a vassal state, but certainly one that through its non-aligned prism would see issues more from the Soviet point of view than ours. Many of my predecessors, I think, would have described the US/India relations in those terms. I think Dennis Kux, in his book India and the United States: Estranged Democracies—a damn fine book—describes the situation that way. I agree with him that both India and the United States until fairly recently were caught in a time warp: we saw India as the embodiment of Krishna Menon and the Indians saw the US as the embodiment of John Foster Dulles. That has changed by now. In fact, Dulles and Menon were psychological and culturally incompatible, but they had passed from the scene many decades earlier. This time warp existed to a much lesser extent when I arrived in India and certainly the mutual perceptions changed considerably while I was there, partly because India's changed economic policies had a great impact in Washington and the United States as a whole. India had always paid considerable attention to the U.S., sometimes positive, often negative. The Indians could never understand why, as long as they were paying so much attention to us, we were showing so little interest in them. They are of course not unique in that complaint; a lot of countries feel neglected by the U.S. The tensions were not

personal; a lot of Indians sent their children to the U.S. for education—Oxford was nice, but MIT was better. There are now 40,000 students in the U.S. There have always been many, many of them. Even our severest Indian critics have some personal attachment to the U.S., either though relatives or educational facilities.

There is a story in India which goes something like the following: there were a million Indians in the US; each had 880 relatives with no overlap which covered the whole Indian population of 880 million. I think that story had some truth in it because every Indian I ever met in my three years had a relative in the United States. It was obviously an exaggeration, but among the Indians that were the leaders of the society, it was absolutely true. They all had relations or connections living in the U.S . So Indian interest in the U.S. was always acute, even when reactions were negative. I could always attract a crowd for any public appearance I might have made, unlike my counterpart in Washington who was mostly ignored by the American public. The question, “Why is the U.S. not more interested in India?” was asked all the time. It was usually phrased, “Why are you more interested in China than you are in us?” The answer was that China had been a concern and interest of the U.S. for many, many years whereas India had become only a recent actor on the world stage. The size of the two countries was not that much different, but our first Consul was sent to Calcutta in 1896. As I mentioned earlier, he was refused entry at the time. India was perceived until after WW II as part of the English sphere of influence and therefore did not loom very large on our interest list. China, on the other hand, had always excited the American imagination and our connections with that country went back to the first half of the 19th Century. When I was growing up, I was aware of missionaries who had just returned from China because they would address our congregation and raise money for their next foray. That never happened with India; some Americans were of course aware of Indian religion and its ancient origins, but it was not a topic for popular consumption. What the Americans knew of India came from Kipling. It was only in the last half of the 20th Century that India came into popular American focus through contacts with Indian students and emigrants and through the opening of the economic markets. The challenge of

raising American awareness of India was still with us in 1989-92, although slow progress was being made. Today, I find greater interest in India and more media coverage about more things than the Maharajahs and the poverty. I think the U.S. perception of Indian acceptance of U.S. business has played a large role in this wider and more favorable media coverage.

Also, I believe that the tilt toward Pakistan has waned in the last few years bringing India into a more favorable light, particularly in the Department, where, as I mentioned before, India and Pakistan were viewed as one package rather than as separate identities in which the US had different and distinct interests. Even the organizational change in the Department hasn't resolved that problem entirely although I think progress is being made.

The economic relationships between the U.S. and India was not always smooth sailing. About the time I arrived in India, the administration announced that it would start an investigation under the “super 301” law. We never really pursued it, but I was repeatedly accused by Indians for having ruined their economy through the application of the “301” rules. I had a hard time convincing them that the U.S. had done nothing; the common perception was that we had landed on them like a ton of bricks. The accusation of having applied the law to India was always followed by a plaintive question, “Why poor us?” The investigation was completed and then the decision was made not to take any action. You have to remember that the “301” target was really Japan and that Brazil and India was thrown into the mix just to make it look more “balanced.” But is was hard to convince the Indians that we had not interfered with their exports to the U.S. or their domestic economic development, although we were unhappy with Indian production of pharmaceuticals. The American companies would have liked to sell their pills in India, but it was not a big market. What concerned them was that as their patents were expiring, the Indians would manufacture geretics which then became competitors with American products. I suggested, and Washington did, that we remove the GSP protection from ibuprofen in India, which in effect took it out of the US market, since it didn't enjoy duty free status any longer. The word about what we had done got around in India and I think reduced

the Indian spurt into the pharmaceutical exports arena. But the US action was taken very quietly and only those immediately concerned ever really knew about it. It was a lesson for the Indians who then understood that we took intellectual property rights seriously.

As long as we are talking about India and Pakistan, I should mention that the relationships between the two American embassies in Islamabad and Delhi were first rate in the 1989-92 period. It had not always been such, I have been told, especially when Deane Hinton and John Gunther Dean were our ambassadors. I was fortunate because Bob Oakley was our Ambassador to Pakistan since 1988. He was an old friend whom I had known for twenty years. Very soon after my arrival in Delhi, I flew to Islamabad and met with the President of Pakistan. Bob later came to Delhi. We agreed from the outset that our two embassies would work in a collegial manner and that we would be in constant communications. If an issue arose on which we might disagree, we decided we would consult and try to be accommodating to both of our views. This agreement between the two ambassadors brought a new atmosphere to our respective embassies, to which they had some problem adjusting. There was competition between officers of both embassies for attention from Washington, which is a natural phenomenon given the circumstances. That competition was probably the result of “localitis,” i.e. the tendency of defending your host country when it was in dispute with another. This is an unstated undercurrent which is not publicly discussed but which does exist. The single event which showed me the folly of this partisanship was May 1990, which I will talk about in greater detail later. I encouraged my substantive staff to visit Pakistan; people from our Embassy in Islamabad came to India, not to the extent that I would have liked, but more than before. My personal contacts, mostly by phone with Bob and then Nick Platt, another old friend who succeeded Bob, were frequent and good. Nick came to Delhi within two months after his arrival in Pakistan; that was a good move. Usually, the two American embassies were working together to move the Washington policymakers in a direction that made sense to us in the field. Most often, Washington did not give us much guidance and therefore we had to fill that gap by pushing Washington in one direction or another.

Of course, the perceptions of the United States differed in each capital. Pakistan saw us as a counter-balance to India, but I don't think either capital saw us as actual or potential mediators in their disputes until May 1990. Then both Pakistan and India looked to us to resolve the tensions. Before 1990, I believe that the Indians had for decades seen us as always favoring Pakistan, but Pakistan wasn't sure that was the case or at least that we didn't show enough bias towards it, particularly on Kashmir. It is certainly true that in a Cold War context, given Afghanistan and the good offices that Pakistan provided for the US/China dialogue during the Nixon administration, Pakistan probably was of greater importance to the U.S. than India. India had had a close relationship with the Soviet Union; by 1989, it was a major exporter to the Soviets of civilian goods which were in part paid for with Soviet military equipment. The Soviets bought 60% of the Indian tea crop and the Indians were the world's largest tea producers.

The subcontinent consisted of Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka (the SARC Association). India has always had a mixed attitude of the SARC. It wants to have a regional grouping of which it wants to be the leader. The other countries agree to a regional grouping because they see it a dispute-resolution mechanism. India doesn't want to submit any major issues to the multilateral context preferring to resolve disputes bilaterally. India faces somewhat the same problem that the U.S. has with Mexico and Canada; it just overwhelms the neighborhood. I don't think Indians would agree with this characterization because when it comes to Pakistan, they feel that country is so large that it can't be treated as an equal. So the Indians are torn, but there is no denying that India is the largest country in the region and its neighbors are wary. China was only important to the subcontinent in the areas that she borders. Today, the Sino/India relationships are better than they were in 1989 when they were not talking about border issues. There was some movement in their relationship, but it was the Rao government that put emphasis on improving ties to China. During my tour, the Indians viewed China as a security threat, stemming from the 1962 Chinese invasion which acutely embarrassed the Indian Army and bureaucracy which literally came unglued as the Chinese moved south from the

foothill of the Himalayas. The Chinese voluntarily withdrew back to their own lines having proven that if necessary they could take territory at will. The Indians have never really overcome that blow. The Indians also recognize that China had nuclear weapons and missiles, which gives the Indians one additional reason to refuse to sign the NPT. Some of the Indian position is tactical, but some is deeply felt. I had good contacts with our Ambassador in Beijing, but we didn't have too many issues on which we could work together.

I mentioned India's mixed views on the SAARC. I should perhaps talk a little about India's view in 1989 of its role in the Third World. Although the Non-Aligned Movement had long ceased to be a major factor, India still saw itself as the spokescountry for the Third World. This is one of the rationales that then Indians use when addressing the need to reorganize the UN Security Council. It wants the permanent membership enlarged to include Germany and Japan—for their economic power—and India, Brazil and Nigeria for the size of their populations. The only problem is that Pakistan would probably not agree to India becoming the spokescountry for South Asia, Argentina might take the same position vis-a-vis Brazil and many countries might well raise a question about Nigeria's stability. India's self perception as the leader of the Third World is ingrained; even today, as India edges toward a market economy, it still holds on to its memories as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement; unfortunately, times have changed and the Third World does not need a leader as much as it might have. Since the Second World—the Soviet empire—has dissolved, is there really a Third World still?

I used to discuss these issues with the Indians regularly. I found that I had good access to all levels of the Indian government. Also the Indians liked to talk about substantive issues of concern to them and they liked the intellectual challenge of debating an issue. Sometimes they lapsed into the teaching/preaching mode which is not always well received; it is a fault of both American and Indian cultures. A lot of these conversations took place as I tried to understand the Indian point of view; most often, I did so without instructions from Washington. We did not get too many instructions from home, which

surprised me a little. The nuclear issue was frequently a subject of my discussions. There had been a stalemate in our talks on this matter. The Indian maintained that their nuclear program was only for civilian purposes; no one believed them, but they stuck to their line. We came down hard on Pakistan when we suspected them of engaging in military applications of nuclear energy; we cut off our assistance to them. Under the aegis of the National Defense University and an Indian think-tank—funded by the Indian government—we held a seminar series in Pune, a town near Bombay. The first conference was attended by our Pacific CINC, the Assistant Secretary for ISA in Defense, the Deputy Assistant Secretary from State, Steve Cohen—a professor from the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign—and myself. The Indian side was well represented and included their most prominent spokesman on non-proliferation, K. Subramaniam. When we had discussions like this, the Indians always fell back on their line that a nuclear freeze on the subcontinent was just not feasible, because they had to worry not only about Pakistan, but China as well. I have always been convinced that the Indians had and have a military program, but are also embarrassed to open their nuclear reactors to IAEA inspection because they just do not have modern or perhaps even adequate and safe technology nor the resources to upgrade these facilities to modern standards. Some of the technology is home developed and some came from the Soviet Union. They have some of their own plants which have had problems and two Russian plants under construction. In any case at this seminar and at other occasions such as lunches, Subramaniam and I used to shout at each other across the table. We each thought that was the only way to catch the other's attention. People would raise their eyebrows at this behavior, but I always said that we were friends and got along well. Over the three-year period I was in India, I think that Subramaniam shifted his position which brought us to the conclusion that there might be ways to reduce the risks of nuclear exchanges. A freeze was not in the cards, but Oakley and I developed the idea of a five nation conference—India, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union and the US—to talk about nuclear non-proliferation. The Indians wouldn't buy it. The three powers—China, USSR and US—could bring a non-first use pledge to the table, which would have avoided any necessity for India to admit to ownership of any weapon, but merely to pledge

that they wouldn't use it first. We never got very far with that idea, but I think it helped making progress on a process that would insure that there would not be a nuclear accident as result of a conventional war—an issue in which both Pakistan and India were greatly interested. This prevented either side from dropping conventional bombs on the nuclear facilities of the other. That meant identifying nuclear facilities—power plants and research labs—in both countries, which was finally done, even though then Indians suspect that the Pakistanis did not divulge their full capacities. That much was done and the dialogue between Pakistan and India on nuclear issues continues. I think the lists exchanged were pretty complete. We still are urging a non-proliferation treaty for the subcontinent. We needed more “carrots”. Near the end of my tour, Ivan Selin, then the Under Secretary for Management and now the Chairman of Nuclear Energy Commission, visited India. I wanted him to discuss the possibility of US assistance on nuclear safety issues. After my tour was over, I talked to Selin again about that “carrot”. The US has never dangled it, but I believe it could be an important inducement towards some progress on nuclear issues on the subcontinent.

I believe we now have reached the stage when I should discuss the May 1990 events in greater detail. As I mentioned, I arrived in Delhi in December, 1989. I found that the Kashmir dispute was heating up on an exponential curve. The Indians were surprised by this development; they had not expected Kashmir to loom so high on the “problems” list. I was told upon arrival that Kashmir was not the principal potential flash point, but the Punjab was. It is fact turned out to be 180 degrees different, as it is still today. I also found that Mrs. Bhutto was making inflammatory speeches; the Pakistani were training insurgents; the Indians were mishandling their side of the border. It was a real mess. This all must be viewed against a background of 1987 events when the Indians decided to run a humongous military exercise named “Brass Tacks,” which the Pakistanis read as a prelude to an invasion.

When it came in the winter of 1989-90 for the Indians to run their annual military exercises in the Majahan training range, the Pakistanis responded by publicly denouncing these

exercises as a disguised effort to prepare the Indian Army for an invasion. The Pakistanis brought some of their forces near the border. It should be noted that both India and Pakistan have strike forces whose location is well known to the other side. No rational war plan would leave those forces unused; they were highly mechanized and well equipped. Neither the Pakistani or the Indian strike forces were moved from their normal locations. But the Indians did move some lightly armed contingents into Kashmir, which has been the breeding ground for all of the wars that those two countries have fought. That Indian move seemed to cause a reaction from the Kashmiris who started to move some of their men into more aggressive positions. Bhutto went to Musafarahabad to hold a large rally; thousands showed up and reminded one of the larger Nazi demonstrations. She called for a violent liberation of Kashmir, which was taped and broadcast throughout India. Not only was it broadcast, but it was done over and over again continuously. That wasn't well received in Delhi and the Indians of course responded in kind. It was obvious that tensions were building up.

Oakley and I set up a hot line between the two embassies. This enabled us to check out rumors that were springing up in both Islamabad and Delhi, which we would check out and report back to the other what the actual facts were. This enabled us to keep the governments to which were accredited informed with real facts, rather than street gossip. I think both India and Pakistan began to rely on our reports and I believe our efforts laid the ground work for the Gates visit. By the spring of 1990, I had already made many contacts in the military. General Sharma, the commanding officer of the Indian Army, whom I mentioned earlier, had gone to school with his Pakistani counterpart before partition. I told you before that he opened up his maps to us and let us see where his forces were and later allowed my Defense Attach# to verify the information. Bob was doing the same thing with the Pakistanis so that the two of us had a pretty good idea of the state of readiness of both sides and through that, I believe, also understood motivations. We concluded that neither military was preparing for war, but we were much more concerned with the emotional fervor that the politicians had raised on both sides of the border which might

eventually force the military to take actions it wasn't prepared for or, as far we could see, was really anxious for. Washington, from its long distance, was much more alarmed and decided to send Bob Gates to try to calm the ardor. It was a funny situation; if Washington had had the same picture that Bob and I had, it probably would not have sent Gates. That would have been unfortunate because Gates did calm tensions that might otherwise have escalated, resulting in perhaps armed conflict. Before Gates left, both Bob and I sent cables explaining the positions of our respective host countries and suggesting some approaches that he might take. Neither Bob nor I saw him face-to-face before he landed in Islamabad. When he arrived in Delhi, I had a chance for a brief private conversation; he did not stay in Delhi overnight. Gates was well informed and had absorbed all the information that we had sent in. I knew what Bob was going to tell him and before Gates even landed in Delhi, Bob and I had a conversation over the secure phone so that I knew what had happened in Islamabad. So Gates was well prepared for his Indian visit and was able in the few hours that he was in Delhi to see the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, who had a lunch for him, and the Defense Minister with General Sharma. Gates went first to Islamabad then came to Delhi. In Pakistan he told the government that it had to stop fomenting unrest in Kashmir. In Delhi, he said that he had obtained agreement in Pakistan to close 31 training camps—the Pakistanis later denied ever having made such a commitment. The Indians appreciated that and soon the tensions were diffused. The hot air went out of the balloon! In Delhi, Gates dealt with a curious man, V.P. Singh, the Prime Minister, who was a minor Rajah. I made a mistake once telling Karan Singh, who would have been the Maharajah of Jammu in Kashmir, that I thought the Prime Minister was one of “his group.” I was quickly reminded that Maharajahs and Rajahs were different and separate and that V.P. was only a “small landlord.” In any case, V.P. was a very introspective man and interested in bringing some reform to the age-old Indian caste system. Gates had a good meeting with him as he did with the Foreign Minister. The Defense Minister was a little more difficult, but fortunately Sharma was there and he did most of the talking. The meetings were very small, which also made them more effective; our side was represented by Gates, Schaffer and myself. Schaffer knew all the

players on both sides having served in both countries and therefore undoubtedly did a lot of briefing of Gates herself. She is very good; I think she and her husband, Howard, are the Department's leading South Asia experts. Both the Indians and the Pakistanis took the Gates visit as the rationale to calm tensions; it enabled them to back down without “losing face.”

The Indians had imposed Presidential rule on Kashmir before I arrived. I don't remember raising the issue with them until some of their actions—atrocities, I would say—became public. Then we discussed this with them often. The Indian of course maintained that they didn't understand why we were raising a human rights issue with them when they were just reacting to Pakistani misbehavior. Gates made it quite clear that we were not supporting Indian actions in Kashmir nor were we supporting Pakistani support for the insurgents in Kashmir. Human rights violations wherever they took place in India were a subject in our dialogue with the Indians, both in Kashmir and in the Punjab. There are some American groups that are very active on both of these issues. A Dr. Aulakh is the President of “Khalistan Committee”—Khalistan being the name of the independent Sikh-dominated state they seek in Punjab. There is a similar committee for an independent Kashmir, which is balanced somewhat by a group of Hindus who were forced to leave the Kashmir and who therefore take a different view of the future of that territory. Both the American Kashmiris and the Sikhs were pressuring certain Congressmen, who in turn made their views known to the Department. We in Delhi were also concerned because some of the Indian suppression was egregious. We always were told that it was all Pakistan's fault—there was some truth of course in that allegation both for Kashmir and the Punjab. The Pakistan under-cover operatives were quite active in supplying arms to the insurgents in both territories. The Indian counterpart operatives were doing the same thing in the Sindh, Karachi and other Pakistani places. It was a tit-for-tat situation. But I don't think all of the unrest in the Punjab and in the Kashmir can be laid at the feet of the Pakistanis; there were certainly local leaders who were acting independently, but the Indians maintained that they could come to some agreements with these local leaders if the Pakistanis would

stop their interference. The total human rights area was the subject of some of my more contentious discussions in Delhi. It was a serious matter for us and we pursued it.

I should say before we leave the India part of my career a few words about the Gandhi family. I had many contacts with Rajiv, who was a charming man. He had lost his Prime Ministership in November, 1989, just before I arrived. I called on him at his official residence not too much after my arrival as I did with all opposition leaders throughout my tour. I would see Rajiv fairly regularly. If he couldn't see me and if he had something on his mind that was important, he would send P.V. Narasimha Rao who is now the Prime Minister. If the matter was not important, Rajiv would send one of his entourage; that process always gave me a clue on whether the matter was important or not. Rajiv had two kinds of advisors: those that always hung around his house, which was also his office and those, like Rao, that he would call on when needed. The “home entourage” was the source of the pressure on Sonia Gandhi to run after Rajiv was assassinated. That would have really shook India: an Italian lady as Prime Minister. The real politician in the Gandhi family is now Priyanka, the daughter. I don't think we have seen the end of the Gandhi dynasty.

Rajiv usually drove his own car; he wore a traditional Indian dress—Nehru jacket—when in public. At home, I used to see him in loafers, slacks and an Italian sweater; he was very comfortable with Western ways, probably more than he was in Hindi tradition—his Hindi was not very good, for example. He had attended the Doon School, one of India's elite schools and his English was very good. He was not very much like his mother, whom I didn't know, but from all I have heard must have been a formidable woman. Rajiv had a mild temper and I always felt that he was genuinely nice. He was in politics although I don't know that he initially really enjoyed it. He had tried to liberalize the Indian economy in 1984; it had responded well even though the effort was rather marginal. But then his advisors urged him to stop which he did. That created the curious situation in 1989, when in fact he ran against himself urging greater liberalization even though he had not pursued it while in office. Had he been reelected, I am sure he would have taken up the liberalization cudgels once again. In fact, Rao used for his program a study that

Gandhi had started when he was in power. By 1989, Rajiv was a politician. I have already illustrated that in my comments of our activities in India during “Desert Storm.” Rajiv used that for his own domestic political purposes and as I said, I had to call him on it. He was not happy about that and may have had pangs of conscience about his actions because there was no question that he knew that Washington would resent his remarks, but felt that his domestic political purposes had first priority.

My relationships with Singh were a little more distant; he was not the affable guy that Rajiv was. He was a mystic and could never be quite sure of what he might say. He was more open at the beginning of his administration. One of my first conversations with him dealt with liberalization; he was very positive that he would take all the necessary steps. By the time he left office, he was not doing anything on liberalization; he had become completely bogged down on his efforts for the neglected castes—”set asides”—at Universities and in the Civil Service for those who had not had previous equal opportunities. He became more and more withdrawn towards the end of his term and increasingly difficult to engage in a dialogue. His successor, who was in office very briefly, was a socialist and somewhat of a thug, as I mentioned. On my last call on him, he said that whoever was to be Prime Minister would have to pursue economic liberalization, although I don't think he had a clue about what the phrase meant. It was interesting to me that a hard-line Socialist had come to the conclusion that India had to strive for a free and open market system. During his term, he had to authorize the shipment of some gold reserves to Tokyo and London as collateral; that I think brought to him the realization that the Nehru economic model was just not viable. Rao, who was the last Prime Minister with whom I worked, was a known quantity since I had had conversations with him starting soon after my arrival. He then had just returned from Houston where he had some back surgery. That was a successful operation; he looks better today than he did in early 1990. I think that operation rejuvenated him and allowed him to do things that just weren't possible before the operation. I might say that he looks better since he has become Prime Minister; he has learned to pace himself. I don't think he was ever a convert to liberalization; he understood

that something had to be done, but I think he probably had some doubts and fears about liberalization. So for a while, he kept jumping from one view to another, but I noticed that when he came to Washington earlier this year (1990) he was very comfortable talking to the business community about his “program” and about the changes he intends to make. He has become a real salesman for India; he now can communicate well with Western industrialists. I have mentioned liberalization on several occasions. I should make it clear that when I arrived in India in 1989, the economy was an issue, but liberalization as such was never the focus of any election. It was discussed, but the only election that I witnessed actually took place before the liberalization program was formally announced. Now it is part of the Indian political debate. While I was in India, the major issues were Hindu nationalism, as illustrated by the incident at the mosque in Ayodhya and L.K. Advani's writings on a truck decorated like a chariot. A lot of people were killed because that mosque was supposed to have been built over some sacred Hindu land; that issue is still alive today. The other issues were Pakistan and the “reservation” system for the lower castes.

Foreign policy was discussed, but it was never a major issue in Indian politics. there was interest in the U.S. and, as I mentioned before, in the public comments that the U.S. Ambassador made. Everyone knew about the “Super 301” law and the Gulf War. I can thank CNN for helping me out on the Gulf War. Without it, I would have had a much harder time explaining the Gulf War, but the TV pictures were so self-evident that the opinion leaders did not need to rely on Indian news and obtained our views on the situation directly from their TV sets. It made us look good and that is always helpful. I should note that TV in general had a major impact on Indian views. Rajiv commented to me once that he had underestimated the impact that TV would have on Indian culture. One day, he was campaigning in the Bihar, which is the poorest of the Indian states. He came to a town on a dusty road which didn't even have a tea shop—that is about as poor as you can get. But as he entered the town, he noticed a video library. This new technology had broken the monopoly of Doordarshan; news tapes were made—they were like a news magazine,

called “Eye Witness” and that is what the Indians used for their information. Soon, other producers got in the game and then all Indians including those in the poorest villages had access to tapes, both for news and entertainment. Those tapes spread very quickly. Then, in many homes in Delhi, one could see dishes going up and soon world wide TV was available to many. It took the Embassy a little longer to get into the modern world; I finally had to get USIS to reposition its antenna so that we could access to the same air waves as Indians had. The new technology opened Indian eyes to new sights and insights. The Iraq war was a problem for some Indians because they had a close and warm relationship with Iraq for many years. They were disappointed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; if they had not witnessed it through their own eyes, they might not have believed me if I had told them. So CNN was a great help. Furthermore, CNN and other Western news services were bringing the news in real time. The Indians no longer had to rely on Third World television which consisted essentially of talk shows or news reports without visual evidence. CNN showed events as they were taking place; it was an entirely different experience which the Indians eagerly accepted. CNN was followed by Star TV, originally a Hong Kong based program, started by Richard Lee, a young scion of a very rich family. Murdoch bought it later and made it into a British news service. Because it originated in Hong Kong, the reception in India was much better. The Indians used to say that none of their companies would ever advertise on Star TV because a local TV network was already in operation. They didn't initially, but as soon as Indian businesses noted that their up-scale customers were watching, they jumped on the band wagon and advertised on Star TV, which also carried the Asian version of MTV that attracted the attention of the younger generation. Star TV, in turn, has started broadcasts in Hindi. The whole TV technology has opened India as nothing else has ever done since independence—down to the village level. Radio was influential, but it was government run; only short wave was uncensored and that was too expensive for most Indians.

I should finish this discussion on India by mentioning the high tech aspects of Indian economic development. The Indians are whizzes at developing software. Some one

told me once that if a computer language had not been developed, the next best thing would have been Sanskrit. I found it fascinating just to watch the growth of the software industry. Indians are very good at tailoring programs to the specific needs of an individual client. This ability created a problem for our consular operation because the Indians, once having developed a program for an American client, wanted to come to the US to install it and would then, too frequently, just stay in the US. For the American companies, the outsourcing to India was cost effective because the programmers there received far lower compensation than an American one.

The largest software company in the world is Tata in Bombay. When I was in India, City Corp had a software operation which used in part their internal capacity and in part they contracted some of their development work. This was intended to insure that it was keeping up to date with what was going on in India in the software business. By now, that one company has split into four: two in Bombay and two in Bangalore. The pace of the software development work in India is just mind boggling. The Indians could also manufacture the hardware but their talents really lie in software development. It is a growing market internally and for export and the Indians are now using the new applications more and more. They were and are acquiring computers more and more all the time.

They had some difficulties in installing a computerized reservation system for their railroad; it is now installed and is probably the only modern part of the railroad system. The argument was one often heard: computers will take away jobs. As it turned out, of course, no jobs were lost; there had to be as many ticket vendors as there used to be. It is just that now you can be assured of a ticket and a seat. That was and will always be a continuing argument in India as more and more operations are computerized. One of the consequences of this drive to use computers is that foreign software developers have difficulties in protecting their intellectual property rights. Indians won't always use programs that are just copied from one made elsewhere, but they will tailor that program and then sell it. For example, computer games might well be pirated, but if AT&T had a

program, it would be fine-tuned in India because it is a program that no one could use and could not be sold “as was.” This protection of intellectual property was a source of dialogue between us and the Indians. They did not do as good a job as we wanted on enforcing their copyright laws for films and computer software. I could get a film locally in Delhi before it was shown in American theaters. It was very easy to buy pirated programs and films. You can see some of the same problem here in Washington now from the carts on K Street. The Indian answer to our complaints was always that they didn't have the resources to police and enforce their own laws. I knew that they would have troubles with enforcement, but I was also convinced that it was in the Indians' own self-interest to crack down on pirating because they were so good at software development that eventually their own industry would be severely damaged if they couldn't enforce intellectual property protection and certainly would have had difficulties in complaining to other countries about their practices if the situation in India was not brought under control. That argument I think finally won them over and they improved their enforcement activities, although they still have a long way to go. I admit that enforcement in a country in India is difficult because they are so adept at development that there always is a question of whether the program was just plainly copied or whether it was improved locally or whether in fact it was developed entirely by local sources.

Once, I wanted to install a couple of programs that a colleague had on my computer, but we didn't have the operating manual. So I went down to one of the local stores and bought the manuals; they weren't always as complete as the originals, but they sufficed. There was never any problem buying standard American programs and games on the local market; they had all been pirated and readily available.

The other problem of copyright protection was in the pharmaceutical industry to which I have already referred. That was a problem of patent registration which the Indians tended to neglect because they felt that the drugs were manufactured for the good of the people and therefore somehow exempt from the normal patent protection laws.

Q: In 1992, you were nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs. How did that come about?

CLARK: It came in a couple of ways. Baker became unhappy with Pickering, then our Ambassador at the UN and wanted him reassigned. Tom had always wanted to go to India and the Department granted him his wish. That started a chain of changes with Assistant Secretary Solomon moving to the Philippines and I returning to Washington as the Assistant Secretary. I don't remember whether any one called me or whether I read in the newspapers that Tom was being sent to India. I did get a call from Eagleburger offering me the EAP job—an offer I couldn't refuse! Tom and I worked out the timing because he was in no hurry to arrive in Delhi and I was in no hurry to leave. I stayed until mid-summer, although the change had been announced several months earlier. I did return in May for my son Jerrod's graduation from Columbia. Since I was back in the States in any case, I suggested to Alan Cranston, my Senator from California, that I have my hearings while I was in the U.S. He told me that he didn't have certain reports from EAP that he had requested and that although I was not responsible for the delay, he was not going to proceed with my confirmation hearings until he had received those reports—which, by the way, had nothing to do with me but were on some subjects of interest to the Senator. So I went back to the Bureau and got the reports sent to Cranston. Then he didn't have time for the hearings at that moment, so I went back to Delhi and returned in June for the hearings. I was in Washington then just for the day—forty-five minutes for the hearing and back to Delhi. As was true for my previous confirmation hearings, I appeared before two Senators, one Democrat and one Republican. In the 1992 hearing, Cranston was in the chair and Frank Murkowski was the minority representative, as he had been three years earlier when I was being confirmed for India. Frank was an old friend; he would come into the hearing room, throw me some “soft balls” and leave; for the Assistant Secretary hearing, he stayed a little longer. Then it was back to Delhi for the goodbyes and return to Washington in mid-summer.

The Secretary of State was Jim Baker. Larry Eagleburger was the Deputy Secretary and Arnie Kantor was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. These were all people whom I had worked when I was the Acting Assistant Secretary and who knew me well. As far as I was concerned, the Baker team was very good. There was a lot of criticism that the “Baker gang” was a closed circle which you couldn't penetrate. But since I knew the people well, I did not have any problems. Also just as I began my tour as Assistant Secretary, Baker began to phase out in preparation to his transfer to the White House. I always had easy access to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. Baker held a staff meeting every morning which permitted all the Assistant Secretaries to keep him informed and to receive guidance unless it was a complicated problem which required a separate session. So it wasn't necessary to see Baker frequently. I used to see Larry more frequently on personnel and other issues. I saw Kantor once a week at a regularly scheduled meeting; the same was true for Frank Wisner who was the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. These were meetings strictly on EAP matters.

My days as assistant secretary would start early so I could read the night time telegraphic traffic before diving into the day's work. Then I would go to the 8:45 staff meeting which took about a half hour. That was a meeting of the Seventh Floor principals and the regional assistant secretaries; one or more functional bureaus would be represented on a revolving basis. I remember those meetings well because there never seemed to be enough chairs; on a couple of occasions, people had to stand against the wall. After that, I probably had a meeting with Kantor or Wisner or another Seventh Floor principal. In the afternoon most of the time I would chair one study group or another; I had formed several on one topic or another. Then there was always the constant stream of visitors and the staff. The day would end about 7 or 7:30 p.m. EAP had jurisdiction over a disparate group of countries. I don't think we were nearly as disparate as my colleagues in NEA were; there is more commonality in EAP than in NEA. We basically had ASEAN, North East Asia and Oceania; those groupings in effect covered all of the countries in EAP and I think could be supervised adequately by one person, as long as he had four deputies. Now one

deputy handles Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Burma which is much too much. I disagree with the way the Bureau had been organized by Dick Solomon because one deputy carried too great a workload and I certainly disagree with the current organization. We will try to develop a regional security policy as are the countries in the area; I don't think it will be entirely effective because I am not sure you can separate out one part of the world without much relationship with other parts. On economic issues, ASEAN is developing its own as is AIPAIC; then there are the burgeoning economies of Japan and China which far outweigh all the others. You can't develop a meaningful general economic policy for the whole Far East; there are too many issues that require special and distinct attention. That is not to suggest that there aren't enough commonalities among the nations of the Far East that would require separate regional bureaus; I believe one can handle all the issues, but I don't believe that one regional policy will ever replace the webs of bilateral relationships. Country experts are still absolutely essential. It is a fact nevertheless that our position vis-a-vis one country is becoming increasingly important to our bilateral positions with other countries; we do set precedents when we act in a certain way on a bilateral issue; other countries in the area expect the same treatment. If we are developing a policy towards China, for example, we must take into consideration its effect on other Asian countries. We have not done that sufficiently because the whole phenomenon of Asian assertiveness is new; those countries are collaborating much more and are not always supportive of our actions. They want to be consulted—real consultation and not just notice ten minutes before the public announcement. For example, for the Japanese being on good terms with the U.S. was sufficient reason to go along with us. The rest of Asia, if the Japanese agreed, would also go along. Now some Asia countries will advise the Japanese not to go along with us on certain matters. The Japanese are also becoming more concerned about the impact on Asia of any agreements they might reach with us. It is a different game and we are very slow in catching up with the new reality. The ascent of China, along with the increasing economic importance of many Asian countries, has made for a new ball game in the Far East. Other Asian countries are impressed by the obvious expansion of the Chinese economy; this has been happening for the last fifteen years,

but has become impressive only recently. The growth of China's economy has of course security implications for all Asian countries and that is becoming a very important factor in their policy considerations. Furthermore, ASEAN has graduated from the poverty; Japan has to be more careful about its US policy in light of the growth of China and ASEAN. All these new developments require new US approaches and perceptions. Despite all of this, I still think that one person can give oversight to US policy in the region, particularly if, as I did, he or she has very good deputies. I used to see my deputies all the time; we exchange information often and directly; my door was open to them all the time. I held a small staff meeting three times a week and a large one once a week. Then we had a meeting with deputy assistant secretary levels officials from DOD, CIA and other agencies. It was very informal intended to let all of us know what was of concern that week to a particular agency. That meeting was unique in the Department; I don't think other bureaus had such an exchange with other agencies. It was a system that Paul Wolfowitz started and I think worked very well, as long as it was not used as a platform for a lecture by an assistant secretary.

The evening social season was not that burdensome. I think we may have attended functions two or three times each week; it was not a great burden. There were also two or three lunches each week.

By summer, 1992 the Presidential campaign was in full swing. That had some impact on one issue that I dealt with, such as the sale of 160 F-16s to Taiwan. The General Dynamics plant where these F-16s were built was located in Texas. the political campaign meant that the decision on the sale was made much quicker than otherwise might have been the case. Our memorandum requesting a decision was devoid of any reference to the domestic political issues. Once the decision was made, I recommended that a high level emissary be sent to Beijing, so that the Chinese could berate someone for our actions. I thought that would be good therapy for the Chinese. I also suggested that we provide the emissary with some good news to offset the Chinese unhappiness. That recommendation came back approved with a note of congratulations because I had been

chosen as the “high level” emissary. If nothing else, our approval of the sale made G.D. a much better buy for Lockheed which occurred a couple of years later.

The “two China” policy had always been a very delicate balancing act for the U.S. By the time I became Assistant Secretary, the Chinese had been berated, as they are almost every year, by the Congress; the President had vetoed the anti-Chinese legislation and had been upheld. So I found a stable situation with the U.S. maintaining close relations with both Beijing and Taipei. My deputy, a China expert, Lynn Pascoe, who is now the head of the American office in Taiwan, was very good; I had brought him on board as I had all of my deputies. He is still young and has a very bright future in the Foreign Service, which is one of the reasons why I had him assigned as one of my deputies. When he first reported for duty, he was still carrying the traditional banner “We can't do anything for Taiwan.” Our Ambassador in China, Stapleton Roy, opposed the sale; he was a real student of Sino/US relations having been involved in that process for many years. He believed that the sale was a violation of the letter and spirit of the 1982 communique, which had become the central tenet of our China policy. I thought somewhat differently; I saw no reason why we couldn't be more forthcoming with Taiwan and I was pushing our policy in that direction. I asked for a review of our China policy which has just now been completed. With Lynn's assistance, we wrote a very balanced decision memorandum for the President. I was able to take some of the heat of out the dire predictions that the China experts were making; he on the other hand was able to convince me that some of the predictions were probably right. So I felt comfortable with our memorandum because while it did predict strong Chinese reactions, it did not assume that all ties with China would be broken by our sale to Taiwan. I was told by a number of people around town that the White House had already reached its decision; that didn't seem to me to erase the desirability of forwarding a balanced, well considered memorandum with options. It was Lynn who suggested that among some other actions we might take a high level emissary be sent to Beijing. We knew that it would be a terrible visit during which the Chinese would vent all of their frustrations on the U.S. delegation. We also put together a package of four

“goodies” so that the Chinese could rightly say that while we were selling the planes to Taiwan, they had not been forgotten. For one, we settled four FMS cases that had been held up since Tiananmen. We closed the cases—the Chinese lost a lot of money in the transaction and got their junk back. That action permitted the Clinton administration to start its relationship with the Chinese on a level field. Secondly, we agreed to re-establish military-to-military talks and for that I invited Teddy Allen, the head of DSAA at the time, to join my delegation. He came in full uniform and a military presence which I believe made our offer to restart the talks more credible. Thirdly, we agreed to have a joint committee hearing on commerce and trade that the Chinese were anxious to hold. This was an established mechanism which we had also put in abeyance after Tiananmen. For that purpose, Barbara Franklin went to China in December 1992 on a trip which was greatly criticized, but which was absolutely critical to the calming of the roiled US/Sino waters. She was criticized for a “boondoggle” trip which was unjustified because she managed to get $2 billion worth of contracts signed. Lastly, we also agreed to restart the Science and Technology joint committee; that took place in Washington and was important also to calm the Chinese apprehensions.

We worked out this package and then I took it to Eagleburger. I told him that I could only be effective on this trip if I had a U.S. Air Force plane for the trip. He said that I just didn't qualify for that. I pointed out that I was a high level emissary. We finally compromised on a small airplane that took me from Tokyo to Beijing. That plane was so small that we had to refuel somewhere both on the way to and from Beijing. The meetings with the Chinese were even tenser than I had imagined. I knew that I was going into rough waters when I was met only by Roy at the airport—no Chinese. Got to Beijing and Roy and I talked about the game plan and did some fine tuning. Then we went to the Foreign Ministry where I was received by the Director General for American Affairs, who is now the DCM in Washington. I spent about two hours with him with me explaining why we had made the sale, why we thought it was good for the Chinese and then what we had in mind to do for China. He told me that I spoke with no honor and that I had a forked tongue; this was all done with

great formality. Then I was asked to wait because my next meeting was to be with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lee Hung Qwa. We waited for about half an hour and then the Vice Minister came. He read from a script, which I did note had been somewhat modified to take into account what I had said to the Director General. That meeting lasted for about a half an hour and that was the end of my meetings with the Chinese. The package I brought with me was not that great, but since the Chinese only expected me to explain our rationale behind the F-16 sale, it was helpful. We did not make a big deal of the four “goodies” because that would have been counter-productive, but we just explained the sale and said we had also decided to proceed on the four items that I mentioned. We never linked the two, but the package was presented as matters on which we wanted to proceed because it would be good for both us and the Chinese. Although these were not my more pleasant meetings, I think the whole trip was worthwhile for it did reduce the level of hostility that Beijing was manifesting. The Chinese press was rather low key about my visit. In the first place, they didn't want to treat me as a Presidential envoy, which I was, but rather as an Assistant Secretary. That was alright with me. I have seen my two Chinese interlocutors since that time and they both have always assured me that their coolness was not a personal matter and that I should come back to Beijing when they could host me appropriately. That was an interesting trip!

On the F-16 deal, we worked very closely with Frank Wisner, the Pentagon and the NSC; to a much lesser extent, with PM in the Department. EAP was the action bureau and we wrote the report, obtained the clearances and sent it up the chain. That is a process that was different than that which might have been used some years earlier or is used today. I always prefer that the action bureau be a regional one.

I mentioned before that I hired a new deputy for China matters—Pascoe. I hired one other one and kept two who had worked for Solomon. When I arrived, the principal deputy was a Japan expert; it didn't make any sense to have both the Assistant Secretary and his principal deputy being expert in the same area. I wanted some one who knew China and that was Pascoe. Then I wanted a real go-getter and recruited Don Westmore who

was the DCM in Sri Lanka—a job for which I had recommended him. He dealt with ASEAN affairs. He has unfortunately left the Foreign Service and is now the regional representative for AT&T. So one deputy handled China and Korea, one was responsible for Japan and ASEAN, one had Vietnam and the Pacific Islands and one handled region-wide economic issues. That was a different arrangement than had been customary for EAP, but I wanted to shake things up and therefore changed the deputies' areas of responsibility. Long before I became the Assistant Secretary, Sandy Kristoff, the economic deputy, had been at USTR and had asked me whether she should take the EAP deputy job. I knew her from India where she had served before her USTR assignment. Now she is at the NSC. So I knew all my deputies well and had worked with most of them at one time or another.

In general, I was satisfied with the level of competence that I found in the Bureau. I did think that it was not as lively as it might have been. It was not as pro-active as I wanted it to be. Some people had been there too long and were obviously in need of new challenges. So my first goal was to shake the place up and I am glad to say that the core of my new staff is still in place today. I knew of course that economic/trade issues would be central to our relationships with Japan and therefore selected an economic officer to be that Country Director—Steve Eckton, who had been at the OECD and was a Japanese language officer. That was the first time that had been done. I also recruited a few more Country Directors—people that I would be comfortable with.

Vietnam became a central issue for me. When I arrived, Ken Quinn, for whom I had great respect, was the DAS responsible for that part of the world; he was taking a lot of flack on our MIA and POW policies toward Vietnam. He had been targeted by all the critics —"The League of Families", etc. I also found that in DoD there was very hard line official in ISA who had a direct connection with the Secretary. He used to by-pass his Assistant Secretary, Jim Lilley. I found that the head of the "League of Families" used to come to meetings of government officials on the subject of Vietnam. That didn't seem to me to be appropriate, so I just didn't hold anymore meetings. But I did want to proceed with normalization; I thought that it was time to bring the Vietnam war chapter to a close. I think

we—i.e. those of us who saw the situation in the same light—got very close to striking a deal and almost convinced the White House over the tenacious objections of a lot of people in Washington. We had the White House almost convinced that the time was ripe for serious discussions with the Vietnamese on normalization because I felt that they had been sufficiently forthcoming on the MIA/POW issues. Had my recommendation been followed, the Clinton administration would have had a much easier time when it started down the normalization path. Even though I started my efforts before the election, I pursued it even after Bush lost because I thought it was the correct policy and I wanted to start something that the Clinton administration could bring to a conclusion. There was no chance of doing anything before the election, but after it, I was pushing very hard for a change in our position. We did manage to do a lot of the necessary staff work. General (ret) Jack Vessey, who had been in Korea as the CINC when I was there, was very helpful since he was our principal negotiator with Vietnam on the MIA issue. But to get the Washington bureaucracy to look at the Vietnam issue again and to change course, was a very difficult challenge. Some parts of the bureaucracy in DOD and at the NSC never did agree. I was always convinced that once we had decided to proceed with normalization, the threat of a major political back-lash by the veterans' groups would not occur and in fact when the Clinton administration pursued it, there was not much of an uproar. I think Clinton deserves considerable credit for pursuing what we started; my only criticism might be that the process is moving too slowly.

We worked closely with some Congressional members on the Vietnam issue. That was Quinn's task. He urged Senator Kerrey, a Medal of Honor winner in Vietnam, to hold hearings on the subject and we got a lot of help from various Members of Congress. Without their help, we could not have changed course. It was the Congress in fact that approached us. A couple of people, like Senator McCain, went to Hanoi. Both Kerrey and McCain carried considerable credibility on the issue because they both had suffered greatly during the war. Both wanted to move toward normalization and had started the ball rolling even before I returned to Washington.

As I mentioned, I took over as Assistant Secretary in late summer, 1992. The election which the sitting President lost, took place three months later. That really created a vacuum, although I found it somewhat easier to work with because Eagleburger was first acting and later Secretary. As I have said, he was an old friend and we work well together. So I had complete access to the top decision maker in the Department. I think the hiatus also enabled me to get the Vietnam issue to the White House and almost approved, although I was never able to get formal NSC approval. I found that in fact the change in administration did not interfere with progress, such as the North Korean issue. There was a decrease in White House drive to accomplish things, but within the Department, momentum was maintained.

I mentioned North Korea. I had been away from the subject for three years, but I did not in 1922 find that there had been much change in Pyongyang's attitude. The big issue during my tour as Assistant Secretary was one that in fact I had dealt with three years earlier; i.e. the nuclear question. Back in 1986-87, we suspected that the North was taking actions that were consistent with a process of nuclear weapon development. By 1992, we had further confirmation of this development. It is true that the North Koreans had signed the NPT in 1987; by 1992 they had finally concluded an agreement with the IAEA for full scope safeguards. That enabled IAEA inspectors to look at manufacturing facilities and laboratories where development efforts might be taking place. We also had information that we thought should be made available to the IAEA particularly when the inspectors began to have some concern about the accuracy of the North Koreans' information. This was the first time that we released “overhead” intelligence collection material to a non-ally. The membership of IAEA included several country representatives to whom we would normally never had divulged our intelligence findings, much less evidence of our capabilities. But in the case of North Korea, we felt that we had to break with past practices and turned over relevant intelligence collections. Of course, the IAEA had also found religion; it had been embarrassed by the Iraq surprises and had become much more thorough about its inspections. There was a wide spread divergence in the intelligence/

nuclear armament community of what the North Koreans had done or were about to do. There were some who felt that weapons had already been built and that the US had to destroy them as soon as possible. I disagreed with that view profoundly. We also started a dialogue in the UN on the issue where a very good working group and process went to work. I spent considerable amount of time going to New York to talk to some of the Permanent Representatives and I thought that real progress was being made in bringing some rationality to bear on the North Koreans. Although I recognized the potential danger of the situation, I was also intent on not raising it to a hysterical level, which I think it became in 1993-94. I did not think that raising the status of North Korea to “super power” level even if it had built four nuclear devices made any sense. Such status would only encourage them to build more, some for themselves and some for sale.

We laid all we knew about the North Korea situation to the Clinton transition team. The fellow responsible for East Asia was a young Hill staffer who knew remarkably little about the area. We also gave Winston Lord a full briefing. I stressed to both that I hoped that we would not permit the situation to escalate unnecessarily. We did write papers which we eventually sent to the NSC. We used the change in administrations to request a review of our China policy, as I mentioned earlier. We wrote a lot of papers on East Asia issues for the new team, fully expecting that Lake would ask for them sooner or later. In fact, the new NSC never asked for them, but we sent them anyway. Winston showed up soon after inauguration, but was really shackled and not able to function at all. Over the years, the government's guidelines on what nominees could or could not do had been tightened considerably; now, until one is confirmed, one can essentially fill a chair and a desk and that is about all. When Carter was elected, Holbrooke sent Ken Quinn, who was to be his executive assistant, to the Bureau to let everyone know that starting January 20, he wanted all the DAS gone because his new appointees would start working on that day. He moved into the Assistant Secretary's office on January 20 and began to act as if he had been already empowered. That process had changed by 1993; Lord moved into a small office and I stayed on as Assistant Secretary until April. A couple of weeks before

his confirmation, I did move into the office that Lord was occupying and Lord moved into one of the DAS offices. He would not move into the Assistant Secretary's office until he was confirmed. In fact, I weaned myself away and the Bureau's Executive Director became acting assistant secretary. One evening, someone called him and told him that there were a lot of papers to be reviewed. He said that he was leaving and that someone else could look at them. Over the January-April period, I just slowly faded away into the background; at the end I was available if needed, but the Bureau operated without me essentially as April rolled around. I think the transition went very smoothly. I was a little surprised by the change on the Seventh Floor. The advance word had been that the new team would be much more open that the Baker group. Towards mid-February, I finally saw the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff. I suggested that he needed to see the assistant secretaries more often; it had been the pattern for many years that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs saw each regional assistant secretary individually at least once a week. Tarnoff resisted that; he was willing to see us if we had a problem but was very reluctant to schedule a regular meeting. I pointed out that that just wouldn't be adequate because he would not necessarily know if there was a problem. In the three months in 1993, there was one meeting with all the regional assistant secretaries which was very short because after Tarnoff had said his piece, he was called out of the meeting. The Secretary also made a couple of speeches emphasizing his interest in openness, but I can't say that we saw much of him. He held staff meetings with his senior people all the time, but assistant secretaries and others only saw him at staff meetings that he held every Wednesday. Those meetings usually were taken up by a lengthy presentation by one person and then quickly at the end, we went around the table to see whether anyone had anything to say. That was not a recipe for openness. When Baker chaired those meetings, some decisions were made or at least there was an intelligent debate about an issue. Christopher's staff meetings were much too large for that kind of dialogue. This all may have changed by now, but in early 1993, I thought that Christopher was more remote than Baker ever had been. Fortunately, there were not many issues in the three months that we are discussing that required Seventh Floor involvement; we handled most of them at the

Bureau level. As soon as Lord was brought up to date, it was he who went to see Tarnoff and went to the NSC meetings. In EAP's case, the transition worked well; I understand that in other bureaus, there was considerable friction with some of the newcomers being shut out as long as possible. I thought that type of behavior was silly and it didn't happen in EAP. It also helped that Winston and I were friends of long standing.

I 'd like to talk now a little about Cambodia. Dick Solomon had worked long and hard putting the Paris Accords together. There was a good working group at the UN on Cambodia. The sessions at the UN would normally start with a meeting of a small group —France, Great Britain, the U.S. and someone from the Secretariat—which would be followed by a larger group meeting, which also included the Germans, the Russians and the Chinese. All countries had accepted this process and it worked quite well. That was a very useful avenue and Dick should get a lot of credit for getting it started. When I became Assistant Secretary, it was becoming obvious that the Paris accords were not being followed. We reviewed the situation and decided that it was highly unlikely that the Paris Accords would ever be followed strictly. But there was enough movement in Cambodia to make it worthwhile pursuing the peace arrangements. Most of the debate both in Washington and in the UN was the extent to which we would permit modification of the Paris Accords and still maintain momentum. We agreed to just keep moving the process along as long as it was going in a positive direction and would not insist on strict compliance with the letter of the Accords. In the final analysis, an election was held in Cambodia and we had a surprised King. So I think we took the right tack, even if the process was not as smooth as it might have been.

I certainly found that EAP was relying on the UN more in 1992 than it had in 1989. Cambodia was certainly a large part of that shift since the UN had been used first to organize the Paris talks and then to monitor progress in Cambodia. We also used the UN on North Korean issues because the IAEA is a creature of the Security Council and therefore we thought that the Security Council was an appropriate forum to express our concerns. The Chinese did not reject this approach. There had been enough dialogue on

the North Korean nuclear issue in the UN so that when the IAEA governing board had to take up the matter, there was no debate; all the bases had been touched and we were able to marshall virtual unanimity in the IAEA; there may have been a couple of objections from countries like Libya. It is true that the Chinese said that had the issue been subjected to a vote in the IAEA they would have abstained, but since the IAEA works on consensus, it usually does not take a vote and we viewed the Chinese statement as more a warning to North Korea that it couldn't count on China's unswerving support.

So there are some issues that are best discussed and dealt with in a multilateral context. I do not think that this new process made my life as Assistant Secretary more difficult. In fact, issues that lend themselves to international scrutiny are easier for an assistant secretary to handle if they are dealt with in an international forum. I did not find that other parts of the Washington bureaucracy were anxious to be the lead unit even when the matter was being addressed in the UN. It may be that I was just lucky because our representative at the UN in the early 1993 was a temporary delegate since Albright had not yet been confirmed. The Assistant Secretary for IO was also very cooperative. so that I found using the UN a very good and bureaucratically effective method in dealing with Cambodia and North Korea, at least. My philosophy is somewhat different than the present State Department team which concentrates much more on functional issues to the detriment, I believe, to bilateral relations. That new approach puts a lot more of the policy development and implementation burdens on functional bureaus. For example, it is Gallucci, as the head of PM, that spearheaded the US policy towards North Korea. I would have preferred to have EAP be the lead bureau.

Japan was always an issue for the EAP Assistant Secretary. It was always the trade problem. We were aware that the White House was considering using Japan for campaign purposes, but fortunately that didn't happen. By 1992, I had watched Japan trade issues for thirty years. In retrospect, the best I could say is that it could have been worse. If we hadn't engaged in trade negotiations and other dialogues, the Japanese would have had even a greater current account surplus. Their markets would have been

more closed, although they might have some weaker economic sectors. Our pressure for “market opening” has forced Japan to modernize some of its sectors and become more efficient. I guess I would have to say that on balance our efforts have had some positive results although it would be hard to prove by just looking at the statistics. You have to remember that State has had one policy; you can argue that the White House and Treasury have followed two policies. State had always supported free trade and market opening in the hopes that would increase our exports to Japan and decrease their imports to us. The White House and Treasury agree with that thrust, but they also have pushed the strengthening of the yen which hopefully would have had the same results as the market opening efforts. That yen strengthening policy is the one that is always discussed and I think it has been very effective in restraining the trade imbalance. I have already commented about the lack of understanding in Washington about Japanese culture and its decision-making process. By 1992, I think Washington had come a long way in understanding those factors. That did not ease the burden on the Embassy of not appearing to be Japan's spokesperson. It is always the burden of an Embassy of trying to explain the cultural differences between its host country and the US without appearing to be a defender of its hosts. I think when I was in Tokyo we managed to maintain a balance in our reporting, which has not always been the case. But even today, even with an increased understanding of the Japanese culture and process there is a lively debate in Washington on how you deal with it. That debate has not changed in the last ten years, although the environment in Japan has changed markedly. We still have the Team A and B concept: at one time we negotiate, at other we beat on the Japanese. Arguably, ten years ago, Team B might have had the right approach, but now, with Asia growing in confidence, it won't work in Japan and in fact creates a back-lash from other Asian countries. Those other countries will agree with our goal of market opening, but do not agree that strong arm tactics—such as numerical targets and the “301” approach—are appropriate. In 1992, EAP was involved in trade issues; I have the sense that today USTR has taken over entirely. Of course, once again, the fact that I had a friend in USTR, Jules Katz, helped; we had worked together many years. Jules and I didn't agree on many

issues but we respected each other's views. It is a fact, I think, that the Japanese “experts” have an entirely different view on how to deal with the Japanese than other Washington bureaucracies. The Japanese “experts” have to be careful lest they are perceived in the same way as our Embassy in Tokyo was seen from time to time. It is very much a matter of presentation; if you emphasize tactical routes to achieve commonly agreed objectives, then you will have a much better hearing than if you say that the Japanese just won't do some things. Unfortunately, most “experts” tend to take the second line and that is not the road to success.

By the time I became Assistant Secretary, the famous Bush trip to Tokyo was history. That was one of the best prepared trips that had ever been developed for a President; it was then cancelled and then reinstated and became one of the worst trips. The President's illness didn't help, but it was not a well planned trip to start with, even though we did reach some agreements with the Japanese during his stay in Tokyo. In any case, during my tour as Assistant Secretary, the Japanese trade issue was not a major preoccupation of the administration.

As I mentioned, cooler heads prevailed at the White House and Japan did not become an issue that Bush discussed at any great length. I think the Clinton team had a much harder time when they came into office because they had discussed the issue during the campaign—although the Democrats didn't make it a major issue either—and had hinted at a much tougher policy. That made cooperation with the Japanese somewhat more difficult. China was the big campaign issue with Bush being accused of coddling the Chinese dictators. That also caused Clinton more trouble when he became President—as evidenced by the whole human rights fiasco. I should note that the transition team did want to be briefed on what we had been doing on human rights; I think we had a fairly good record on that score. But it was not a subject of much exchange. On China, Lord knew it well and we didn't spend much time talking about it. We did raise the Philippines with the transition team because at the time the SOFA agreements had expired and we

had no legal protection for our armed forces in the Philippines who still used the islands for exercises. So we needed to have new agreements negotiated.

I should mention finally that I wished I had been able to make a couple of changes in the process. I would have liked to stay on to bring those changes about. But the new administration had already selected its team; it did offer me the ambassadorship to the Philippines. It took them a while before they finally decided and that gave me an opportunity to look at other possibilities. Just as they were about to send the paperwork forward, I decided to look for greener pastures. My case is an illustration of the mess we have made of the nominating process; it is now so complex and the confirmation is becoming increasingly longer that it is a wonder that any new appointments are made. I think increasingly people will not be willing to wait that long.

End of interview